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ABSTRACT
"WRITING WITH THE GHOST": THE POTENTIAL HISTORIES OF
SAIDIYA HARTMAN AND SUSAN HOWE
KATHRYN ANN BRADSHAW
CULTURAL STUDIES M.A. THESIS, JUNE 2020
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Dr. SİBEL IRZIK
Keywords: Saidiya Hartman, Susan Howe, Potential History, Fabulation, Emily
Dickinson
This thesis discusses and compares two different but resonant works of creative
scholarship: Saidiya Hartman’s Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments: Intimate
Histories of Social Upheaval (2019) and Susan Howe’s My Emily Dickinson (1985).
Counter to a history conscribed by captivity and criminality, Saidiya Hartman “ex-
ceeds the archive” in order to speculatively narrate the “intimate histories” of African
American women at the turn of the twentieth century. Susan Howe writes through
a counter-historical poetics against mis-readings of Dickinson’s literary experimen-
tation while situating the poet in a feminine nonconformist tradition. Approaching
the archive as a departure point rather than a site for answers, Hartman writes a
“serial biography” of the “wayward” women who fashioned forms of freedom within
constraint while Howe investigates patriarchal authority over literary history. After
addressing the differences between these scholars’ archives and the terms through
which their subjects “enter history,” I illustrate moments in both texts where spe-
cific resonances may be located, focusing on each writer’s close readings of history,
modes of listening for affect in the archive, and methods of counter-historical fabula-
tion. I argue that Hartman and Howe engage adjacent aesthetic modes as they read
their subjects otherwise, refusing normative terms by which resistance, representa-
tion, and intelligibility have been defined. They articulate openings for “potential
history” through a shared recognition of the limits of genre and language while
demonstrating a commitment to “unsettling what’s settled.”
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ÖZET
HAYALETLE YAZMAK”: SAIDIYA HARTMAN VE SUSAN HOWE
METİNLERİNDE POTANSİYEL TARİHÇELER
KATHRYN ANN BRADSHAW
KÜLTÜREL ÇALIŞMALAR YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, HAZİRAN 2020
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. SİBEL IRZIK
Anahtar Kelimeler: Saidiya Hartman, Susan Howe, Potansiyel Tarihçeler,
Hikayeleme (Fabulasyon), Emily Dickinson
Bu tez, yaratıcı yazın ve bilimsel araştırmayı birleştiren bir alanda birbirlerini
yankılayan iki farklı eseri tartışıp karşılaştırıyor: Saidiya Hartman’ın Wayward
Lives, Beautiful Experiments: Intimate Histories of Social Upheaval (Asi Hayat-
lar, Güzel Deneyler: Sosyal Ayaklanma’nın Özel Tarihi 2019) başlıklı eseriyle Su-
san Howe’ın My Emily Dickinson’ı (Benim Emily Dickinson’ım 1985). Hartman,
Afrikalı Amerikalı kadınların yirminci yüzyılın başında geçen “özel tarihlerini” kur-
gulayarak, esaret ve yasadışı suçlarla kayda geçirilmiş bir tarihe karşı “arşiv-ötesi”
bir anlatı kuruyor. Howe ise, Dickinson’ın edebi denemelerinin yanlış okumalarını
hedef alan şiirsel bir karşı-tarih yazarken, şairin yapıtlarını konformizmi dışlayan
bir kadın yazını geleneğine yerleştiriyor. Arşive, cevapların bulunduğu bir alan
olarak değil bir çıkış noktası olarak yaklaşan Hartman, kısıtlanmaların içinde farklı
özgürlük biçimleri şekillendiren “asi” kadınların “seri biyografisini” yazarken, Howe
edebi tarih üzerindeki ataerkil otoriteyi soruşturuyor. Öncelikle bu akademisyen-
lerin arşivlerindeki ve araştırdıkları öznelerin “tarihe giriş” noktalarındaki farklılık-
ları ele alıyorum. Daha sonra onların tarihi yakın okumalarına, arşivdeki duygu-
lanımları (afekt) dinleme biçimlerine ve hikayeleme (fabulasyon) yoluyla karşı-tarih
yazım yöntemlerine odaklanıyor, bu iki metnin birbirini yankılama anlarını örnek-
lerle açıklıyorum. Hartman ve Howe’ın, direnç, temsil ve anlaşılabilirliğin normlarını
reddederek anlatılarının öznelerini alternatif biçimlerde okurken birbirlerine yakın
estetik tarzlar kullandıklarını savunuyorum.
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Better an errant path than the known world. Better loose than stuck.
Saidiya Hartman
Wayward Puritan. Charged with enthusiasm. Enthusiasm is antinomian.
Susan Howe
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 1997 Saidiya Hartman, a scholar of African American literature and cul-
tural history, published Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in
Nineteenth-Century America in which she studied performances of power and rights
discourses, investigated forms of terror and resistance during slavery, and discussed
the “non-event” of Emancipation. Within this work, one can locate the beginnings
of Hartman’s long engagement and interest in forms of everyday or ordinary refusal,
the manner through which gender and sexual norms operate to reproduce racial
hierarchies, and spaces of refuge and redress available through poetics and perfor-
mance. Throughout her writing she argues that the strategies of black subjugation
and subjection continued after slavery through logics of capital, and particularly
through the regulation of black women’s sexualities and reproductive labors.
Hartman continued to discuss the afterlives of slavery in her next book Lose Your
Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route (2006) through narrating a per-
sonal story of journeying to Ghana’s historical slave “sites.” In this work, Hartman
engaged reflexively with the silences and losses she encountered within the archive
and began to experiment more with genre, mixing academic historiography with
personal, reflexive writing. In an interview with Patricia Saunders, Hartman ex-
plains, “I’m writing about an experience that I psychically inhabit. Most history
isn’t written from that perspective . . . I never wanted to write . . . anything some-
one could refer to as a memoir. But I had to be there to be the bridge between
the present and the past, since I was part of the remains” (Saunders 2008b)(9-10).
Shifting between travel writing, memoir, history and reportage genres, Hartman in
Lose Your Mother introduced her method of entering and writing from the archive
through affect.
In a follow-up essay “Venus in Two Acts” (Hartman 2008), Hartman revisited a
story she had previously avoiding telling about two girls murdered on a slave ship.
She used this story to experiment with “another mode of writing” that could say the
name or tell the story of “Black Venus” who fails to be found in the archive except
as a “dead girl” (1). Venus, she writes, is “an emblematic figure of the enslaved
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woman in the Atlantic world”: “Hers is the same fate as every other Black Venus:
no one remembered her name or recorded the things she said, or observed that she
refused to say anything at all. Hers is an untimely story told by a failed witness”
(1-2). Hartman considers in this essay how one might ethically undertake archival
research and write about the lives of the enslaved without reproducing the grammar
that made their subjection and disappearance “titillat[ing]” (7): “How does one re-
visit the scene of subjection without replicating the grammar of violence? . . . Do
the possibilities [of this revisiting] outweigh the dangers of looking (again)?” (7).
Hartman suggests both advancing speculative arguments and using the subjunc-
tive mood (expressing possibility) to tell “an impossible story and to amplify the
impossibility of its telling” (11).
In “Venus in Two Acts” Hartman named this narrative mode “critical fabulation”
(11). Critical fabulation is a mode that can be employed when there is no alternate
way to tell the story. It is not a practice of “giving voice” to those obscured or
erased in the archive but rather a method through which “to imagine what cannot
be verified” (12). Against the archive that failed to bear witness, this mode addresses
“an unrecoverable past” (12). According to Seth Moglen (Moglen 2016), Hartman’s
aim is to craft narratives “that explicitly link the past and present” through a double
effort to attend to “dishonored lives” while “acknowledging ‘what we cannot know’”
(157). Hartman’s strategy of “narrative restraint,” he writes (quoting Hartman),
"can be complemented by listening with the most careful possible atten-
tion and respect to ’black noise,’ to ’the mutters and oaths and cries
of the commodity’ that hint at ’utopian’ ’aspirations.’ Hartman empha-
sizes that ’counterhistories of slavery’ of this kind can contribute to a
’history of the present’ and, in particular, to ’the incomplete project of
freedom.’ ... Through writing one can attempt to imagine ’a free state’
– not through projected fantasies of ’the time before captivity or slav-
ery, but rather as the anticipated future’ of one’s own writing." (Moglen
2016)(157)
Hartman found that trying to imagine the enslaved “outside the terms of statements
and judgments that banished them from the category of human . . . was beyond what
could be thought within the parameters of history” (Hartman 2008)(9). The statuses
of historical subjects such as the enslaved, ex-slave, newly free, or the criminalized
black woman of the “ghetto” are “matters . . . still contested in the present” given
that if these subjects appear in the archive at all, they are conscribed according to a
logic that reiterates their subjugation (10). Critical fabulation as an aesthetic mode
works to read these subjects otherwise, and it necessitates an interdisciplinarity that
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pushes the limits of scholarly or intellectual discourses.
Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments: Intimate Histories of Social Upheaval
(2019), Hartman’s latest work and the first text on which this thesis focuses, has
garnered much interest for the way in which it is written through modes of “crit-
ical fabulation, speculative history, close narration, and documentary poetics,” all
which, Hartman explains, are at “the heart of [her] practice” (Hartman 2020). They
“are methods for engaging and remaking the document, for building story from
sampled utterances, photographs, fragments, and sonic traces, for attending to the
radical thought of everyday life, for assembling and composing alternative narratives
of Black existence.” In Wayward Lives Hartman continues to map the afterlives of
slavery but through imagining and describing in vivid detail the intimate, every-
day rebellions of young African American women living in the northern city at the
turn of the twentieth century. Sarah Haley writes that “reading Wayward Lives
after ‘Venus’ allows one to linger even further in the definiteness of what is beyond
archival accounting” (Haley 2020).
Since the records containing traces of the stories she seeks are conscribed by crimi-
nality and captivity, Hartman “exceeds the archive” through speculation (Hartman
2019)(360). She strives to provide “a different set of descriptions” counter to the
repetitive violent excess and crude “shorthand” marking the archive of the enslaved
and their descendants (Hartman 2008)(2-7). The archive in which Hartman found
the subjects of Wayward Lives, she explains, was in fact full of fictions produced by
the state to justify the confinement and punishment of young black women, fictions
taken for granted as historical “data.” Hartman explains how she writes “counter-
fictions” to those the state conjured, choosing to fluctuate between speculative and
historical-biographical narrative modes to loosen and blur the fiction-fact divide
(Hartman and Jafa 2019).
Unlike most historiographies or conventional biographies, Wayward Lives describes
quiet pursuits, private affairs, emotional journeys, and everyday experiments – what
might be figured as the “unknowable” historical data. Haley writes, “In Wayward
Lives ‘want,’ ‘stubborn desire,’ vision, rhythms, dreaminess, imagination, and prac-
tice are terms of order and history. These categories of narration and analysis
contest, exceed, and derange the ditto ditto of violent details accumulated in the
archive produced by sociologists, social workers, and prison authorities” (Haley
2020). Hartman’s “modes of presentation, annotation, and narration . . . exceed
traditional regimes of substantiation.” Hartman narrates the hopes, anticipations,
fears, and desires of her subjects, all of whom were real people. As in Lose Your
Mother, she “psychically inhabit[s]” the world of the women she narrates in Way-
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ward Lives (Saunders 2008b)(9), and through narrative techniques, she expresses a
“desire to mourn for victims of the past, endowing the dishonored with both ‘love’
and ‘beauty’” (Moglen 2016) (157). The book is a continuation of Hartman’s com-
mitment to the study of what lies beyond official accounts purporting to contain
the information through which we come to “know” the past and frame the present.
Beyond addressing obvious silences in the criminal record and social reformers’ ac-
counts, the project exposes how the logics of archivization dishonor and erase lives
from history. Rather than claim the authority to speak for underrepresented sub-
jects, Hartman instead works to reveal how the terms of representation promised
their exclusion and open a speculative space in which the reader can imagine those
subjects otherwise.
Speculation is described by Tavia Nyong’o (2018) as a mode of “tactical fictionalizing
of a world that is, from the point of view of black social life, already false” (Nyong’o
2018)(6). Next to this, Hartman attests that the difference between fiction and
non-fiction is about who holds the power to make truth claims. What is called
“non-fiction” can only be written, she claims, with authoritative power backing
it (Hartman and Jafa 2019). Hartman’s “critical fabulation” in Wayward Lives
works to disrupt the authoritative status of so-called “non-fictive” or “truthful”
“events" while unsettling teleological and falsely linear temporality overwriting the
potentiality of our present. Her fabulation is “an insurgent movement – in the
face of an intransigent and ever-mutating anti-blackness – toward something else,
something other, something more” (Nyong’o 2018) (6).
Poet Susan Howe, like Hartman, has garnered attention for her creative recombi-
nation of historical artifact and found text and her attempts to deconstruct not
only the boundaries between fiction and historicized “fact” but also those between
scholarly disciplines. In the last decades much critical work has been centered on
her artifactual collage poems in which she often weaves personal stories of loss. In
addition, critics have been interested in her extraction of obscure textual artifacts
which she often performs as sound-scape pieces, sometimes in collaboration with ex-
perimental musician David Grubbs. Prior to writing poems, Howe was an artist and
performer on the stage. She tried acting, following in the footsteps of her mother,
the Irish playwright Mary Manning, and from there, she became a painter. It was
from the gallery that her word-collage installations eventually came to live on the
page, first in artist-books and then in books of poetry starting with Hinge Picture
(1974). She is occasionally grouped with “Language” poets and writers, namely for
her poems’ “concrete” appearance and emphasis on language deconstruction. The
canvas and the stage figure often for Howe as metaphors for the page (Keller 1995)
(7, 13). Rachel Blau DuPlessis devotes an essay in The Pink Guitar: Writing as
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Feminist Practice (1990) to Howe’s practice, in which she writes of the poet’s “page
space: a space devoted, consecrated to marginality, a page space that is a canvas of
margins” (DuPlessis 1990)(136).
Beyond her poetry, Howe is known for her own reflexive, process-oriented essays,
which she often places between poems within the same publication. In W. Scott
Howard’s recent book on Howe’s work, Archive and Artifact: Susan Howe’s Factual
Telepathy (2019), he discusses Howe’s recontextualization and performative repeti-
tions of her poetry and essays across her publications. Much that has been written
about Howe’s experience with archival research and her creative process she has writ-
ten herself, in essays appearing throughout her poetry books and in The Birth-mark:
Unsettling the Wilderness in American Literary History (1993) and The Quarry:
Essays (2015). In Spontaneous Particulars: The Telepathy of Archives (2014), her
“collaged swan song” (Howe 2014)(9) for the physical archive in the face of its dig-
ital, virtual turn, she writes specifically on the possibilities and opportunities for
free association and serendipitous encounters in the physical archive, a practice that
is part of the poet’s “factual telepathy”1 and what Howard calls Howe’s “radical
contingency” (Howard 2019) (9).
Howe’s prose and poetry have always been centered on North American and Eu-
ropean history and literary history, with a focus on both canonized writers (like
Dickinson, Melville, and Thoreau) as well as obscure literary figures. Throughout
the 1970s and 80s Howe published small press editions of her poetry, including,
for example, The Liberties (1980), which explores the role Esther (Hester) Johnson
may have played as muse to Jonathan Swift. In Secret History of the Dividing Line
(1978) Howe meditates on the relation between the “history” and “secret history” of
events recorded in the diary of William Byrd on two land surveying expeditions re-
sulting in the boundary marking between Virginia and North Carolina in the 1700s.
Howe’s interest in the exertion of political control over land and inhabitants and
the history of borders continues in Defenestration of Prague (1983), in which she
reflects on the division between Ireland and Northern Ireland by restaging events
inaugurating the Thirty Years’ War between Protestants and Catholics. After My
Emily Dickinson, while Howe would continue to research Dickinson manuscripts,
she expanded her poetic investigations on war (The English Civil War [1642–51],
King Philip’s War or the First Indian War [1675–78], and the American Civil War
1Howe defines “poetry” as “factual telepathy” (her first use of the phrase) in an essay on filmmaker Chris
Marker called “Sorting Facts, Or, Nineteen Ways of Looking at Marker” (1996, 91). Howe doesn’t offer a
clear definition of factual telepathy, but the method stems from her study of filmic editing: “Editorial use of
split sequences, ‘disruptive-associative montage,’ emphasis on the mysterious patternment and subliminal
structures of images (icons), sensitivity to the sound shape (even in a silent film) of each pictured event,
awareness of the time-mystery of simultaneous phenomena (co-occurrence and deployment). . . ” (93-94,
republished in The Quarry, (Howe 2015)).
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[1861–65]), American frontier literature, and various Puritan figures, ranging from
fire-and-brimstone preachers, like Cotton Mather and Jonathan Edwards, to exiled
theologians, like Anne Hutchinson and Hope Atherton. She has also engaged in the
long study of obscured philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce, known as “the father
of pragmatism.” The centuries-long cultural and linguistic collision and comingling
between Christian white settlers and indigenous communities are also a continuous
thread throughout her work.
Ming-Qian Ma (1994) writes that Howe’s “use of history departs radically from that
of other poets, past and present” (Ma 1994)(717).
"What distinguishes Howe especially in this respect is the poet’s un-
remitting insistence upon the fusion of ’history and fiction.’ In contrast
to the modernist ’poetry including history,’ which still demarcates truth
from untruth, Howe’s fusion of ’history and fiction’ not only erases that
boundary but also, by extension, calls our attention to the artificiality
of such a distinction. Thus engendered, then, is the critical perspective
which insists that ’what we were given of tradition is what we must break
off, examine, fabricate’ (DuPlessis 130)." (Ma 1994)(717)
In her poetry, Howe does not write “about history” but instead “immerses” herself
in the historical lives she studies. As I will discuss in more depth in Chapter 4,
Howe’s “historical figuration,” as named by Howard (2019), resonates with Hart-
man’s methodology of “close narration.” Like Hartman, Howe positions her per-
sonal narrative encounter with historical traces as a “bridge” that contacts the past
through affect: “Once dams, narratives are bridges” (Howe 1993)(51). As Candace
Stockton-Bleakley (2003) describes it, “Often Howe uses verifiable historical events
as her paratext or framework, recreating them within the bounds of poetic license
and creating a dialogue with the original text” (Stockton-Bleakley 2003)(30). The
material of the archive, “the fragment, the piece of paper,” and above all words
themselves, for Howe, are how the past is “felt” and how we “connect with the
dead” (McLane 2012).
My Emily Dickinson (1985) (reprinted in 2007 by New Directions) was Susan Howe’s
first work of criticism and is considered a seminal text of feminist literary criti-
cism and creative scholarship. This immersion into Dickinson’s interiority initiated
Howe’s long study of American history and the lasting effects of Europe’s coloniza-
tion of North America on psyches and landscapes. In My Emily Dickinson Howe
concerns herself with the “psychic past” of New England (her birthplace and Dickin-
son’s), and Puritan and Calvinist influence on the formation of an American literary
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voice, a history which Howe connects to her own paternal lineage. In her project of
recovering the marginalized voices of “wayward” thinkers, Howe writes that “Emily
Dickinson’s writing is my strength and shelter” (Howe 1993)(2). Dickinson, she ex-
plains, has been a “necessary” guide in her writing, “not at a remove, but in me”
(Keller 1995)(20).
In form, one can see how My Emily Dickinson stands out from Howe’s other pub-
lications, such as Pierce-Arrow (1999) and Souls of Labadie Tract (2007), in that
her prose is not interrupted by discrete poems. However, as I will discuss, po-
etic gestures are woven throughout the text so much so that it becomes impossible
to distinguish between poetry and prose while reading, mirroring Dickinson’s own
writing style. My Emily Dickinson makes transparent Howe’s aim to articulate a
writer’s process. When Howe’s study was published in 1985, it differed from the
majority of Dickinson scholarship in its focus on the poet’s working method rather
than details of her life and enigmatic psychology. While Howe’s study is informed
by a dedicated interest in Dickinson’s “psyche” culled from her poetry and letters
within a larger historical and geographical context, in the text Howe passionately
distances herself from others who, according to the writer, had uncritically assumed
Dickinson’s “madness.”
My Emily Dickinson is driven by an investigation into Dickinson’s influences by
Howe’s excavation of the poet’s reading history and intellectual environment. As
Howe wrote in a letter to George Butterick, “I needed to find out that she didn’t
just write all that stuff of the top of her head. That she used other writers and
how she used them” (Collis 2006)(90) cited in (Heim 2015)(121). At the same
time, Howe reads Dickinson’s writing through researching the poet’s New England,
her Calvinist ancestry, the influence of the Civil War, and her refusal to join the
Congregational Church during the Great Revival which “left her startingly alone”
(Howe 1985a)(54). A method she would echo in subsequent works, Howe riffs off
Dickinson’s writing style and borrows her textual strategies. To invoke the writer,
she consults dictionaries used in the Dickinson family house (Noah Webster’s 1844
American Dictionary of the English Language) and immerses herself in studying
the poet’s linguistic climate, in which “change was happening wildly all the time”
(Gallagher 2005)(48). Howe visits Dickinson’s literary influences as she imagines
Dickinson would have. This strategy of textual “mediumship” marks an early point
in Howe’s practice of writing “as” historical figures (Heim 2015)(112-15).
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1.1 A “Counter-Tradition” of Writing Counter-Histories
In this thesis I propose that Saidiya Hartman’s Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experi-
ments and Susan Howe’s My Emily Dickinson are counter-historical “fabulations”
that value the “counter-fact” or “marginalia,” by which I refer to the affective trace
that complicates “official” historical narratives. Counter-histories, writes Stephanie
Smallwood (2016), “are never not engaged with the archive, however fraught that
engagement might be” (Smallwood 2016)(120). As Hartman’s and Howe’s narratives
expose “the methodological limits of the discipline of history,” both writers engage
in a practice of refusal to take the archive as “merely a repository of free-floating
empirical facts to be lifted off the page by the researcher” (123), or to take History
(epistemologically and grammatically) for granted.
Before discussing their specific archives, including their important differences, I wish
to situate Hartman and Howe within a tradition of scholars challenging the notion of
the archive as a repository for the facts. Various critical concepts and theories of the
archive commonly describe it as a site of power and a process rather than a thing.
Michel Foucault (1972) wrote that the archive not only dictates “what can be said,”
but is also the process under which the “statement-event” is organized and functions
(Foucault 1972)(145-46). Michel Rolph Trouillot (1995) has argued that the archive,
as one of the first sites in which historical silencing happens through a process of
assembly and selection, becomes a regime of knowledge (Trouillot 1995)(26). Jacques
Derrida (1996) also highlights the impact of the process of archivization, which
“produces as much as it records the event” (Derrida 1996)(17). The archive is also
“a status,” according to Achille Mbembe (2002), in that its contents are the result
of a process of discrimination by actors exercising their power to privilege certain
documents or objects judged “archivable.” The authority of the archivist is, in this
sense, conferred upon the items archived (Mbembe 2002)(20).
Several scholars, especially historians interested in the individual experiences of
the enslaved, subaltern, dispossessed, or otherwise marginalized, advocate a critical
move “beyond archival empiricism” toward “a kind of thinking that is askew from
the empirically verifiable” (Kazanjian 2016)(134-35). These researchers call for “‘the
exercise of the imagination’ en route to ‘an uncoercive rearrangement of desire’”
on more “unverifiable path[s],” and for maintaining a critical stance against the
overdetermination of the “Archive” as a site for “answers” (134, citing Spivak 2008).
Mbembe portrays the archive as “a type of sepulchre” (Mbembe 2002)(22), echoing
Hartman’s description of slavery’s archive as “a death sentence, a tomb” (Hartman
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2008)(2). Jennifer Morgan (2016) writes,
"The archive is a site of violent dispossession, a point of departure, not a
conclusion; so to navigate that archive is to foreground the speculative,
to juxtapose the record with the imaginary, to leave the questions unan-
swered. The conceit of the archive is that it is the repository of answers,
of knowable conclusions, of the data needed to explain or understand the
past. The reality, however, is that the archive is the troubled genesis of
our always-failed effort to unravel the effects of the past on the present;
rather than verifiable truths, the archive – and its silence – houses the
very questions that unsettle us." (Morgan 2016)(187)
These theorists and others have pointed to the problematics of considering the
archive as a potential site of discovery, even (or especially) for the information that
may be “loosely classified” or deemed excessive (Featherstone 2006)(594). Mike
Featherstone (2006) draws upon Foucault’s practice of reading the French national
library “on the diagonal,” or across disciplines, centuries, and civilizations, in order
to “radically re-think and reclassify received wisdom,” and likens this type of re-
searcher to the flaneur who walks through the archive with an ear and eye toward
serendipitous encounters (594). Featherstone’s description of research that “can de-
pend upon chance and be likened to divination” (594), which could possibly resonate
with Howe’s “factual telepathy,” can be criticized for how it downplays the extent
to which the archive’s logic or order determines what is present and discoverable.
Further in this thesis, I attempt to address the kind of “hope” that seems to accom-
pany this search for “serendipitous encounters.” A critique of the “flaneur” approach
may argue for the recognition of fundamental differences between archives. In other
words, can a researcher “divine” what is obscured in the archive of slavery if this
archive is structured by the erasure of all that one is looking for? What seems to be
overlooked or under-considered is the possibility (or impossibility) of constructing
undiscoverable histories through methods of reading that transcend typical utter-
ances and ways of knowing. Hartman, for example, poses the question, “How does
one write a story about an encounter with nothing?” (Hartman 2006)(16-17). How
does one confront the “slipperiness and elusiveness” of the archive, while going be-
yond the limits of what’s archivable, discoverable, and, therefore, sayable?
Omnia El Shakry (2015) in her article on the “vexed archives” of decolonization in
the Middle East, explores “two senses” of the phrase “history without documents,”
borrowed from Egyptian historian Ibrahim ‘Abduh (1975):
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"One references what Achille Mbembe calls the chronophagy of the state,
the way it devours the past through either the material destruction of
archives or the presentation of a history purified of antagonisms and
embodied in empty commemorative accounts. The second sense refers
to the history that we might seek to reconstruct because of, and despite,
the absence of access to such documents. The archive thus functions as
an ’instituting imaginary’ that seeks to reassemble and inter the traces
of the deceased – always incomplete, always unknowable, and always, at
least partially, the projection of our own desires." (El Shakry 2015)(920)
Anne J. Gilliland and Michelle Caswell (2016) similarly consider “imagined-but-
unavailable records” as possibly “fertile sources of personal and public affect” whose
projections can inspire a multitude of artistic or scholarly productions (Gilliland and
Caswell 2016)(55). These might include what Erica L. Johnson (2014) has termed
the “neo-archive,” or “fiction that creates history in the face of its absence” (Johnson
2014)(157).
Coming up I will discuss the differences or possible incommensurabilities I locate
between Hartman’s and Howe’s archives and these archives’ silences. I am, however,
less interested in marking stark and irreconcilable contrasts between “archives” than
I am in discussing the resonance between both researchers’ sensibilities in approach-
ing the archive and its exclusions and their resonant imaginaries or commitments to
constructing something “because of, and despite” absences. I argue that Hartman’s
and Howe’s “dispositions” (Rancière 2009) as researchers and their commitment to
affectively and aesthetically unsettling what is settled, allow them to be similarly
positioned in community with those scholars and artists building counter-histories
out of an investment in not only falsifying the objectivity of historiography, but also
revealing the complex constructedness or “falseness” of our stories, subjectivities,
and realities generally.
In doing so, they are, as Moglen (2016) writes, “drawing on the representational
strategies of modern fiction and poetry in order to create new nonfiction idioms
that deploy the scholar’s expertise to enhance available versions of the practical
past” (Moglen 2016)(158). Referenced here is Hayden White’s notion of the “prac-
tical past” (borrowed from Michael Oakeshott), which is counter to the disciplinary
tradition of divorcing the past from the present in order to transform “history” into
an object of study for professionals (White 2014)(10). The “practical past” is defined
by White as “the past that people as individuals or members of groups draw upon in
order to help them make assessments and make decisions in ordinary everyday life
as well as in extreme situations” (xiii). Narratives of the “practical past” reduce the
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“scholarly” distance thought to be required to study the past while dispensing with
the myth of the “objective” scholar or historian (xii). White writes, “our interest
in the practical past must take us beyond ‘the facts’ as conventionally understood
in historiographical thinking. Indeed, it must take us beyond the idea that a fact,
whatever else it may be, is identifiable by its logical opposition to ‘fiction,’ where
fiction is understood to be an imaginary thing or product of the imagination” (23).
I argue that methods like critical fabulation, close narration, and historical figura-
tion seem similarly useful in that they make room for the study of affective and
“intimate histories” and open the way for ethically researching minor figures and
what Nyong’o (2018) calls the “shadow archive” (Nyong’o 2018)(12) – that which
has been occluded by history and which vexes temporal linearity.
In addition, I propose that Hartman’s and Howe’s works can be connected within
a tradition of feminist historiography and counter-narrative writing. My Emily
Dickinson situates Dickinson in a lineage of feminine antinomians and rebels, mak-
ing it comparable to Hartman’s “serial biography” of wayward women (Hartman
2019)(31). Wayward Lives is, like Howe’s study, a narrative of the non-conformist
voice in American history. In Hartman’s counter-history of the “ghetto,” she re-
writes young black women as catalysts of a radical, revolutionary, cultural-political
rebellion prior to the Harlem Renaissance. In situating Dickinson alongside other
historical nonconformists, Howe’s study resonates with Hartman’s utopian history
of the “chorus.” Howe counters normative narratives that have portrayed Dickinson
as a fearful, non-political “spinster,” out of touch and ineffectual, while Hartman
writes against pervasive narratives that have cast black women as powerless victims
and non-intellectuals. Both authors also locate their subjects in a larger feminist
movement of the present.
Ma (1994) contends that Howe “subpoena[s] history for an investigation of its violent
crime against women” (Ma 1994)(718).
“’Sometimes I think my poetry is only a search by an investigator for the
point where the crime began,’ says the poet (’Difficulties’ 21). That be-
ing so, poetry becomes for Howe counterdiscourse to history, a ’rereading
[of] the reading that a social status quo puts [her] through’ (Andrews 27).
When enacted in poetry ’with the foregrounding of language’ (Hartley
xii), Howe’s rereading demonstrates itself through a complex and pecu-
liar textual feminism. . . " (Ma 1994)(718)
Though by no means do I intend to conflate the nature of the “excess” each researcher
faced in her research, it is interesting to note how Howe describes confronting an ex-
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cess of documentation in the “shadow archive” of feminine/feminist nonconformism
that influenced Dickinson, an excess that attempted to mold this nonconformism
into something palatable and intelligible to the “gentlemen of the old school” – edi-
torial authorities and keepers of patriarchal literary history. In the following section,
I will tell of how she contends with the “authority” of these documents, sometimes
personally.
Antoinette Burton (2013) writes that “it remains the task of historians of women
to challenge the residue of objectivist approaches to history-writing and, in the pro-
cess, to continue to query the gendered presumptions of what counts as evidence,
archive, impact, and History as well” (Burton 2013)(187). Of course, as I will dis-
cuss, Howe’s My Emily Dickinson differs from Wayward Lives in that it focuses on
a canonical writer as opposed to predominantly anonymous minor figures. The task
Howe embarks on, however, resembles Hartman’s because both writers “engage in
[the] challenge rhetorically” by writing against the discourse of historical narratives
attempting to limit the political or philosophical range or depth of subjects gen-
dered female by defining them as incapable of true originality and creative thinking
(Burton 2013)(187).
Howe writes, “History has happened. The narrator is disobedient. A return is
necessary, a way for women to go. Because we are in the stutter. We were ex-
pelled from the Garden of the Mythology of the American Frontier. The drama’s
done. We are the wilderness. We have come on to the stage stuttering” (Howe
1993)(181). Both writers, I will argue, “return” “stuttering” to re-tell history within
what Stockton-Bleakley (2003) names a “feminist imaginary” (Stockton-Bleakley
2003). Their counter-histories are not reversals nor simple acts of corrective “re-
venge”; the ways in which they “counter” history literarily reveal how the terms
through which history has been written fail to make sense anymore. Their “stutter”
loosens the narrative, revealing the textuality, constructedness, and performance of
the stories on which we base reality and identity. Their reparative redress reveals a
textual “self-consciousness,” an undoing of our “common sense” and sensibilities.
1.2 Dissonance
While this thesis is primarily interested in considering how Hartman’s and Howe’s
projects resonate and where their research and writing methodologies overlap, in
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closely reading these two texts, I have also realized where they importantly diverge.
The archives, first of all, from which Hartman and Howe craft their narratives are
both “distorted” but differently so, and despite using similar approaches within the
archive, these writers ultimately and necessarily produce different texts with dif-
ferent stakes. While I propose that their historical subjects are similarly written
as nonconformists working to produce an “outside” within enclosures, these sub-
jects’ “beautiful experiments” necessarily differed since very different structures of
enclosure were experienced.
The enclosure extends beyond the confines of the bedroom, the homestead, the
ghetto, and the ward; it refers to the archive and its logics, which have long been in
service to the structural logics deeming black life as worth less than white. Hartman
writes (borrowing from Hortense Spillers), “Great dangers awaited those who lived
in the lexical gap between black female and woman. This category crisis defined the
afterlife of slavery” (Hartman 2019)(184). Though Howe is nothing if not deeply
concerned with how language haunts in the gap, the stakes of Howe’s project differ
from those of Hartman’s given the specific historical and theoretical moments in
which they write and are read. My hope is that by considering these two works as
somehow commensurate, I might assess more critically the logics determining the
capacity by which narratives distort or occlude our stories and experiences. Though
I will argue for resonance between Hartman’s and Howe’s refusals and imaginaries,
I ask in the following, where do their projects diverge?
1.2.1 Different Archives, Incommensurate “Silences”
Studies of colonial archives, such as that of Ann Stoler (2002), have crucially ex-
panded the discussion around the limits of the archive for knowledge retrieval by
reframing colonial archives as “cultural artifacts of fact production [and] taxonomies
in the making” (Stoler 2002)(91), or as “‘fonts’ of colonial truths in themselves”
(Guha and Dening, quoted in Stoler 2002, 91). Rosanne Kennedy (2011) labels
“perverse” the archives keeping record of private trauma, particularly of indigenous
or refugee groups, and which document, for example, sexual abuses and forms of in-
stitutionalization or compulsory assimilation. In her consideration of how “perverse
archives” can be used to create a “cultural memory of dehumanization and survival,”
Kennedy reads counterintuitively for other possible, obscured narratives (Kennedy
2011)(90). Through an expanded attention to “Dickinson’s archive” (in which the
silenced stories of banished antinomians and feminine nonconformists are included),
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Howe reveals histories of trauma, exclusion, and marginalization as her study sheds
light on the gendered violence wrought upon a poet’s work and legacy. Howe’s larger
project too, as discussed, involves attending to the archive of the U.S.’s psychic past
and aftermath of North American colonization. Admittedly, however, it would be
a stretch to call the Dickinson archive “perverse” in the same way as that which
Hartman consults of the lives of the enslaved, criminalized, or dispossessed.
Despite a resonance between evidence of distortion in their archives, one must ask if
Hartman’s and Howe’s archives can really be compared. Wayward Lives is, first of
all, a reading of mostly state archives whereas My Emily Dickinson is born mainly
from Dickinson’s own literary production. What must be acknowledged beyond the
obvious differences between these scholars’ archives is the “sub-status” of Hartman’s
subjects who represent historical “unknowability.” In the archives of the Atlantic
slave trade, Hartman has written of the dual violence of absence and excess. In
researching for Scenes of Subjection, Hartman had a “plentiful archive, of the Freed-
men’s Bureau papers, the WPA [Works Progress Administration] narratives, and
hundreds of slave narratives produced in the U.S.,” an archive she attempted to
read “symptomatically and against the grain” (Saunders 2008b)(8). “But in order
to do a symptomatic reading,” says Hartman, “it presumes a kind of canon, and
there was no canon or vast archive available regarding the experience of the captives
in the Atlantic slave trade” (8). In researching for Lose Your Mother, she again
faced excessive evidence of human commodification in “trade” documents but again
no traces of the experiences of the enslaved. She tells Saunders, “the archive of
the trade in some ways proved to be a distraction – I mean, it wasn’t a trade for
us. It was war and death, and kidnapping, but there was, again, the volumes of
trade documents” (8). And, as discussed earlier, the archive of slavery Hartman
confronted in her search for “Black Venus” was inundated by “scandal and excess”
(Hartman 2008)(5).
Wayward Lives is written in response to the sociological surveys, prison files, and
journalists’ accounts that “failed to discern the beauty” in black survival, improvi-
sation, and experiments in living otherwise (Hartman 2019)(5).
"I am not an archival sleuth, so my counter-narratives have not been
composed as a consequence of discovering new documents, but rather by
engaging with extant archival materials critically and creatively. My aim
has been to compose and reconstruct, to improvise and augment. In this
task, I have embraced the document, which isn’t to suggest any fidelity
to the truth or authority of the document, but simply that I have tried
to figure out what I might do with official documents, given the limits,
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the lies, the omissions, the fabrications." (Hartman 2020)
InWayward Lives Hartman writes, “The surveys and the sociological pictures left me
cold. These photographs never grasped the beautiful struggle to survive, glimpsed
the alternative modes of life, or illuminated the mutual aid and communal wealth
of the slum. The reform pictures and the sociological surveys documented only
ugliness” (Hartman 2019)(19). She writes in response, for example, to W.E.B. Du
Bois’s The Philadelphia Negro (1899), which was a sociological study commissioned
by the University of Pennsylvania intent on identifying social ills of Philadelphia’s
African American communities. In all of Hartman’s sources, which beyond sociolog-
ical surveys included rent collectors’ journals, prison case files, trial transcripts, and
the reports of parole officers, social workers, and psychologists, her subjects were
represented as “problem[s]” (xiii). Wayward Lives (which is in many ways modeled
after the poly-genre form of The Souls of Black Folk) critically addresses the terms
through which Du Bois poses his famous question: “How does it feel to be a prob-
lem?” (Du Bois 1903). Perusing the files of the New York State Reformatory for
Women at Bedford Hills, where many of her subjects would be held on trumped-up
charges of errancy, vagrancy, and prostitution, Hartman learned that almost all of
the black girls and women there were labeled “feeble-minded” by authorities: “It
did not matter if they were intelligent, avid readers, songwriters. Ryan Lane, an
opium-addicted poet, wrote a one-act play in verse, In the Woods, and composed
thoughtful, melancholy letters. None of this mattered, only the results of the battery
of intelligence tests to which she had been subjected” (Hartman 2019)(265).
To counter this archival violence, Hartman labors to liberate a new narrative free
from that which described her subjects as “promiscuous, reckless, wild, and way-
ward” and in need of “uplift” and “reform” (Hartman 2019)(xiv). She expands her
method of reading “against the grain” to include a form of affective “listening” that
enables her to craft stories more accountable to those whose experiences the archive
distorts or leaves out. As I will discuss and illustrate further in Chapter 2, Hartman
subverts the paucity and excess of the archive, exploiting its limitations as well as
the historiographical idiom in order write a “fugitive text” that might describe the
“nowhere” of the ghetto or the ward, and how its errant inhabitants experienced it
as a kind of utopia at the turn of the twentieth century. This “urban commons” is
described through the perspective of its “wayward” dwellers (xiv): “Outsiders call
the streets and alleys that comprise her world the slum. For her, it is just the place
where she stays” (3). While Hartman quotes her subjects as much as possible in
order to let them narrate the story, she avoids subjecting them to the same type
of coerced visibility through which the so-called “progressive” reformers had forced
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Harlem’s inhabitants to be representatives of “the black urban poor” (21). She ex-
poses the trap of racial uplift discourses and ideology that instructed young black
women to raise themselves “up” according to the very terms through which they
had been “kept down.” And to trouble the logic of “uplift,” she envisions how these
women lived and what they thought as they creatively and beautifully survived
precarity.
In Chapter 4 I will discuss more at length the breadth of Howe’s archive, by which
I include several of the major paratexts framing My Emily Dickinson’s counter-
historical gesture. In large part, however, Howe’s archive is mostly comprised of
Dickinson’s own poetry and letters, both the original manuscripts and fascicles and
editors’ printed versions. In comparison to Hartman, Howe arguably focuses less on
the violence wrought by the archive as a structure and process because she spends
more time critiquing the process of “archivization” via publication of a noncon-
formist literature. Because Howe’s books typically focus on writers, her attention
therefore shifts from the intellectual or philosophical systems guarding archives and
obscuring anomalous contents and toward another but related authority: the editor.
The “historian” or “archivist” in this case specifically for Howe is the (male) editor
of Dickinson’s writing. Those “gentlemen of the old school” figure prominently in
Howe’s study as they represent for the most part the guardians of Dickinson’s archive
(Howe 2015)(170). In Howe’s prose she points out the ways in which the editor, pub-
lisher, and the critic’s process and philosophy have been in line with the simplifying
and silencing of nonconformist voices for centuries. Against this American Tradition,
she unearths the roots of a counter-tradition out of which potential readings may
recognize Dickinson’s poetics as “processes rather than products” (Howe 1993)(19).
Dickinson scholarship, including Howe’s, was revolutionized by Ralph V. Franklin’s
two-volume Manuscript Books of Emily Dickinson published in 1981 because it in-
cluded facsimiles of her manuscript books and unsewn fascicle sheets. According to
the Harvard University Press catalog, “Every detail is preserved: the bosses on the
stationery, the sewing holes and tears, and poet’s alternate reading and penciled re-
visions, ink spots and other stains offset onto adjacent leaves,” and “the experience
of reading these facsimile pages is virtually the same as reading the manuscripts
themselves.” This publication gave birth to “the manuscript school” of scholars who
argued for the primacy of Dickinson’s handwritten and self-copied poems, with their
typographical originality and oddity, over previously printed versions. Examination
of the manuscripts made possible a deeper exploration of Dickinson’s myriad mean-
ing and variations in “meaning-making” (Gallagher 2005)(11-12). Advocates for
the study of Dickinson’s fascicles or packets proposed a “theory of the fragment,”
arguing that the Dickinson’s fragments – often found on the backs of envelopes or
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scraps of paper – should be left to stand on their own as versions of poems or prose
pieces. The publication of the unsewn fascicle pages and fragments, poems, and
letters opened the Dickinson archive and destabilized the identity of poems, series,
and all previous interpretations of her work.
In My Emily Dickinson and a subsequent essay “These Flames and Generosities
of the Heart: Emily Dickinson and the Illogic of Sumptuary Values” (1993), Howe
discusses the misediting of the poet’s writing made evident via careful readings of
her manuscripts and fascicles. The works Howe specifically critiques include The
Poems of Emily Dickinson; Including variant readings critically compared with all
known manuscripts (1951) and The Letters of Emily Dickinson (1958), both edited
by Thomas H. Johnson and published by the Belknap Press of Harvard University,
and The Manuscript Books of Emily Dickinson (1981) and The Master Letters of
Emily Dickinson (1986) edited by Ralph W. Franklin and published by Belknap
Press and Amherst College Press, respectively. Howe writes, “For a long time I
believed that [Johnson] had given us the poems as they looked” (Howe 1993)(131).
However, Franklin’s publications would reveal Johnson’s extensive editorial amend-
ments. Examining the manuscripts, Howe learned “that Emily Dickinson . . . may
have been demonstrating her conscious and unconscious separating from a main-
stream literary orthodoxy in letters” (1).
The poet’s handwritten marks, crosses, dashes, and marginal notes demand Howe’s
devoted attention. To her they contain undervoices of what has disrupted an editor’s
order, defied interpretation, and have been summarily silenced and obscured in pub-
lications of the Dickinson’s work. “Print beats imagination back” (Howe 1993)(66).
In “These Flames and Generosities,” she points to the various meanings of “to edit,”
one of which is “to prepare a book or paper for the public eye, by writing, correcting,
or selecting the matter” (7). She adds:
"Editing is the art of discipline; the mastery of detail. Eccentric punc-
tuation, blots, dashes, smudged letters, gaps, interruptions, aborted
sketches, ’textually irrelevant’ numbers, uncanceled or canceled alterna-
tives in the manuscript are a profitless counteraction. Editing is sensible
partitioning. . . . In spite of the zealous searching of editors, authors, and
publishers for the print-perfect proof of intellectual labor, the heart may
be sheltering in some random mark of communication. Cancelations,
variants, insertions, erasures, marginal notes, stray marks and blanks . . .
Maybe they are memories in disguise . . . another kind of writing, as
are Dickinson’s word variants, directional dashes and crosses. Editors
too often remove these original marks of ’imperfection’ or muffle them
in appendixes and prefaces." (Howe 1993)(8-9, emphases mine)
17
Editing figures for Howe in My Emily Dickinson (and elsewhere) as the removal of
the “feminine mark,” interpreted as excess or deformity by “masculine observers”
(Hawthorne 1843)(2). While the “feminine” here includes both men’s and women’s
nonconformist experimentation and affect, Howe attends to the banishment of
women’s voices specifically, an attention, Howard writes, that is central to her “po-
etics and praxis” (Howard 2019)(12). Despite knowing the archive preserves “the
record of winners [and] documents were written by the Masters,” she considers the
possibility of locating affect “pre-removal” if she attends closely to “the marginalia”
(Howe 2015)(179).
In addition, Howe closely studies Johnson’s and Franklin’s framing devices – their
introductions, prefaces, appendixes, footnotes, and other notes – that reveal to her
the ways in which these editors work to impose an order onto Dickinson’s poems and
letters. Next to these, she examines the same handwritten manuscripts these editors
handled and follows textual traces that lead her to readings often countering their
conclusions. Howe writes in response to Johnson’s “formal assumptions” (seemingly
shared by Franklin judging from his introduction to the Letters) (Howe 1993)(1).
She cites that in Johnson’s introduction, titled “Creating the Poems,” he wrote
that Dickinson’s “latent talents were invigorated by a gentle, brave young man . . .
who taught her how to observe the world . . . she was trying to fashion verses in a
desultory manner. . . . Whereas Newton as muse had awakened her to a sense of
her talents, Wadsworth as muse made her a poet. . . . [S]he continued to write verses
throughout her life. . . ” (Howe 1993)(133). Howe explains that Johnson assumes here
that Dickinson, who could only write half-planned “verses,” was inspired to write
by a “male muse-minister” (134). Dickinson was also a poet who apparently only
wrote verses, which Howe explains were “distinguished from poetry esp. by [their]
lower level of intensity and [. . . ] lack of essential conviction and commitment”
(133). Johnson then arranges these “verses,” she writes, “into hymn-like stanzas
with little variation in form and no variation of cadence. By choosing a sovereign
system for her line endings – his preappointed Plan – he established the constraints
of a strained positivity. Copious footnotes, numbers, comparisons, and chronologies
mask his authorial role” (134-35). Howe further cites Johnson’s editorial notes:
“No important changes in form” (131); “Standard typesetting conventions have also
been followed . . . No attempt has been made to indicate the amount of space
between words . . . Stray marks have been ignored” (132).2 “For readability” (Howe
1993)(69).
2In the introduction to the published Letters (1958), Johnson also commented on Dickinson’s lack of (direct)
reference to historical events. He claims, “[T]he fact is that she did not live in history and held no view of
it past or current” (132).
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According to Howe, Franklin continues in the Johnsonian tradition of ignoring in-
convenient marks. She quotes his editorial notes: “A drop of ink mars the top of
the third page [first letter], but it may have come after she had written an awk-
ward predication [my italics] further down the same page” (132, emphasis Howe’s).
More than this, Franklin ignores Dickinson’s line breaks altogether. In 1985 (four
years after his publication of the poems and one year prior to his publication of the
letters), Howe stages an intervention:
"I wrote a letter to Ralph Franklin, the busy director of the Beinecke
Rare Book and Manuscript Library at Yale University, to suggest . . .
[Dickinson] began to break her lines with a consistency that the Johnson
edition seemed to have ignored . . . I received a curt letter in response. He
told me the notebooks were not artistic structures and were not intended
for other readers. . . . My suggestion about line breaks depended on an
’assumption’ that one reads in lines . . . " (Howe 1993)(134)
Apparently, according to Franklin, Howe was the one making assumptions. The
next year, Franklin sent Howe a copy of the Letters, which “showed facsimiles, and
had them set in type on each facing page, with the line breaks as she made them”
(145).
"I wrote him a letter again suggesting that if he broke the lines here
according to the original text, he might consider doing the same for the
poems. He thanked me for my ’immodest’ compliments and said he had
broken the letters line-for-physical-line only to make reference to the
facsimiles easier; if he were editing a book of the letters, he would use
run-on treatment, as there is no expected genre form for prose. He told
me there is such a form for poetry, and he intended to follow it, rather
than accidents of physical line breaks on paper. . . " (Howe 1993)(145)
Franklin’s letter to Howe reveals more than his loyalty to generic rules. His conde-
scension toward her (whom he refuses to see as a fellow Dickinson scholar) echoes
his apparent attitude toward Emily Dickinson: he fails to consider her possible
intentionality in writing how she wrote and prefers to see her formal decisions as
“accidents.”
In defiance of the editor, Howe attempts to consider Dickinson “poet to poet.” The
space between lines Howe calls “the poem’s space” (139):
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"After 1861, Dickinson’s practice of variation and fragmentation also
included line breaks. Unlike Franklin, I believe there is a reason for
them . . . As a poet, I cannot assert that Dickinson composed in stanzas
and was careless about line breaks. In the precinct of Poetry, a word, the
space around a word, each letter, every mark, silence, or sound volatizes
an inner law of form . . . I wonder at Ralph Franklin’s conclusion that
these facsimiles are not to be considered as artistic structures . . . It
takes the poet to see how urgent this subject of line breaks is. But then
how often do critics consider poetry as a physical act? Do critics look at
the print on the page, at the shape of words, at the surface – the space
of the paper itself? Very rarely." (Howe 1993)(139, 145, 157)
Howe’s feminist intervention in the publication history and literary criticism of Dick-
inson’s writing aimed to address an archive that at the time Howe wrote My Emily
Dickinson in 1985 had rendered Dickinson’s poetic innovation negligible or non-
existent. Howe’s intervention was feminist because it responded to Dickinson critics
and editors that had reduced the poet to her gender and to the facts of her life (that,
according to Howe, were limited and dubious at best). As I will discuss in Chapter
4, Howe also countered several feminist critics’ assumptions as to the soundness of
Dickinson’s mind, which were affecting readings and limiting interpretations of her
work. Most critically for Howe, this criticism had closed off other readings of the
poetry and promised to inhibit the intellectual influence of Dickinson’s experimen-
tation in writing and thinking otherwise. Thus, secondly, Howe aimed to situate
Dickinson within a collective of nonconformists who had been historically banished,
erased, and forgotten, and in doing so, she points out historical exclusions in the
archive. She writes: “The real Anne Hutchinson was banished by the founders of
the Massachusetts Bay Colony, then murdered in the natural wilderness by history.
Emily Dickinson’s textual production is still being tamed for aesthetic consumption.
If antinomian vision in North America is gendered feminine, then what will save it
from print misfortune?” (Howe 1985a)(4).
1.2.2 Disparate Stakes and “Subjecthoods”
In the following I aim to address something of the difference between the pressures,
conditions, strategies, and stakes of survival confronting Hartman’s and Howe’s sub-
jects. Before discussing both writers’ works together in more depth, it feels necessary
to address the different kinds of enclosure present in the comparison. How can Emily
Dickinson, for example, who rarely left her family’s homestead, be considered a part
20
of a social history adjacent to that of Hartman’s subjects? How should one ad-
dress the difference between the confinement of the “black ghetto” and Dickinson’s
privilege to confine herself at home and abstain from societal participation without
reducing these subjects to their circumstances? How can homesteading (albeit anx-
ious or agoraphobic) be compared to prison? But then, my question isn’t, how were
their isolations similar? They did not have to be and would not be commensurate
experiences.
Nonetheless, I need to address the ways in which the relative privacy and freedom
afforded to Dickinson and not to Hartman’s subjects, whose private lives were pub-
licly condemned and actively regulated, has had something to do with how their lives
have or have not been recorded and historicized. To me, it is important to address
the differences between Hartman’s subjects first of all as laborers and members of an
unsettled, displaced community (Hartman 2019)(23). The slum, Hartman writes,
is a place where “no one ever settles [. . . ] only stays, waits for better” (4); Dickin-
son, on the other hand, was materially and comfortably settled, rooted physically in
place, and did not labor outside of her own home. Though her homesteading might
not have felt mentally luxurious, in comparison, of course, it was, and it afforded the
poet time and resources to write and thus the opportunity to create an imaginative
“outside.” More than this, and more to my present point, Dickinson’s creation has
been deemed valuable in large part because her life was.
Indeed, why is a counter-history or fabulation of Emily Dickinson “necessary”? As
Howe makes plain, Dickinson’s writing greatly inspires her own work, and Howe
believes that Dickinson has been an underacknowledged innovator. When My Emily
Dickinson was written, as I discussed, the extent of that innovation had been over-
looked as part of a larger trend to discount the impact of poets gendered female
and the influence of poetic experimentation on an American literary imagination.
Howe’s project at the time was partly critical and corrective; at the same time,
it contributed to a longer engagement and confrontation with the archive and his-
torical narratives through a poetic praxis. Beyond setting the record “straight,”
Howe was interested in unsettling the logic of the record altogether through using
Dickinson as a case study or jumping off point. As I understand it, she began
with a poet everyone “knew” already, in order to boldly insist on the necessity of
confronting normative ways of structuring our knowledge of the world, our history
and our heroes, and to reveal that our “sense-making” depends in large part on the
stories we tell ourselves. She aimed to contribute, as she believed Dickinson had,
to the repository or archive of a feminist and feminine oppositionality. Luckily for
Howe, the publication of Dickinson’s original manuscripts made it possible for her
to become a scholar of the poet counter to the editor-expert. Howe, like Hartman,
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is concerned about her subjects’ gendered conscription within heterosexist, patriar-
chal norms in and beyond the academy, yet it cannot be overlooked that Hartman’s
subjects had to “earn” their subjecthood in a way Dickinson did not.
Earlier I addressed some of the differences between Hartman’s and Howe’s archives.
According to Hartman, one difficulty in attempting to narrate black lives in history is
to recover any trace of lives under “the annihilating force” of degrading and “obscene
descriptions” that overwhelm reading. She writes, however, that “the more difficult
task,”
"is to exhume the lives buried under this prose, or rather to accept that
Phibba and Dido [or Black Venus] exist only within the confines of these
words, and that this is the manner in which they enter history. The
dream is to liberate them from the obscene descriptions that first in-
troduced them to us. It is too easy to hate a man like [slave owner]
Thistlewood; what is more difficult is to acknowledge as our inheritance
the brutal Latin phrases spilling onto the pages of his journals." (Hartman
2008)(5, emphases mine)
Thus, Hartman points to the tension I most want to highlight between Wayward
Lives and My Emily Dickinson – that is, the differences between the terms through
which their subjects “enter history” and the stakes of refusing those terms conscribing
subjecthood.
I do argue that Howe’s utopian vision of the poet beyond the confines of the gender
binary and feminist stance against the sub-status of the female innovator and femi-
nine voice reveals a rejection of the terms and categories imposed on subjecthood:
"She works in issues of transcendence – as possibility, but also as impos-
sible political privilege. Of ’feigning’ and the sincerities of artifice. She
works between abstract thought and precisions of image. She maintains
a Woolfean admiration for the odd and quirky, the resistant and way-
ward. And makes fruitful a subtle play between determinate meaning
and indeterminacy: a woman – a person mainly gendered female – writ-
ing ’feminine’ discourses, knowing and rewriting “masculine” discourses,
in the name of a feminist and critical cultural project which wants to
transcend gender." (DuPlessis 1990)(125)
As Hartman is interested in both giving the capacity for agency and stories to sub-
jects deemed “objects” while rejecting the normative terms of subjecthood, Howe
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strives to create the “enunciative clearing” in which to grant Dickinson (and her
nonconformist forebearers) the possibility for greater intellectual agency and intu-
itive consciousness (Howe 1993)(136). In attempting to do so, she simultaneously
tries to challenge the terms through which subjecthood is granted and specifically
the ways in which subjects are gendered.
However, Hartman’s method in Wayward Lives is intimately linked to her project
of imagining the subject otherwise or beyond that of “liberal” or so-called “eman-
cipated” subjecthood. Despite clear differences between the writers’ subjects’ civil
and social statuses, a more precise dissonance I think can be located firstly if we
consider the historical difference and distance between Howe’s feminist scholarly
intervention in historical writing and criticism (in 1985) and Hartman’s critique
of the archive in our contemporary moment. In other words, as examined, Howe
and Hartman are working with different archives and, therefore, incommensurate
silences. Also, then, one must examine the differences in subjects’ “capacities” for
subjecthood, characterized by Smallwood (2016) as “the capacity for biography that
is otherwise foreclosed . . . in the normative registers of modern liberalism” (Small-
wood 2016)(126). Examining both levels of dissonance together I believe helps
reveal the differing stakes of My Emily Dickinson and Wayward Lives. Hartman’s
project significantly differs from Howe’s in its gesture toward reparatively providing
the conditions for “the capacity for biography.” In doing so, Hartman places her
subjects within a valid community, narratively structured as a “chorus.” As I will
discuss more, however, in Chapter 4, one of Howe’s primary intentions is to show
how Dickinson was a participant within a larger community of anti-authoritarian
literary “enthusiasts” whose religion was poetry.
Utilizing experimentation at the level of grammar, Hartman writes a historical text
that exceeds but also critically amends the archive, in affiliation with a tradition of
black feminist scholarly interventions, such as Hortense Spillers’s in her 1984 essay
“Interstices: A Small Drama of Words”: “[T]he point was to try to understand the
maneuver, the colonial ‘choreography’ that rendered subjects dominant and subor-
dinate not because some were inherently better than others, but, rather, because
some were installed – a political decision reinforced by words, words, words – over
others” (Spillers 2003)(22). As she discusses in “Venus in Two Acts,” Hartman
un-tells stories that could never be told through “telling” because to do so would
re-inscribe her subjects as captives, criminals, and subjects without “subjecthood.”
To “tell” their stories, in other words, means to re-inscribe them in the language
that has worked to obliterate the very possibility for them to have stories. “[W]hat
was the ‘problem’? Always shifting and elusive, it is the giant that the midget would
depose. But in a word, it is the Word – both the named and that which struggled
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to be named, but just as emphatically, it is the never-said” (Spillers 2003)(12).
Similar to the poet M. NourbeSe Philip, whose experimental, expressivist long poem
Zong! (2008) is a “textual invocation” of the mass drowning of over 150 enslaved
Africans who were thrown overboard the British slave ship Zong for insurance money,
Hartman must “not-tell” these stories in attempts to avoid replicating the “logic”
that foreclosed them, the same “brutal calculus,” “logical system,” and “technology
by which Africans and their descendants are rendered as outside the scope of Man”
and “by which African laborers would be routinely brutalized in service of national
accumulations of wealth while simultaneously omitted from the categories of subject
and citizen” (Morgan 2016)(189). “The disorder, illogic and irrationality of the Zong!
poems,” Philip writes, “can no more tell a story than the legal report of Gregson
v. Gilbert masquerading as order, logic, and rationality. In their very disorder and
illogic is the not-telling of the story that must be told” (Philip 2008)(198). Arguably,
this logic is in and of the language that also structured “the antique imagination of
[Dickinson’s] fathers” (Howe 1985a)(85). Philip writes, “I deeply distrust this tool
I work with – language . . . language in which those events took place promulgated
the non-being of African peoples, and I distrust its order, which hides disorder;
its logic hiding the illogic and its rationality, which is simultaneously irrational”
(Philip 2008)(198). Utilizing this shared distrust or hesitance with language, the
point for Hartman, like Spillers, is to “translate certain subjectivities,” whose traces
she locates through listening in the archive, “back into modes of abeyance, in which
case we would have to await a content, ideally, in contradistinction to arriving on
the scene with one already in hand” (Spillers 2003)(22). In this “abeyance” or
suspended state, Hartman’s subjects are transported into an imaginative “content”
that is critically fabulated in contradistinction to the narratives in which they were
found.
The women whose stories Hartman desires to tell fall into what Spillers calls the
“lexical gap” in “Interstices” (1984), in which Spillers describes the role of repre-
sentations of black female sexuality in repertoires of dominant (white) myths. The
black woman “mess[es] up a neat picture,” she writes, being “sexual subject and ob-
ject, simultaneously” (Spillers 2003)(13-14). Hartman expands on this in Scenes of
Subjection in discussing the slippage between consent and nonconsent: “The oppor-
tunity for nonconsent is required to establish consent, for consent is meaningless if
refusal is not an option. . . . Consent is unseemly in a context in which the very no-
tion of subjectivity is predicated upon the negation of will” (111, cited in (Hartman
and Wilderson 2003)186). Wayward Lives is part of Hartman’s long study of the
tension between the capacity of “will” and objectifying conditions. “Ultimately it’s
about the paradox of agency for those in these extreme circumstances,” who reside
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in conditions where they cannot give consent (as “property”) yet are considered cul-
pable agents, because “in formulation[s] of law and its punishment, blackness is on
the side of culpability” (Hartman and Wilderson 2003)(192). Spillers writes, “Win-
ning the right to the nuantial – let’s say – goes with the territory of subjecthood,
which must be earned for some” (Spillers 2003)(14).
Hartman refuses throughout her work “to have faith in the liberal state which has
licensed black death and dispossession for centuries” (Hartman, Campt, and Wehe-
liye 2018). Her refusal matches that of the women of Wayward Lives – “to disavow
what they know – the extraordinary violence of a world organized against them”
(Hartman 2020). Hartman is concerned with how to tell socio-poetic stories from
the paradoxical position of the “not yet free” within, between, and beyond the terms
and language of unimaginative and repeatedly oppressive narratives (Hartman and
Wilderson 2003)(192). These conditions essentially “necessitate fabulation” given
the “necessity of trying to represent what we cannot,” that “position of the un-
thought” the enslaved and their descendants occupy that reverberates through the
historical present (Hartman and Wilderson 2003)(186).
1.2.3 Textual Dissonance and Adjacent Practices of Refusal
Arguably, Howe makes herself more “visible” in her writing than Hartman, perhaps
in part because Howe relates to Dickinson as a fellow poet in order to specifically
challenge editorial reduction and disfigurement with which she herself contends.
Though Howe employs several of the same techniques as Hartman toward articulat-
ing the “unknowable,” her writing does not “flatten” discourse in the same way as
Hartman’s to confuse historical or authorial voices; in other words, Howe’s “historical
figuration” is not identical to Hartman’s “close narration.” Hartman does, however,
employ some framing devices (her note on method and endnotes, for example), but
this seems to have to do with the context and characteristics of Wayward Lives’
specific historical intervention and Hartman’s device of the “chorus” I will discuss
later on. While both writers find openings through hesitation and anticipation and
possibilities in the interrogative, Howe focuses on articulating potentiality through
poetic-syntactical deconstruction and the sounds of words themselves. Howe em-
ploys parataxis and wordplay to a great extent, so that prose and poetry in My
Emily Dickinson cannot be clearly distinguished. In some ways, Howe’s minimalism
through operations of erasing grammatical connectives contrasts with Hartman’s ef-
forts to describe “as fully as possible” (Hartman 2008)(1). In the following, I locate
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a textual dissonance in the style of their writing and divergent experimentations
with language that reveal, paradoxically, what I argue could be an adjacent practice
of refusal.
Hartman’s rhetorical subversion is evident in the ways in which she blurs and flattens
points of view by switching between first, second, and third-person narration. Use
of the second-person point of view is especially arresting: addressed directly by the
narrator, readers become aware of themselves and of a textual “self-consciousness.”
Like the interrogative, the shifts between these points of view emplace the reader as
potential “narrators” through a poetic register. Next to this, Hartman also blends
past and present tenses, narrating history as “unfinished” or “unending,” and the
subjunctive mood is weaved throughout the text to communicate the connection be-
tween “what happened” and otherwise narratively obliterated possibilities of “what
could have been.” Importantly, Hartman refigures the “the archive’s object . . . as
its historical subject” by recasting the enslaved and their descendants living in the
wake of chattel slavery in a historical collective biography and, furthermore, as in-
tellectual innovators and creative revolutionaries (Smallwood 2016)(126). This kind
of counter-historical narrative performs recuperatively to restore “the capacity for
biography” to those who have been historically denied it, as previously discussed
(126). Hartman’s writing in Wayward Lives may express a kind of “hope” that is,
however, more hesitant perhaps than Howe’s in the sense that Hartman expresses a
keen awareness of the failures of language. Her formal project in Wayward Lives is
in many ways about using language “against” itself parallel to her strategy of using
the genre of biography to narrate the lives of subjects lacking the “capacity” for life
stories (i.e. minor figures, errant and wayward “criminals,” the enslaved and their
dispossessed descendants, and so on).
As discussed, Hartman refuses the terms of western modernity that have functioned
to dehumanize individuals and a discourse that reiterates the ontological, epistemic
violence of black being “in the hold” (Sharpe 2016). Part of the work of restoring the
“capacity for biography” to subjects denied subjecthood while refusing these terms
is practiced in the text through a form of narrative “disidentification” that extends
beyond refiguring subjects and objects (Rancière 2009)(74). In several scenes of
Wayward Lives, Hartman describes a loosening of imposed boundaries of the subject,
figured as a kind of “self-forgetting.” For example, in the story of Mattie Nelson she
writes, “In the crush of folks on the pier, she breathed comfortably inside her own
skin, enjoying the self-forgetfulness that she had imagined was possible in a free
territory” (Hartman 2019)(48). Later, attempting to articulate the drive of desire
in a girl who “wanted so much from the world and had been allowed so little,” she
narrates a scene of sexual flesh “enfolding” in which “the act confused the doer and
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the deed”: “Mattie threatened to disappear, the force of it exceeding her and erasing
the boundaries of the discrete body, making her something less than she was and
something more” (63). Similarly, through the repeated image of the “chorus” I will
discuss more in the next chapter, Hartman experiments with making the subject
porous and/or plural.
I have tried to show how Howe’s intervention in the editor’s authority is crafted
in counterpoint to the assuredness of the historians’ reason-centric language, which
also anticipates Howe’s own poetic impulse. Howe identifies with Dickinson as a
woman poet but wants her own experiments in writing to speak louder than her
gender identity. She turns away from the genre of biography partly in response to
the slew of biographies that misrepresent Dickinson and her experiment, but she also
wishes to speak a word for the poet as scholar, not only to challenge disciplinary
boundaries and authorities but to expose the limits of the genre. To Howe, biography
as well as the genres of historical writing and literary criticism lack the capacity to
represent the excess and complexity of a life and mind, especially that of a poet. My
Emily Dickinson reveals a curiosity about the potential gap in which the past and
language meet and transform through the “feminine” voice and through “cinder[s]
of the lexical drift” (Howe 2015)(167).
DuPlessis proposes that “the impossible question posed in every crevice” of the book
is the following: “How to make a culture that does not demand subjugation when
‘Culture representing form and order will always demand sacrifice and subjugation of
one group by another’” (DuPlessis 1990)(131, citing (Howe 1985a)93). It seems that
Howe’s “counter-culture” insists on “show[ing] the half-seen, the half-forgotten” and
representing “the silence half-sounded of the powerless ... and the sounds of power
in relation to doubt and silence” (131). For Howe, “sound” is present in words down
to their syllables and letters. Peter Nicholls (1996) compares Howe’s Dickinson to
Melville’s Bartleby the Scrivener in their shared “refusal to relinquish ‘spirit’ to a
language complicit with authority” (Nicholls 1996)(592). He writes, “in the poetry of
‘spirit’ or enthusiasm, words do not become figures for things but remain stubbornly
themselves” (592). DuPlessis asks,
"Why does Howe erase or elide some words? . . . Why does she confound
grammar? . . . She is suspicious of languages and discourse as already
made and inhabited things; she wants to enter and inhabit the untoward
crevices of language . . . archaic words, names that may no longer have
things, shadows of things and feelings difficult to name . . . where the
whole weight of Indo-European consonant relations, not to speak of our
culture’s relations with the underwritten, undersaid, socially repressed,
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becomes the fulcrum for the line break, ’whispered’ to ’buried.’" (DuP-
lessis 1990)(131)
Since “the page is not neutral ... [but] is a territory” (DuPlessis 1990)(131), Howe
trespasses through linguistic “camouflage and cunning” to “unsettle” the settler’s
linguistic settlement (Howe 1985a)(70).
According to Tina Campt, refusal is not a question of participation per se, but rather
a refusal of the categories and the assumptions that reiterate epistemic violence
(Hartman, Campt, and Weheliye 2018). It is a refusal of the terms on which the
violent question grasps (or gasps) for legitimacy.3 Indeed, “The way in which the
question has forever been posed deserves only a very deeply felt refusal to speak”
(Abbas 2005). Campt clarifies that for her, “refusal is not not participating in
[the] conversation, but literally challenging the categories on which it is based as
in any way, shape, or form legitimate . . . as well as, all of the collateral damage,
. . . injuries, erasures, negations on which it is premised” (Hartman, Campt, and
Weheliye 2018). While refusal may be the refusal to speak, or the refusal to remain
silent, or the refusal to look away and a commitment to looking differently, it is
foremost a recognition of the inadequacy of our questions and our vocabularies,
and a mode of engagement that undermines the capacity for and legitimacy of
unimaginative thinking.
In the style of Dickinson, Howe’s writing resists interpretation, and it is in this sense
I propose that her poetic praxis can be described as a practice of refusal. Hartman
refuses the terms of the archive, narratives of history, and readings that reiterate
violence through care-less description. Howe’s refusal resonates with Hartman’s
in the way Howe refuses to reproduce the codes through which “intelligibility” is
determined. In the monograph Through The Words of Others: Susan Howe and
Anarcho-Scholasticism (2006), Stephen Collis highlights Howe’s formal method to
“erase (as far as possible) the line between poetry and prose, primary and secondary
text – to upset all discursive hierarchies” (Collis 2006)(19). She inspires to unsettle
not only editorial and archival order, literary history, the canon, and normative
historiographies, but also the logics of what Ma calls, “patriarchal language” (Ma
1994)(725). BothMy Emily Dickinson andWayward Lives cross and combine genres
but appear to do so differently, as Howe’s work is not only a combination of prose and
poetry, but also “show[s] little interest in the connectedness of syntax” (DuPlessis
3In a lecture, prompted by an audience member, Campt responds to the question, “Should Europe accept
refugees or not?” with critiquing the “basis” on which the question attempts to describe the capacity, for
example, of a human to live in a place called Europe, and the basis of the very category of “citizenship.”
She asks, “What makes sense about that question? I refuse the very terms on which you are constituting
a European and a refugee” (Hartman, Campt, and Weheliye 2018).
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1990)(126).
One of the literary techniques Howe employs extensively in My Emily Dickinson is
parataxis, in which short, simple clauses are placed “side by side” without conjunc-
tions or with coordinating (not subordinating) conjunctions – that is, with words
that show separate elements to possess equal grammatical rank and importance. In
contrast to hypotaxis, in which conjunctions subordinate clauses while linking them,
parataxis gives each clause equal “weight.” “Finally freed from the ‘halter measure,’
words begin their chance meeting in ‘another situation’” (Ma 1994)(734). Howe bor-
rows the tactic from Dickinson, whose word variant lists placed at the end of poems
Howe considers to be “strings of words [constituting] texts in themselves” (Nicholls
1996)(593). Her parataxis “defies syntactical regulation” and “forces prosody against
syntax,” favoring sound over “sense” (593-96). “This move carries us beyond the
more familiar, modernist forms of fragmentation,” according to Nicholls, “which
tend to break discourse into phrases to recombine their elements into new wholes.
In contrast, Howe attends to sound and to individual words, recombining these in
an order that defies syntactical logic” (596).
Against the claim, however, that Howe’s anti-syntactical style in My Emily Dickin-
son (and other work) is a purely “objectivist” project, Howard (2019) argues that
Howe inserts herself affectively and dynamically into texts and contexts (Howard
2019)(114), which in effect destabilizes limits imposed between “experimental” and
“expressivist” writing (Smith 2010)(104). In other words, Howe’s parataxis may
simultaneously be read as syntactic disjunction or rupture and as an aesthetics of
relation; as words are laid side-by-side, so are their meanings. I borrow here from
Laura Smith’s analysis (2010) of Akilah Oliver’s poetry: as the writer becomes “a
site of larger and longer historical knowledge than one literal life experience affords,”
Smith writes, “parataxis binds this disparate knowledge together” (114). As Kristen
Gallagher (2003) puts it, “Copious listing has a way of paratactically leveling hier-
archy” (Gallagher 2005)(25), which, according to Smith, works toward “pluralizing,
critiquing, and expanding . . . representational possibilities” (115). Smith makes
the case that parataxis “privileges a logic of relation” (rather than “rupture”) in
part because it “undermines the conventional division between formally-motivated
poetics (often called ‘innovative’ or ‘experimental’)” and “identity poetics” or “ex-
pressive” poetry (104). Howe’s parataxis performs a similar relation, parallel to
challenging the division between subjective or personal and “historical-objective”
scholarship. Paradoxically amplifying relations by trimming the syntactical linking
elements, parataxis complements a poetics that aims to cross temporal “distances”
and bridge subjectivities and knowledges. It should be noted also that Howe’s rela-
tionship to the dictionary could be characterized as “excessive”: she is a collector of
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obscure etymologies. A word never has just one meaning because as it travels time
it transforms. As a result, Howe’s writing in My Emily Dickinson stays always in
movement.
Nicholls writes that language, for Howe, is “a wilderness which – paradoxically –
must now be unsettled if we are to avoid the Puritan trap” (589).
"During the 1980s I wanted to transplant words onto paper with soil
sticking to their roots – to go meet narrative’s fate by immediate access
to its concrete totality of singular interjections, crucified spellings, abbre-
viations, irrational apprehensions, collective identities, palavers, kicks,
cordials, comforts. I wanted jerky and tedious details to oratically bloom
and bear fruit as if they had been set at liberty or ransomed by angels."
(Howe 2015)(53)
Howe’s relational fragmentation of language is not unlike NourbeSe Philip’s poem
Zong! (2008), in which voices of the murdered slaves are “excavated” through the
painstaking destruction and reconstruction of a legal decision (the only archived
document surviving the case). Zong! is almost entirely written within the legal text.
Philip tells Saunders, “I have locked myself in the text in the hope of discovering
something that remains hidden below the surface of the legal document” (Saunders
2008a)(65). In Zong! she writes,
"[T]he imperative for me was to move beyond representation of what the
New World experience was – even one filtered through my own imagi-
nation and knowing, for what that would have meant working entirely
within the order of logic, rationality, and predictability; it would have
meant ordering an experience which was disordered (and cannot ever be
ordered), irrational, illogical and unpredictable..." (Philip 2008)(198)
Besides their disjunctive style, resonance between Zong! and Howe’s study of Dick-
inson can be located in Philip’s method behind appropriation of the footnote, whose
use is typically prohibited in poetry (except by editors). She names the Africans
on board the ship as “ghostly footnotes floating below the text,” highlighting their
relegation to the margin even within the text that documents and “justifies” their
murder, while at the same time referencing them in “acknowledgment” – “someone
else was here before . . . Footnote equals the footprint” (Philip 2008)(200). Their
names function also “to establish[. . . ] a critically dialogic relation between text and
note,” “something approximating a counter-text in the notes” (La Capra 2001)(6-
30
7). This relation resembles Howe’s intention in reinserting the obliterated “stray
mark” in her readings of the Dickinson facsimiles. In the last book of Zong! called
“Ferrum,” the poet “risk[s] destroying language” as she writes to appropriate “the
code in which was encoded images of the horror and death on board the Zong”
(Saunders 2008a)(71). Breaking the language of the legal text down to “its most
intricate level” appears to affect Philip cathartically: “I felt that this broken, stum-
bling thing . . . is my very own language” (71). Howe’s deconstruction similarly
serves to let “the explanation breaks free of itself” as meanings are multiplied and
space is opened (“as if the words are seeking space to breathe”) for other ways of
knowing and reckoning with loss (Saunders 2008a)(73).
Howard (2019) contends that Howe shares with Philip an awareness of the risks of
implication involved in appropriating stories of the dead particularly through “forms
of discourse and figuration perhaps ‘already contaminated, possibly irrevocably and
fatally’ (Zong!, 199)” (Howard 2019)(117). This, I find, resonates with Hartman’s
hesitation: “How does one recuperate lives entangled with and impossible to differ-
entiate from the terrible utterances that condemned them to death . . . that claimed
them as property . . . that stripped them of human features?” (Hartman 2008)(3).
Where Zong! follows a different path from Howe’s work, according to Howard, is
through Philip’s use of “several rhetorical framing devices – multiple personae and
prefaces, annotations and appendices, voices and variables – that signify the poet’s
complex role as both censor and magician, either constraining speakers or conjuring
spirits from varying proximities to the disaster” (Howard 2019)(117). Wayward Lives
similarly includes framing devices, such as Hartman’s “A Note on Method” and end-
notes section, which is an amplified collection of bibliographic material. Although
in Chapter 2 I will focus on the more speculative and poetic sections within the
Wayward Lives, between these Hartman weaves more conventional, historiograph-
ical chapters which serve as frames. In contrast, My Emily Dickinson minimizes
“rhetorical distinctions among and distances between layers of radical contingency
and historical figuration” (Howard 2019)(118). Howe writes, “A great poet, car-
rying the antique imagination of her fathers, requires each reader to leap from a
place of certain signification, to a new situation, undiscovered and sovereign. She
carries intelligence of the past into future of our thought by reverence and revolt”
(Howe 1985a)(85). Howe’s own paratactic “leaps” propel readers through a “whirl-
wind” narrative.4 With the dictionary close at hand, Howe illumines where the sense
(meaning) is combined with and cancelled out by sense (sensation) (Reed 2014)(27).
4I confess that Howe probably wouldn’t herself call it a “whirlwind.” In an interview with W. Scott Howard,
she corrects his characterization of her book The Midnight (2003) as an “intense remediation [of] pho-
tographs of books, of letters, of fabrics . . . all in a whirlwind” by saying, “Not a whirlwind to me. It was
formally arranged” (Howard 2019)(201).
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Spaces opened between the contradictions are, for Howe, where the “feminine” po-
etry thrives through a refusal of an imposed order.
1.3 Making the Case for Resonance
Adjacent to these differences and deliberately unresolved ambivalences, in the fol-
lowing I make the case that Wayward Lives and My Emily Dickinson are resonant
“potential histories” (Azoulay 2013), the results of Hartman’s and Howe’s meth-
ods of reading archival material through an “affective register” (Georgis 2013)(24).
In their careful attention to and desire for what Georgis calls “the stories of the
discarded in history” (21), Howe and Hartman confront discourses and logics of
the archive’s linearity, epistemologically taking care not to fossilize new teleological
readings of resistance and freedom.
"Might there be other ways to think about our relationship to domination
outside the paradigms of emancipation? What would it mean to treat
the violence of colonialism and its legacy in contemporary forms of social
expulsion and racial hatred as psychic injuries – legacies that thrive in
our constructions of history, identity, and cultural representation? Might
this view of history, culture, and identity provide new conditions for
creation and renewed political futures?" (Georgis 2013)(20)
By “tak[ing] seriously the presence of injury in our constructions,” both writers
demonstrate a practice of reading history otherwise, for the incompossible stories
that unsettle and break open the stories we thought we knew and desire to hear
and tell (Georgis 2013)(21-2). Hartman and Howe read archival texts affectively
to refuse teleological, linear narratives of history or a “past that is past.” Through
doing so, they lessen the relevance or usefulness of imposed and repetitive divisions,
like fact versus fiction. And they write “wayward” texts to “claim the right to
opacity [and] love what is not loved” as a “practice of the social otherwise” (Hartman
2019)(228). “How might we grasp the significance of affect in shaping history as
well as apprehending it?” asks Hartman (Hartman 2020). Writing through methods
embracing ambivalence, Hartman and Howe attempt to narrate this “psychic past”
and the injuries that leave traces in our texts, landscapes, bodies, and futurities.
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1.3.1 Reading through an Affective Register
I first locate a similarity in Hartman’s and Howe’s approaches to the archive. Both
employ methods of “listening” to traces and marginalia for the “ghostly affect”
(Georgis 2013)(11) and to what Anthony Reed (2014) calls “a silence that is not
silent” (Reed 2014)(47). One way in which affective engagement with archives has
been approached is through reading existent archives with the purpose of construct-
ing a “counter-archive.” A thorough discussion of counter-archival projects, such as
the Lesbian HerStory Archives in Brooklyn and Avery Gordon’s Hawthorn Archive
(Gordon 2017), is beyond the scope of this thesis though I am interested in the
“frames of attention” surrounding such projects. As Ann Cvetkovich (2003) writes,
the affective archive is that which views history “from the vantage point of memory
and experience” and catalogues “emotional” histories (Cvetkovich 2003)(28). “Si-
lence” has been considered part of the realm of the affective archive, especially in
considering the archive of Atlantic slavery. Far from being “empty,” silence, accord-
ing to Jenny Sharpe (2014), can be a “space of affect” (Sharpe 2014)(474). Sharpe
describes affect as “a potentiality for memory existing in places and things,” and for
beyond what is discoverable in the archive (469).
Recalling Mbembe’s description of the archive as “sepulchre” from which we may
reassemble remains and “resuscitate” the dead (Mbembe 2002)(25), Avery Gordon’s
(1997) theory of haunting attends to a mode of writing “ghost stories”: “stories that
not only repair representational mistakes, but also strive to understand the condi-
tions under which a memory was produced in the first place, toward a countermem-
ory, for the future” (Gordon 1997)(22). “To write stories concerning exclusions and
invisibilities,” according to Gordon, “is to write ghost stories” (17). She advocates
forms of reflexive writing that are concerned not only with those under study but
also “the ones who investigate,” since “the ghost must speak to me in some way”
(24). This writing must be open to the unexpected and, along the lines of Toni
Morrison’s differentiation between “truth” versus “fact” (Morrison 1987)(93), nego-
tiate “the always unsettled relationship between what we see and what we know”
(Gordon 1997)(24). Hartman and Howe both engage in a practice of reading his-
tory’s representations through an “affective register” (Georgis 2013)(24). Reading
through affect allows one to think beyond the fact/fiction divide and makes room
for “counter-historical” narratives. In the next chapters, I will illustrate moments
when Hartman and Howe read the archive for stories of silencing and for the silences
that refuse to be silent, as well as for the “psychic” resonance reducing the distance
between “ghosts” and ourselves. Both researchers also closely read their own expe-
riences researching in archives to attend to the trauma unattended or to that which
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is still “unworked through.” Oriented toward reading “feeling” in historical narra-
tives, Hartman and Howe search for the archive of affect that “trespasses” official
accounts, seeking evidence of how we perceive, attempt to make sense of, or renew
our understandings of ourselves and each other, for our shared affective experience
over time, and for our best methods of surviving trauma – a practice that Georgis
(2013) calls crafting “the better story.”
Georgis writes of the relevance of feelings, that which “fact” devoid of “fiction”
generally leaves out. “Fiction,” she writes, allows history the “space to mourn”; “it
allows us ‘to dispense with ‘what really happened’ (Morrison 1990, 302) and instead
puts ‘life back in where only a vague memory or a bare trace was visible to those
who bothered to look’ (Gordon 1997, 22)” (Georgis 2013)(11). She writes, “Official
historical records are made with such renditions of traumatic tragedies: renditions
that expel and sanitize the voices of injury. Indeed, when emotional life is washed out
from the record, reason effectively functions to foreclose the fact of racism and the
fact of suffering . . . because such accounts cannot consider the centrality of trauma
and suffering to history” (10). Quoting Deborah Britzman, she adds, “fiction allows
history to be an ‘improper study’ (2006, ix) . . . As long as ghosts exist, the story is
interminable, sketched and resketched from the unassimilated traces of experience
and of being itself” (11). Indeed, Georgis claims that “ghosts speak through affect,
which is yet to narrativized,” but “we can be sure that even the most hardened
story-form cannot completely defend itself against its ghostly affect”5 (11).
If we think back to Howe’s and Hartman’s archives, we can read the “trace” or
“marginalia” as the “ghostly affect.” Though arguably it seems that Hartman must
in ways be a “historian” where Howe can be an “antiquarian” (in, for example,
her excavation of buried etymologies and other obscurities), I locate a similarity
between their openness and method of “listening” for affect within the archive. In
my analysis, I extend Georgis’s discussion (drawing from Andre Green and Mary
Jacobus) of “listening” to aesthetic texts and objects to Hartman’s and Howe’s
methods of reading “haunted” artifacts and history’s narratives for their “affective
remainders” (Georgis 2013)(19). Georgis writes, “In listening, the aesthetic object
has touched you and found its way inside. That is because an aesthetic experience
often ‘rebinds affect to representation’ (Jacobus 1999, 129)” (17).
As discussed, Howe approaches and “listens” to Dickinson’s handwritten poems and
fragments as visual and sonic artifacts through which to imagine the poet’s inner
5Georgis calls the “ghostly affect” the “queer” affect because “queer etymologically registers socially repudi-
ated desire.” She writes, “In this sense, ghosts are anxiously censored, or cast out when they leak through
the surface or face you by surprise. In the world of narrative, queer exceeds language, it haunts and
disquiets and refuses endings. Queer affect unsettles meaning, creating the conditions for change within
the story” (Georgis 2013)(11).
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world and outer gestures. Dickinson’s dashes or lists of word variants are invitations
or openings for communion, for “ghostly affect” that resides in the “signal escapes”
of a word assembled or disassembled and unsettling meaning (Howard 2019)(1).
Hartman has also discussed her reliance on physical documents and attention to
handwriting:
"What sounds did Virginia and Jamaica, North Carolina and Guyana
make when they collided in a Harlem row house, and how was this dif-
ferent than the rhythm and the tenor of those who could boast of having
been in the city for generations? How could I tell the story of Eva Perkins
and convey the bluesy tone of her speech, or the aspiration latent in her
partner’s diction . . . I got to know Eva’s man, Aaron, through his care-
ful and practiced handwriting, a cursive style that shouted, ’I am a man.’
’I am an intelligent Negro.’ All of which is simply a way of saying that in
order to write, I had to engage the materiality of the document, study
and remake it through transposition and augmentation, redaction and
annotation. I thought of this practice as a historical poetics or poetics
of the document, a radical sociography, a Black compositional practice."
(Hartman 2020)
Often Hartman also finds openings for fabulation in the archival photograph. Affect
is apparent in the unexpected small but urgent discovery of, for example, the blurred
face in a photograph, or the ways in which there is an uncanny resemblance between
a “manner of walking” and its criminalization “then” and now. This affect appears
through kindred kinship arrangements between the plantation and the ghetto or
the continuance of the pride and defiance of black assembly in the face of antiblack
police violence a hundred years “distant.”
1.3.2 Fabulating “Potential Histories”
According to Mbembe, the work of “following tracks” and “reassembling remains” is
a “ritual” by which the dead are “reintegrate[ed] . . . in the cycle of time” (Mbembe
2002)(25). To Hartman, writing counter-histories, counter-narratives, or counter-
fictions is “inseparable from writing a history of the present,” and as such, articulates
our intimacy with the “lives of the dead” and the ways in which our present is “in-
terrupted by the past” (Hartman 2008)(4). By shifting between historical registers
and bringing forth a multivocality, Hartman and Howe assist readers in imagining
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ways to acknowledge the continuance of lives that have been silenced both in and
outside of the archive. Their work may be what Catherine Gander (2013) calls a
“poetics of connection” in how archival “traces” and affects are read in order to,
in Muriel Rukeyser’s words, “extend the document” (Kingsley 2015)(31, 55). Both
writers, I propose, craft their narratives through an aesthetic mode of fabulation
(Nyong’o 2018).
Keeping in mind the cross-disciplinary uses of “fabulation,” I am referring back to
Hartman’s “critical fabulation.” In “Venus in Two Acts,” Hartman cited Mieke Bal’s
(1997) definition of “fabula” as “a series of logically and chronologically related
events that are caused and experienced by actors. An event is a transition from
one state to another. Actors are agents that perform actions . . . To act is to cause
or experience and [sic] event” (Hartman 2008)(11, citing Bal 1997, 7). Hartman
writes that “by playing with and rearranging the basic elements of the story, by
re-presenting the sequence of events in divergent stories and from contested points
of view,” one may “attempt to jeopardize the status of the event and to displace the
received or authorized account” (11). Hartman considers telling what could have
happened in attempts to produce a “recombinant narrative” in which events are
re-presented, narrators and speakers are confused, and “levels of narrative discourse
flatten[ed]” (12).
Nyong’o (2018) cites “critical fabulation” as “crucial” to his application of fabula-
tion to black performance and “afro-fabulation,” which is “a theory and practice
of black time and temporality” with the potential to “rearrange our perceptions
of chronology [and] time” (Nyong’o 2018)(5-6). He writes that critical fabulation
“throws into crisis the progressive teleology from bondage to freedom” and creates
the conditions through which we can address how to tell the story of slavery’s af-
terlife or talk about what it means to live in the wake of dispossession and trauma
(6). Fabulation enters the scene when there is no other way to tell what happened
at the level of subject, discourse, or other terms of intelligibility; it is a method
through which to imagine “what cannot be verified” according to normative logics
(Hartman 2008)(12). Fabulation is, therefore, an exercise in reading and writing our
present as it is interrupted by the past, toward envisioning the anticipated future as
a “free state” outside the terms of a “sense” that has ceased to make sense (Hartman
2008)(3, citing Foucault 2003, 284). Foucault (1977) writes, “We want historians to
confirm our belief that the present rests upon profound intentions and immutable
necessities. But the true historical sense confirms our existence among countless lost
events, without a landmark or point of reference” (cited in (Howe 1993)103). The
fabulated story does not only break open the story and unsettle officialized “truth,”
it also produces real emotion and attachment, thereby exposing the constructedness
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of our history and our fictions, and ultimately our reality understood temporally as
a series of discrete “events.”
I borrow from both Hartman and Nyong’o in thinking about how “critical fabula-
tion” can be brought to bear too on Susan Howe’s counter-history of feminine non-
conformist poiesis. In discussing “afro-fabulation,” Nyong’o draws on the Deleuzean
appropriation of Liebniz’s concept “incompossibility,” which is helpful in thinking
about the nonlinearity of fabulation (Nyong’o 2018)(134). “Incompossibility,” with
“compossible” generally referring to one thing being possible with another, does
not imply contradiction but rather “divergence from a continuous series of com-
possible individuals and events” and the co- or poly-presence of individuals and
events outside of a linear cause-effect seriality (Widder 2012, 34, cited in (Nyong’o
2018)134-35). In my reading of Hartman and Howe, I find that they are both con-
cerned with bringing into “co-presence a sense of the incompossible, mingling what
was with what might have been,” so that the so-called “originality” of events is unset-
tled (Nyong’o 2018)(7). Incompossible readings otherwise can be drawn upon in the
service of contributing to our counter-archive of oppositionality. For example, both
Nyong’o and Hartman discuss how “black bodies that were objects of speculation
can become speculative bodies” (Nyong’o 2018)(25); the body, for example, that is
gazed upon can gaze back. Howe rereads Dickinson’s “failure” or “fear” to publish
as a refusal to destroy the integrity of her work. Rather than a rewritten counter-
story that “replaces” the so-called “original,” the incompossible reading agrees that
several stories are co-present. This opens room for the possibility that many stories
may be “true,” but, more importantly, it upsets the logic of an original or autho-
rized account. In addition, affect is allowed entrance to history and historiography.
History is re-framed as “incomplete” as our “urgent” desires come to bear on it.
Through the register of performance, Nyong’o proposes that “re-enactments” of his-
torical events further destabilize the teleologic temporality of historical registers. By
utilizing Henri Bergson’s (2001) concept of “duration,” he discusses “kind[s] of time”
that disrupt “tensed” or linear time, and therefore, unhinge causal logic (Nyong’o
2018)(10). The “original” event in the past is not seen as “causing” a re-enactment
or reperformance, and the re-enactment is not seen as an “effect” of an event; rather,
both are co-present and may have effects (or affects) on each other. I read Howe’s and
Hartman’s books and the scenes that comprise them as “re-enactments” written in
the affective register of their subjects. Both writers perform a kind of “mediumship”
or “care” work in order to speculate their subjects’ experiences, journeys, and inner
worlds. A method of “re-enactment” might be understood as a form of “close narra-
tion” or “critical fabulation” in the sense that it vexes “historical periodization and
the discrete regimented time of capitalist modernity” and presents simultaneously
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lived temporal registers (Haley 2020).
Though Hartman does not clearly differentiate between “critical fabulation” and
“close narration” as methods employed in Wayward Lives, the latter she describes
as a means through which time is “opened” by “entangl[ing]” narrator and character
in an “intimate history” :
"I believe that listening to and thinking with them for so long enabled
me to hear something else in the compelled biographies and meager sto-
ries of the case file and the state archives, and to create what [Sarah]
Haley names the ’long form historiographic song’ of Wayward Lives. . . .
Wayward Lives, as Haley observes, is an intimate history in at least two
senses. Intimate history describes the effort to convey the revolution of
Black intimate life that unfolded in the twentieth century and it names
the style of close narration that is utilized in the book. It reckons with
the violence of history by ’crafting a love letter to all those who had been
harmed.’ As Haley notes, close narration produces a different tempo of
history, which some might describe as the changing same or heteroge-
neous time or a constellation; in other words, it is an accumulated and
sedimented experience of time, a now containing multiple moments and
eras, a durée unregulated by discrete and homogenized units of time,
imposed periodization, and hierarchical and linear plots of history. It is
all now." (Haley 2020)
Haley adds that close narration, as a “vivid rendering of violation, intimacy, care,
closeness, assembly, mutuality, and mutual aid,” “resists modes of estrangement
and alienation upon which the afterlife of slavery depends”: it renders the “slave”
no longer a stranger (Haley 2020). Re-enactment, close narration, critical fabula-
tion, and Howe’s historical figuration, can be read as kindred methods of narrating
the “now” through which it becomes possible to reactivate, revitalize, and thereby
“fabulate” history.
Lastly, a method of writing “potential history” complements the “tactical fictional-
izing” of fabulation. “Potential history,” according to Ariella Azoulay (2013), both
destabilizes univocal historical knowledge and recreates the conditions for histor-
ical potentialities. In an essay cited by Hartman in Wayward Lives, “Potential
History: Thinking through Violence,” Azoulay describes her own counter-archival
project, “From Palestine to Israel,” in which she re-reads documentary photography
“against the grain.” Specifically, she attempts in her readings to avoid reconstituting
the “constituent violence” used by the regime to keep Israelis and Palestinians sep-
arated into “coherent” national identities. By reorienting her attention away from
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teleological captions and toward body language and background, she writes, “one is
rather invited to reconstruct the formations and deformations of being-together of
all those taking part in the event of photography” and to “make that history appear
as what could have been” (Azoulay 2013)(557, 554).
To me, Azoulay’s counter-archive firstly recalls the ways in which Hartman, along-
side Christina Sharpe and Tina Campt, approaches photographs. Hartman’s read-
ings of photographs found in the archive similarly seek to undermine the “scopic
regime” that undergirds the system of disciplining racialized, gendered, and sexual-
ized bodies, as I will discuss in more depth in Chapter 2 (Azoulay 2013)(571). Both
Hartman and Howe extend new readings to archival documents, and Howe particu-
larly examines text as a charged visual artifact. “One should aspire to a complete
change of archival conditions,” writes Azoulay, to expose not only the violence in and
of the archive and historical tellings, but also “to approach a discursive or archival
point zero from which one could begin to see that which could not have been seen”
and traces of what has been “illegible, intangible, and unseen for years, buried un-
der existent categories” (551). Through the use of a range of archival material and
paratextual recontextualization, both writers attempt to create new conditions of
potentiality for the study of the traces that feminine and feminist nonconformism
leaves behind.
Azoulay explains, “potential has a dual meaning” in “potential history”:
"On the one hand, it signifies the reconstruction of unrealized possibil-
ities, practices, and dreams that motivated and directed the actions of
various actors in the past . . . On the other hand, it means the transfor-
mation of the past into an unending event, into what Benjamin has called
incomplete history, in which our deeds in the present allow us to read
the violently constituted achievements of the past in ways that histori-
cize the sovereign power of the past and render it potentially reversible."
(Azoulay 2013)(565)
Potential history in Hartman’s and Howe’s books is a textual strategy to destabilize
the past and to make it “unending,” which has various effects. It first creates an
opening for interventions in the present and future. Azoulay describes her counter-
archive as enabling her “to make historical moments reappear at junctions where
other options could have been chosen, not reiterated or altered later once their disas-
trous effects became clear” (Azoulay 2013)(551, emphasis mine). By making these
“other options” somehow visible, knowable, or historically viable, potential history
changes not only “the appearance of things” but also readers’ appearance as his-
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tory’s potential narrators, “as the ones who can – at any given moment – intervene
in the order of things that constituent violence has created as their natural order”
(565). Within an incomplete history, the “moment of decision” has not ended, which
means that “researchers, writers, spectators, or readers may be positioned as if they
were actually participating” (553).
In diving into both books in the next chapters, I will aim to show how Hartman and
Howe deliberately situate their texts in an unconfined phenomenal space and allow
for the past and present to “invade” each other. Howe’s concern with recontextualiz-
ing Dickinson’s work in the context of a literary experimental tradition makes room
for the reconsideration of “experimentation” in general and how the imposition of
“patriarchal language” determines the boundaries around and within which we can
imagine otherwise. Hartman reveals the continuity of antiblackness in the U.S. by
weaving the experiences of young African Americans at the turn of the twentieth
century with those of the twenty-first. When Hartman asks, “What is it like to
imagine a radically different world, or to try to make a beautiful life in a situation
of brutal constraint?” she creates the conditions in which we can reimagine a new
past, present, and future (Siemsen 2018).
Readers of both texts are emplaced in a new relation to history. Making the past
unending also means that texts and images travel and resonate, reverberating some-
times in unexpected ways and crossing disciplinary categories. Seeing Wayward
Lives and My Emily Dickinson as potential histories is way through which they
can be described as resonant historical poetics. I will show how Hartman’s trope of
the “chorus” is apt because through it we can further conceptualize both writers’
projects as affiliated – as potential “members,” conceivably, of adjacent or at least
“compossible” choruses. Through kindred methods of counter-historical fabulation,
I propose that Hartman and Howe engage their personal encounters with the arti-
fact to articulate openings for a “potential history” of an “incomplete” past (Azoulay
2013)(565). This method is only possible for these writers through recognition of
the limits of linearity and the traps of genre and language.
Both writers engage in an urgent, ethical, and personal aesthetic practice. I ar-
gue that Hartman and Howe share and express a commitment to expose, examine,
and work through the psychic damage wrought by the unending colonialist project of
the U.S., of which the institutional terrors of slavery and Christian white supremacy
have been paramount. I propose that they both engage a “politics of knowledge pro-
duction” and a “radical hope” (Lear 2006) through presenting “disturbing questions
about race and origin, sexuality and domination, intellectual honesty and political
engagement” that, according to Françoise Lionnet (1989),
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"are questions we must face with great urgency if we believe that intel-
lectual work can have any kind of effect on reality, if we do not want
our words to be ’dust tracks on a road,’ aimless detours or strategies
of deferral, and would rather choose to have them function as means
of transforming our symbolic systems, for the symbolic is real, and in
symbols lies our only hope for a better world. To reinterpret the world
is to change it." (Lionnet 1989)(26)
In their works, they attempt “to narrate a certain impossibility” and plumb “the
shadow-aspect” of a collective North American inheritance toward repair, redress,
and renewal (Hartman and Wilderson 2003)(184); (Howe 2015)(196).
In the next chapters, I illustrate the contours and material of these critical, poetically
fabulated histories, aiming to evince how these narratives are resonant “potential
histories” offered in counterpoint to normative historical narratives found in the
archive. I start by examining the ways in which Saidiya Hartman “exceeds the
archive” through listening for affective encounters toward telling the stories “that
cannot be told” (Philip 2008)(199). My analysis focuses on scenes in Wayward Lives
that exemplify Hartman’s approach to the archival artifact, her self-positioning as
a reticent narrator, and the stakes upon which she bases her storying. I also choose
scenes in which Hartman frames her desire for an alternative “better story” (Georgis
2013), which she narrates through close narration:
"I recreate the voices and use the words of these young women when
possible and inhabit the intimate dimensions of their lives. The aim
is to convey the sensory experience of the city and to capture the rich
landscape of black social life. To this end, I employ a mode of close
narration, a style which places the voice of narrator and character in
inseparable relation, so that the vision, language, and rhythms of the
wayward shape and arrange the text. The italicized phrases and lines are
utterances from the chorus. This story is told from inside the circle. All
the characters and events found in this book are real; none are invented."
(Hartman 2019)(xiii-xiv)
Hartman’s stories differ from fictions that invent characters and events; rather, she
crafts a “counter-narrative” that through the re-arrangement of lived events and
real actors contests and refuses the terms of an “official” history inscribed by the
“judgment and classification that subjected young black women to surveillance, ar-
rest, punishment, and confinement” (xiii). In this chapter I examine the ways in
which Hartman builds alternate accounts from archival traces and positions herself
as someone “marked” by the worlds and lived experiences she describes (Hartman
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2008)(4, citing Das 2006, 17). Close narration, she claims, is about “how to speak
outside a fiction of the individual voice” and makes evident her entanglements or
“intimacies” with her subjects (Hartman and Bruce-Jones 2019). I discuss how for-
mally she reveals the plurality inherent in the idea or thought by marking her debt
to others’ “utterances”: as she explains, “we are never alone on the page” (Hartman
and Bruce-Jones 2019). I attempt to show how in its architecture, Wayward Lives
“sounds” the space of an ensemble, an an-archive, assemblage, and dialogue across
time and space with numerous contributors.
In Chapter 4 I focus on the ways in which Susan Howe inhabits a critical openness
in the archive and trespasses disciplines and literary territories in order to listen
for Dickinson’s “ghostly affect.” I attend to Howe’s rigorous study of the poet’s var-
ied influences and her deft fabulation of the poet’s formal experiment, highlighting
specific instances where Howe counters editorial assumptions and challenges several
paratextual judgments. This chapter discusses Howe’s mode of “historical figura-
tion” (as Howard names it), through which Howe writes “a book of love” to Dick-
inson and through the poet’s language. Howe says: “It’s my tribute and nothing is
more difficult for a Yankee to do than to express love” (Beckett 1989)(36). Beyond
what a novelist or biographer might contribute, I discuss the ways in which My
Emily Dickinson, similarly to Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments, unsettles the
logic through which we differentiate between “fact” and “fiction” while disturbing
imposed linguistic, generic, and cultural hegemonies.
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2. A POTENTIAL HISTORY OF THE CHORUS
In Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments: Intimate Histories of Social Upheaval
Saidiya Hartman casts the young women labeled “errant,” “vagrant,” and “way-
ward” as radical thinkers, “astute social analysts,” and actors in a social movement,
who recognized and could articulate how enforced domestic labor in the northern
city perpetuated the same system undergirding the southern plantation. Hartman
credits these women with shaping an urban cultural movement that would resist
heteronormative forms of family and intimacy and create the conditions that made
dwelling or “making home” possible.
"By attending to these lives, a very unexpected story of the twentieth
century emerges, one that offers an intimate chronicle of black radical-
ism, an aesthetical and riotous history of colored girls and their experi-
ments with freedom – a revolution before Gatsby. For the most part, the
history and the potentiality of their life-world has remained unthought
because no one could conceive of young black women as social visionaries
and innovators in the world in which these acts took place." (Hartman
2019)(xv)
In Wayward Lives Hartman builds the argument that these women were the catalyst
for a revolution “in a minor key” occurring between 1890 and 1935. Futures during
this time would necessarily be re-envisioned by new black residents as they were
made painfully aware of the exclusions, brutalities, and deprivations of northern
city life. In turn, a new language would be needed to imagine ways of living out-
side normative structures of thought that read strategies of creative survival amidst
“the weather” (Sharpe 2016) of antiblackness as a “social problem”: “It is our rela-
tion to the white world that is the problem,” writes Hartman (Hartman 2019)(23).
She describes the “mere” strategies of survival as the “real work” of social change
(Hartman and Bruce-Jones 2019), namely of redressing social reproduction or the
continuation of social inequality “in the wake” of slavery (Sharpe 2016) – “the state
of emergency [that] was the norm not the exception” (Hartman 2019)(32).
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Because Hartman is interested in writing in a new grammar to articulate the “un-
thought,” she occupies a position that refuses to assume the archive “tells the truth”
(Hartman and Wilderson 2003); rather, she attempts to make evident how the
archive collaborates with hegemony through logics of classification and violent era-
sures. Hartman explains how she wrote Wayward Lives as a project that is “an-
tagonistic to the state, as [her] subjects were” (Hartman and Bruce-Jones 2019).
She repurposes and re-narrates certain historical concepts, like radicalism or anar-
chism, whose histories she reminds us have usually left out women and almost always
women of color, who are “vulnerable to the triple jeopardy of economic, racial, and
sexual violence” (Hartman 2019)(29). She also complicates the conventional history
of black radicalism by revealing how black women refused the terms of what radicals
and women “should be” (Hartman and Jafa 2019).
Where Wayward Lives seems to diverge from Hartman’s other work is that it fore-
grounds a psychic or phenomenal space, wherein multiple lives intersect and become
fused energetically. In this sense, this book is a kindred text to Toni Morrison’s
novel Jazz (1992). In the foreword to Jazz, which mirrors Hartman’s “A Note on
Method,” Morrison describes how she attempted structurally in the narration to
infuse the energy of “the so-called Jazz Age”:
"I was struck by the modernity that jazz anticipated and directed, and
by its unreasonable optimism . . . when an African American art form
defined, influenced, reflected a nation’s culture in so many ways: the
bourgeoning of sexual license, a burst of political, economic, and artistic
power; the ethical conflicts between the sacred and the secular; the hand
of the past being crushed by the present. Primary among these features,
however, was invention. Improvisation, originality, change. Rather than
be about these characteristics, the novel would seek to become them."
(Morrison 1992)(xii, xviii)
In Beloved, Morrison writes, she had explored the “emotional disfigurement that
a slave society imposes” and the idea of “love as perpetual mourning (haunting),”
which led after to a consideration of “how such relationships were altered . . . in (or
by) a certain level of liberty” (xii). With a similar focus on how notions of “beauty”
and “freedom” were transformed and improvised in and by changing life conditions
and new forms of constraint in “freedom,” Hartman considered how to compose a
narrative in which “structure would equal meaning” and not just “enhance” it: “The
challenge,” writes Morrison, “was to expose and bury the artifice and take practice
beyond the rules . . . [to make] the work [. . . ] be a manifestation of the music’s
intellect, sensuality, anarchy; its history, its range, and its modernity” (xix).
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In Wayward Lives Hartman writes through the aesthetic mode of critical fabulation
in order to narratively inhabit the intimate, everyday experiences of young black
women living in the “slum” between 1890 to 1935.1 When possible, Hartman uses
her subjects’ own words, present in statements culled from their psychiatric and
prison case files, which she puts in relation to a larger “chorus.” In describing, for
example, what outside observers failed to capture about the black home in the
tenement, Hartman interweaves the voice of Audre Lorde (1978):
"Some things didn’t appear in the photographs, like the three flower-
pots lined up on the windowsill . . . The reformers and the journalists
were fixated on the kitchenette. They didn’t know that the foyer, the
fire escape, and the rooftop were a stretch of urban beach . . . They
didn’t know that the hallway and the stairwell were places of assembly,
a clearing inside the tenement, or that you love in doorways." (Hartman
2019)(22)
The italicized phrase is borrowed from Lorde’s poem “A Litany for Survival”: “for
those of us who cannot indulge / the passing dreams of choice / who love in doorways
coming and going / in the hours between dawns / looking inward and outward /
at once before and after / seeking a now that can breed / futures” (Lorde 1978).
Lorde’s poem is a rolling refrain, an orison for those “never meant to survive.” As
Hartman explains to Patricia Saunders, she is interested in describing “not home as
inheritance, but home as making [. . . ] about creating conditions that make dwelling
possible” (Saunders 2008b)(13). In borrowing from Lorde, Hartman recasts those
whom the journalists and reformists failed to see as more than poor inhabitants of
cramped kitchenettes as dwellers who sought futures by making their own spaces
for creative survival, and she repositions this survival as part of larger, continuous
social movement. “For me,” says Hartman, “at issue in this book was also thinking
about young black women as radical thinkers, which no one ever does, because they
imagine that thought is only the capacity of the educated, or the endowment of
elites” (Siemsen 2018).
Stephanie Smallwood (2016) writes, “For as long as it has been a subject of profes-
sional scholarship, American slavery has exposed the methodological limits of the
1When asked what drew her to these years specifically, Hartman answers: “In 1896, W.E.B. Du Bois
arrives in Philadelphia. For a year and a half he lives in the heart of the black slum and then produces
a monograph, which is The Philadelphia Negro ... the first study of the black slum, or what we will later
call the ghetto. So much of the discourse on black pathology, on the forms of black intimacy, sexuality,
kinship and affiliation that deviate from bourgeois heterosexual norms start with that monograph ... In
the 1880s and 1890s black people are thinking very intensely about the meaning of freedom as is Du Bois.
It’s after the demise of Reconstruction and a new racial order is emerging, one also founded on violence,
servitude and the disposability of black lives.” (Siemsen 2018)
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discipline of history” (Smallwood 2016)(120). In Hartman’s previous books Lose
Your Mother (2006) and Scenes of Subjection (1997) she mapped the geographies of
slavery and its afterlives in the U.S. Wayward Lives continues this study, which puts
it in community with the scholarship of Hortense Spillers, Sylvia Wynter, Christina
Sharpe, Jenny Sharpe, and Fred Moten, among others, whose voices Hartman weaves
throughout the text. The book’s mode of critical fabulation also relates it to spec-
ulative historical literature, including neoslave narratives, or what Wynter (1990)
calls “counternovels” (cited in (Walcott 2000)140). These include literary works by
Toni Morrison, Dionne Brand, Michelle Cliff, Fred D’Aguiar, and Octavia Butler,
who write historical or speculative fiction that in several ways engage what Er-
ica L. Johnson (2014) has termed the “neo-archive”: works that “create history in
the face of its absence” (Johnson 2014)(157). In addition, Wayward Lives can be
considered a form of historical or documentary poetics and linked to poetic works
confronting the archive and conventional historiography. Muriel Rukeyser’s and Su-
san Howe’s poetry similarly re-imagine history through conjectural assemblage of
archival fragments (Kingsley 2015). Hartman’s book is also largely in dialogue with
M. NourbeSe Philip’s writing, specifically her “fugal antinarrative” Zong! (2008).
Philip writes, “Zong! bears witness to the ‘resurfacing of the drowned and the
oppressed’ and transforms the desiccated, legal report into a cacophony of voices
– wails, cries, moans, and shouts that had earlier been banned from the text. . . ”
(Philip 2008)(203).
Hartman has defied genre in her previous works. For example, Lose Your Mother
has been called memoir, autoethnography, history, and travel literature. It is evident
to me, however, that Wayward Lives even more so than Hartman’s previous work
crosses genres and disciplines more freely, given the ways in which creative and
academic writing are nearly fused. It is in many ways a sister-text to W.E.B.
Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk (1903), which like Wayward Lives combines
fiction, memoir, sociocultural theory, cultural history, and lyric. It is also indebted
in several ways to Du Bois’s Black Reconstruction (1935)2 and C.L.R. James’s The
Black Jacobins (1938), seminal revisionist historiographies of black revolution and
rebellion. James in a 1971 lecture titled “How I Would Rewrite The Black Jacobins”
stated, “I would write descriptions in which the black slaves themselves, or people
very close to them, describe what they are doing and how they felt about the work
that they were forced to carry on. . . ” (Bertholf 2015)(82). Arguably, Hartman’s
2ThoughWayward Lives describes black life post-Emancipation, Hartman makes clear the ways in which the
systems undergirding the plantation extend their reach. Smallwood (2016) notes how Du Bois considered
questions of historiographical narrative methodology in Black Reconstruction which connects this work
to Hartman’s and her critiques of the archive. Du Bois asks, “What was slavery in the United States?”
and “Just what did it mean to the owner and the owned?” “Shall we accept the conventional story of
the old slave plantation and its owner’s fine, aristocratic life of cultured leisure? Or shall we note slave
autobiographies...?” (Smallwood 2016)(121)
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book takes up that task while incorporating the music of Souls. Wayward Lives also
scoffs at the boundaries separating academic disciplines and subdisciplines, crossing
black studies, American studies, cultural, queer, and women’s history with literature,
and engaging critical archive, memory, trauma, and visual studies, as well as affect
theory. This puts the work in community with scholars experimenting with new
registers of witnessing embracing ambivalence, many of whom the book cites. The
effect of Hartman’s crossing or combining genres is powerful because, as Christopher
B. Patterson puts it, “different genres ask different questions but also reach different
audiences” (Patterson and Hannabach 2020).3
The following chapter will be my own reading of Wayward Lives, focused on those
most speculative portraits and sketches which weave in literary, photographic, and
theoretical texts. I argue that Hartman’s intertextual engagement and mode of lit-
erary speculation most clearly serve to destabilize the archive through conjuring a
communal phenomenal space in which to emplace the reader in “productive sus-
pension” (Gopinath 2018)(16). The reader is invited to participate as narrator of
the past in order to reimagine the present and future; thus, Hartman redefines the
community, not only of the ghetto, the reformatory, and the social movement, but
also of readers and narrators. This chapter does not spend as much time on Hart-
man’s portraits of well-known figures, such as Du Bois, Ida B. Wells, and Hubert
Harrison, and in future research it would be interesting to examine how speculation
disorients or puts in doubt the validity of the archive’s attempts to narrate these
life stories. Therefore, this chapter does not attend in depth to the effect of the
combination of known and unknown lives catalogued in the book. Relatedly, I have
chosen to spend less time on the more historical-revisionist parts of Wayward Lives,
in which Hartman in part rewrites and reframes the history of black intellectualism
and radicalism. These segments contribute importantly to redefinitions of commu-
nity; however, given the relative wealth of information in the archive about these
subjects, I have chosen instead to focus my attention on the parts of book more
clearly “critically fabulated.”
In this chapter I will start by describing the overall dramatic structure of Wayward
Lives and the important paratexts that serve to frame Hartman’s counter-historical
gesture and contribute to the book’s “chorus.” Next, I will visit specific scenes in the
book in which Hartman’s narrative method of weaving in others’ “utterances” among
recontextualized archival artifacts works to conjure a speculative, phenomenal space
temporally unbound. Hartman’s intertextual literary, photographic, and theoretical
3In a recent article (Hartman 2020), Hartman cites Sarah Haley’s No Mercy Here (2016) LaShawn Harris’s
Sex Workers, Psychics and Number Runners (2017), and Cheryl Hicks’s Talk With You Like A Woman
(2010) as critical to the research and writing of Wayward Lives.
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interventions operate to position the narrator, her characters, and others (including
the reader) into affective relation – or a “chorus” arranged by the text. Her method
also places the work in relation to other literary texts crossing subjects, time periods,
and geographies, creating openings, in other words, within the “enclosures” of genres
and disciplines.
I attempt to illustrate the ways through which Wayward Lives can be considered
a “potential history” in how it recreates conditions for historically “incompossible”
stories while destabilizing univocal historical knowledge. Hartman’s text excavates
“the energy of nonnormative desires” and practices of everyday revolt by minor
figures so that the reader may be reattuned and suspended in affective affiliation in
the present with an unending past (Gopinath 2018)(8). Overall I aim to show how
Hartman’s dialogic method of narration implicates the reader as narrator who can
“at any given moment – intervene in the order of things” (Azoulay 2013)(565).
2.1 “Chorus” as Subject and Structure
Appropriating popular conceptions of the black chorus line, typically remembered
in the American imagination as male-directed entertainment through which African
American women were further subjugated and exoticized, Hartman describes the
chorus as a space for performance and a means of creative survival through which
women located an “outside” within the enclosures of heteropatriarchy and systemic
antiblackness. Several of Hartman’s historical subjects aspired to be chorus girls,
choreographers and performers of synchronized song and dance routines for the mu-
sical theater, so in many ways Wayward Lives is a cultural history of the black
chorine, setting the stage for the Jazz Age and Harlem Renaissance. The “cho-
rus” of the book functions as a whole, however, to symbolize the community of
“colored” women in the city, who sang, shouted, and moved in unison, a beautiful,
choreographed force creating a “city-within-the-city” (Hartman 2019)(235).
The “chorus” is also represented in the book as a “swarm,” a term appropriated and
rearticulated inWayward Lives and figured in a photograph of blackbirds; the chorus
and swarm of “blackbirds” become visual and sonic emblems for the community of
riotous black women. “Swarm” calls to mind its rampant contemporary usage to
disparage and dehumanize people of color, typically marginalized groups of migrants
and refugees. The New York Times called the influx of black migrants to San Juan
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Hill in New York a “swarm” in 1905 (Hartman 2019)(181). According to Hartman’s
endnotes, the term “swarm” was also used by Du Bois to describe “the movement
of the enslaved and the fugitive” as well as to describe “the collective action of
the general strike” (394). In Hartman’s appropriation, the swarm is transformed
– it figures to represent beautiful, non-hierarchical organization, a powerful and
potentially dangerous configuration that resists interpretation. The arrangement of
the swarm eludes our “common sense” and defies explanation. Observers are left
only to wonder at and consider perfect organization without hierarchy. As described
by biologist Deborah Gordon (2007), “A flock of birds turning in the sky is doing
something that people don’t know how to do: moving together, beautifully, without
a leader or choreographer. It’s a spectacular version of the collective behavior that
goes on everywhere, in groups of animals and among cells in our bodies. Each
bird responds to its neighbors, and the whole flock turns” (Gordon 2007). In fact,
Hartman makes the case that the chorus also or at least appears to function without
hierarchy and with no single voice; instead, many single voices become one, noisy
and harmonic.
Beyond the chorus line, “chorus” recalls the refrain, repetition in song and lyric,
and the Greek dramatic chorus. Hartman reminds us that the Greek etymology of
chorus means “to dance within enclosure” (Hartman 2019)(347). In Classical Greek
drama, the chorus was a group of actors who narrated and commented on the action
of the play with song and dance and often represented the polity’s hopes, fears, and
judgments: “their judgment is the verdict of history” (Britannica 2020). The chorus
in Greek drama could be interpreted as impartial while their commentary could
foreshadow events. In this way, the chorus could travel through time; their song
resonates and narrates the past often by predicting the future. In Wayward Lives,
lyrical and filmic vignettes break up historical and biographical narratives like songs,
echoing the style of Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk (1903) or Jean Toomer’s Cane
(1923). These segments function as the chorus in several senses of the word.
In Hartman’s “Note on Method,” which opens the book, it is explained that italicized
phrases mark “utterances from the chorus” and “all the others hovering about” her
subjects and narrative (Hartman 2019)(xiv, 33). Throughout the book she quotes
from various authors, poets, musicians, social-cultural theorists, and from state
archives, weaving, crossing, and combining temporalities and genres. In this way
the text becomes collaged and palimpsestic. Some of the voices of the chorus serving
as “supportive” texts include those by scholars Hazel Carby, Hortense Spillers, Sylvia
Wynter, Christina Sharpe, and Tina Campt; writers and poets Audre Lorde, Lucille
Clifton, Zora Neale Hurston, and Gwendolyn Brooks; blues musicians Ma Rainey,
Bessie Smith, and Trixie Smith; and historical “ancestresses” Ida B. Wells, Sojourner
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Truth, and Harriet Tubman.
The book is also structured by and in many ways modeled after several paratexts. It
seems to position itself in critical or ambivalent response to, as mentioned, Du Bois’s
The Philadelphia Negro (1899) in addition to his later work, Black Reconstruction
in America: An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the
Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880 (1935), in which Du Bois
argued that slaves during the Civil War staged a “general strike” resulting in the
Union’s success (therein positioning African Americans as historical actors) (Du Bois
1935). In Black Reconstruction he also discusses the psychological constructedness of
white identity. Hartman also writes in response to the ideology of “racial uplift” and
the pessimism surrounding African Americans’ migration to the city characterized
in Paul Laurence Dunbar’s essay “The Negros of the Tenderloin” (1898), in which
Dunbar lamented the wave of southern black migrants to the city who mistook it “for
a place where [they] might thrive” (Hartman 2019)(55). “What is to be done with
them, what is to be done for them,” Dunbar wondered, “if they are to be prevented
from inoculating our civilization with the poison of their lives?” (264, 267) cited in
(Hartman 2019)(9).
In Hartman’s portrait of Du Bois, “An Atlas of the Wayward,” Hartman calls him
“the guilty Victorian,” who “could regard wayward colored girls as nothing more
than the victims of a long history of violation and destined for the trade” (Hart-
man 2019)(120). Hartman writes counter to the logic of overwritten victimhood
and refuses to continue the story that destines black girls to defilement and dispos-
session. “Colored girls, too, were hungry for the carnal world,” she writes, “driven
by the fierce and insistent presence of their own desire, wild and reckless. Most
were determined not to sell anything, but content with giving it away” (120). Way-
ward Lives similarly stages a confrontation with Oscar Micheaux’s “race films” by
plotting their re-writing. Hartman imagines if the plotline of Body and Soul (1925)
had not been driven by a black mother’s failure. She also sketches a film Micheaux
never (and would never have) made – the life of queer performer Gladys Bentley.
In addition, the book’s paratexts include conventional historiographies of anarchism
and black radicalism, and of course the archival materials – photographs, newspa-
per articles, and prison case files – Hartman encounters in her research. These texts
all contribute to the book’s “chorus.” Weaving in “utterances from the chorus” is a
technique beyond intertextuality; it is a practice of recontextualization through a
“performative ethic of citation” (Nyong’o 2018)(10).
Following her note on method, readers are presented with a Cast of Characters and
list of Locations, supporting the idea that the book is modeled after the dramatic
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structure of a play or at the very least frames the text as a performance, further
complicating the fact/fiction divide. Following this, the book is broken up into
Three Books (Acts) divided into smaller chapters (Scenes). As Hartman explains,
all three books follow an errant path of the building of the community toward a
collective strong enough to transform the world or bring about “the end the world”
as we know it (Hartman 2019)(63).
Book One is comprised of individual stories of mostly newcomers to the slum and
chronicles experiences of failure, disappointment, and exploitation; there are many
false starts and ruptures in community in these scenes. However, there are also
moments of pleasure, friendship, and unexpected connection. Book One highlights
the persistence of hope deferred and describes the beginnings of communities form-
ing in the ghetto and the ward. Book Two describes the flowering of a racially
and ethnically heterogeneous community (particularly in Harlem) amidst intensify-
ing police repression and violence. These scenes specifically focus on the growing
community of “sexual variants.” Hartman describes how the crisis of categories is
slavery’s legacy and how social reformers’ “project of racial uplift” often centered
around regulating sexualities and gender roles and limiting freedoms on how (and
with whom) people lived. The subjects of these stories reject norms and practice
“a politics of refusal” by refusing that which has been refused to them (Hartman
and Moten 2016). Additionally, these stories show how openings were created for a
variety of gender performances, open queer and/or lesbian relationships, and alterna-
tive living arrangements, which were always followed by various forms of repression
and repudiation. Book Two explores living as performance and art and discusses
how queer black women were catalysts in a cultural revolution. Book Three opens
onto the backlash and criminalization of young women in the city. In response to
tightening laws, there was always resistance. In these scenes Hartman highlights
unconventional and minor histories of anarchism and sexual deviancy and describes
the organized and noisy rebellions and riots which occurred on the street and in
the ward. The chorus in the cabaret continues to dance within these enclosures
and carries the reader through this more cohesive and tightly woven community of
stories and subjects. By the end of Book Three, lives are interlocked and in step,
while retaining their specificity.
The following section will dive into each of these inner books and examine them
more closely as I map some of Wayward Lives’ key inter and paratexts, including
photographs and objects extracted from the archive. Due to the limits of space and of
the format of the thesis, I have chosen to skip through the book in order to focus my
attention on scenes that exemplify Hartman’s affective readings within the archive
and practice of fabulation. I intend to illustrate those moments when Hartman most
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clearly utilizes “close narration” and expresses her desire for an alternative “better
story” (Georgis 2013). I acknowledge that another writer might have made different
choices.
2.2 Fabulating the Space of “Might Could Live”
"The scene pivots around the breach and the wound and endeavors the
impossible – to redress it. The beauty resides as much in the attempt as
in its failure. What it envisions: life reconstructed along radically differ-
ent lines. The chorus elaborates and reconstructs the passage, conjures
the deaths in the fields and the death on city pavements, and reanimates
life; it enables the felled bodies to rise, plays out in multiple times, and
invites all to enter the circle, to join the line, to rejoice, and to celebrate
with great solemnity." (Hartman 2019)(197)
The epigraph to Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments is taken from Nella Larsen’s
1928 novel Quicksand: “She was, she knew, in a queer indefinite way, a disturbing
factor” (Larsen 1928)(7). Before discussing the novel and its parallels to Hartman’s
book, I want to analyze the quote “pre” contextualization. Firstly, Larsen’s line
reveals that a female-identified subject knows something about herself and is aware
that she produces an effect on her surroundings. She is conscious of the fact that
she is a “disturbing factor” or, in other words, an element of a larger whole – an
environment or community – and disrupts the homogeneity of that whole. She is a
part that stands apart, and her difference disturbs, meaning that she interferes with
the normal arrangement of things. Like water disturbed, she might have a rippling
effect. We order those who clean our rooms for a living, “do not disturb.” She might
come unannounced, at an inopportune time, on her own time, noisily “disturbing the
peace.” “Disturb” comes from the Latin disturbare, from dis- meaning “utterly” and
turbare from turba for “tumult”. Her presence brings a rupture, a tumultuous break;
she bothers or perhaps makes others anxious. She was, furthermore, disturbing “in
a queer, indefinite way.” She knew she was queerly and indefinitely interfering in
the order of things. Her disturbance was odd and could not be easily defined; she
was mysterious and capable of rousing suspicion. Possibly she was dangerous. It is
particularly these qualities of Helga Crane, whom the quote describes, that parallel
the subjects of Hartman’s text and makes both books resonate. Quicksand functions
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as a paratext framing Wayward Lives in ways similar to The Souls of Black Folk
and Cane; Quicksand, however, is narrated by a woman.
The epigraph is pulled from Quicksand’s first chapter, in which Helga sits alone
in her bedroom, thinking about her current employment as a schoolteacher at a
black southern boarding school called Naxos, based on the Tuskegee Institute and
built on the philosophy of “racial uplift”; black improvisation and individualism are
discouraged. Helga feels like she is “an insignificant part” and longs to refuse the
work that “smudge[s] out” her personality (Larsen 1928)(1, 5). Her colleagues view
her as an outsider and regard her love of nice things as evidence of her vanity. Helga
knows she “disturbs” but is ambivalent about her so-called faults. She hesitates
to quit the job because she depends on the money and is not willing to give up
her possessions, the books and clothes and furnishings which provide her a sense of
security and fulfil her desire for a beautiful life. At the end of the chapter Helga
goes to bed, leaving things unresolved in her head and her room messy “for the first
time,” her “startling green and gold negligee dripping about on chairs and stool”
(9).
The scene summarizes much of the inner struggles, complexities, and transforma-
tions experienced by the women in Wayward Lives. “Beauty and longing provided
the essential architecture of [their] existence . . . genius was exhausted in trying
to live” (Hartman 2019)(60). Though the time periods of both books nearly over-
lap, there are several obvious key differences between their main characters. Helga
works as a schoolteacher in the south, a job denied to black women in northern
cities. Though Helga (of “mixed-race”) works in a black school, she is an outsider in
her community. Most of the women in Wayward Lives are of course outsiders to the
city as southern newcomers, but their stories are insider-stories. Hartman frames
these women as members of a growing community and as possessing knowledge that
outsiders, such as the reformers, hope and fail to capture. Furthermore, Wayward
Lives is written in ways counter to the “tragic mulatta” trope arguably utilized
in Quicksand: rather than stereotypically depressed victims in a hostile world, the
women Hartman describes are resilient, dynamic, and multi-dimensional (114).
2.2.1 Beauty and the “Shadow Archive”
Under the title ofWayward Lives’ “Book One,” “She Makes an Errant Path Through
the City,” sits a black-and-white photograph of three black women walking down an
alley underneath hanging laundry. They walk in the direction of the camera, but
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their faces are wholly obscured as they are backlit by the sun.4 The first “scene” of
this section, titled “The Terrible Beauty of the Slum,” addresses the reader from an
insider’s perspective. Here readers encounter the narrator’s “ekphrasis,” or detailed
vivid descriptions of images real or imagined, used formally by Hartman to “inhabit”
the space of the ghetto and tenement (Hartman 2020). The narrator amid sense-
heavy description of the street and soon-to-be dilapidated “slum” or “Negro quarter”
introduces us to characters who will make a more explicit appearance in the coming
pages – namely, the voyeuristic social reformers who “fail to discern the beauty, . . .
missing all the ways black folks create life,” and “she” who dwells here, who “escapes
notice as she watches them” or “remains mystery and blur” in their photographs
(Hartman 2019)(4-6).
Hartman’s method of critical fabulation has been criticized for how it serves to
“fictionalize” or even “romanticize” contested histories. In one review, Keeanga-
Yamahtta Taylor (2019) writes that Hartman “is not romanticizing the margins,
though she suggests that we can find romance – the implacable pursuit of freedom –
within the margins’ constraints” (Taylor 2019). How does Hartman’s re-reading of
the beauty of the “dark ghetto” avoid romanticization? Similar to her appropriation
of the term “wayward,” Hartman’s reading challenges the terms that structure nor-
mative conceptions of “beauty.” Writing beauty into the image of the black ghetto is
one way in which she demonstrates a refusal to accept “the system of values” set up
to judge what is beautiful, defies the mechanism of representation that writes the
dwellers of the slum as “social problems,” and abjures the white gaze that routinely
yields pleasure from images of black pain and suffering.
"It was an age when Negroes were the most beautiful people, and this
was no less true of her. It’s hard to explain what’s beautiful about
a rather ordinary colored girl . . . In some regard, it is to recognize
the obvious, but that which is reluctantly ceded: the beauty of black
ordinary, the beauty that resides in and animates the determination to
live free, the beauty that propels the experiments in living otherwise."
(Hartman 2019)(33)
Foregrounding the potential of pleasure and possibility of beauty in the “ordinari-
ness” of economic precarity and social repudiation displaces “the received or au-
thorized account” that destines black women to defilement and lives of misery.
4Though the particular images Hartman discusses in her book are in black and white, it would also be
interesting to read them next to the long history of color photography’s “racial bias,” through which
darker skin tones have been chemically obscured in attempts to best represent white people.
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“Shadow” shades and complicates the picture. “Even in the daytime, the shad-
ows are too dark and too deep to capture it” (22).
Tavia Nyong’o (2018) writes that “fabulation is . . . not so much imagination as it is
imagination’s shadow” (Nyong’o 2018)(42). Against “gradual revelation” and “per-
fect restoration,” shadowy strategies, he writes, “offer us an alternative I want to
call – invoking a long, subterranean tradition of black escape and fugitivity – ‘dark
fabulation’” (49). Shadow can be “cast over . . . reason,” camouflage tactics of re-
sistance, and refer to practices of refusing “hegemonic demands” for “legibility and
transparency” (14-15). Hartman’s mode of fabulation, in this sense, can be viewed
as a way through which to narrate the “shadow archive” of the captive, marginal-
ized, or subaltern that is “darkened” and obscured through the logics of the archive
(11). “How might we begin to make sense of the paradoxical vibrance of a form of
life endangered, or even erased, by efforts at documentation and representation?”
asks Nyong’o (3). “Shadow” figures importantly in Wayward Lives, I argue, as a
metaphor for enigma and reticence, and for the refusal of representation through a
normative system of values.
While I will discuss next instances where those who are photographed “gaze back”
at the camera, it is important to note the fact that Hartman reads other pho-
tographs and images inWayward Lives counterintuitively for the possibilities opened
by “shadow” and always through an attention to the contexts in which photographs
were taken. Sometimes, Hartman writes, the subject of the photograph “eludes
capture” (Hartman 2019)(7). Hartman’s subjects are often able to avoid being pho-
tographed by the social reformer and journalist who desire to use these images as
“evidence” of squalid homes and immoral behavior. But if her subjects are pho-
tographed, they might “avert[. . . ] their gaze or rush[. . . ] past” and become blurs,
“cluster[. . . ] at the edge of the photos,” turn away, slump shoulders, make “side-
eyes” or look mean (17-18, 35). In another example, in Hartman’s portrait of W.E.B
Du Bois (“An Atlas of the Wayward”), she opens with a scene of the sociologist ob-
serving two women walking holding hands and looking in shop windows: “His eyes
settled on them, but they paid him no mind” (81). They elude his gaze by ignoring
him. In this way, Hartman saps the assumed power of Du Bois’s expert gaze and
instead redirects our attention to women’s gaze directed toward the objects for sale
in the window, objects that they read toward imagining a “world so much better,
so much bigger” (83).
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2.2.2 Annotating the “Compelled Image”
Hartman’s reticence to “revisit the scene of subjection” (Hartman 2008)(4) is made
apparent in “A Minor Figure” in which she figures herself as the researcher exam-
ining “compelled images” of anonymous black girls. In this scene Hartman narrates
her encounters with the archived images of prepubescent girls photographed naked
in white men’s studios, such as those of Herman Moens and Thomas Eakins. She
attempts to reread the photograph through new terms and values in order to de-
scribe what the photo “makes plain” – that “her body was already marked by a
history of sexual defilement, already branded as a commodity” (Hartman 2019)(29).
Though “this necessary and routine violence defined the afterlife of slavery” (29)
and so structured and structures the world and “present past” in which we read the
photograph now, Hartman strives to imagine the experience of the photographed girl
to eventually work against dominant readings that she will be lost and obliterated
as a result of her anonymity and nonconsent.
"The photograph is small enough to be cradled in the palm of your hand.
. . . It is a compelled image, an image taken without the permission of
the sitter; it is an image intended to classify, isolate, and differentiate.
. . . The rigidness of the body betrays the salacious reclining posture,
and the girl’s flat steely-eyed glare is hardly an invitation to look. She
retreats as far away from the camera as possible into the corner of the
sofa, as if seeking a place in which to hide." (Hartman 2019)(24-5)
In discussing the “odalisque”-styled photograph, Hartman refuses to see the child
“posing” as she lays on the sofa; she similarly rereads the child’s “direct gaze at
the camera” (27). Unlike the gaze of a black performer who might doubly abjure
and solicit the external gaze (Nyong’o 2018)(3), Hartman writes, this is “not a
solicitation of the viewer” nor “an appeal for recognition” – it is not “an invitation
to look” (25). “Her body is exposed, but she withholds everything” (27).
The image itself is reproduced as faded and hard-to-make-out behind Hartman’s
text. Other photos in this section are also cropped, so that the girls’ bodies are
less exposed. These acts of redaction and attempts at annotation are not only signs
of Hartman’s reticence but also the tension of narrating “incompossible” stories.
Hartman’s ample use of questions in this scene operate to, as Katherine McKit-
trick (2013) writes, reread “black dispossession as a ‘question mark’” (McKittrick
2013)(42). The interrogative, according to Jennifer Morgan (2016), is “a kind of po-
etics that, together with the fictive imaginary, stand as counterweight to the struc-
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tural binds of . . . the slaveholders’ bookkeeping” that in this case is reproduced
through the violence of the white male gaze (Morgan 2016). Hartman wonders,
“What knowledge of the world did she gain that afternoon?” (Hartman 2019)(25).
Rather than see the girl “as tragic or as ruined,” Hartman attempts to view the
image otherwise, to create a more nuanced and generous reading that refuses the
girl’s reduction. Hartman asks, “Was it possible to annotate the image? To make
my words into a shield that might protect her, a barricade to deflect the gaze and
cloak what had been exposed?” (26).
Here and elsewhere in the scene, Hartman cites Christina Sharpe’s proposed method
of “annotation and redaction,” discussed in her book In the Wake: On Blackness
and Being (2016). Sharpe also invites onlookers to study a photograph of a black
child, who was rescued from the devastating 2010 earthquake in Haiti. A piece of
tape is affixed to the child’s forehead reading “Ship,” possibly signaling her next
destination and inevitably recalling histories when Africans were labeled cargo and
commodity. Sharpe asks, “What is the look in her eyes? ... What can one see
beyond the word that threatens to block out everything else?” (Sharpe 2016)(118).
In an act of redaction, Sharpe cuts up images of Delia and Drana, two enslaved
women Louis Agassiz photographed nude for his “racial studies.” Only their eyes
remain after the redaction, “to focus their individual and collective looks out and
past the white people who claimed power over them and the instrument by which
they are being further subjected” (118).
Like Sharpe, Hartman attempts to “recover” the photograph of the anonymous girl
from the violence of the “external gaze,” but in the service of imagining another
kind of story.
"[T]he look is in service of an intramural labor that yearns to produce
a different account of the document. In looking at the girl, – we must
bear the burden of the gaze with her, be situated by its violence, defeat
its logic, look so that she might be covered, no longer captured in the
frame. The photograph of the nude girl on the arabesque sofa pivots
on the matter of how we look, and the hope and the risk is that a look
might be a way of tending to or caring for one another." (Hartman 2020)
Continuing to acknowledge that without a name she may never “exhume” the par-
ticular girl in the photograph, Hartman writes, “What mattered was that she was
a placeholder for all the possibilities and the dangers awaiting young black women
in the first decades of the twentieth century. In being denied a name or, perhaps,
in refusing to give one, she represents all the other girls who follow in her path.
57
Anonymity enables her to stand in for all the others. The minor figure yields to the
chorus” (Hartman 2019)(15-17). In other words, Hartman repurposes these pho-
tographs toward the goal of retracing “her steps through the city” and to “imagine
her many lives” (30). Similarly, Smallwood (2016) discusses how in Hartman’s essay
“Venus is Two Acts,”
"Venus represents millions more: the twelve-and-one-half million counted
in quantitative studies of the slave trade; and the ’Sixty Million and
more’ to whom Toni Morrison dedicated the novel Beloved, those ’who
didn’t make it from there to here and through.’ She embodies the im-
measurable weight of black lives made barely knowable by the violence
of racial slavery, and ’which are visible only in the moment of their dis-
appearance.’" (Smallwood 2016)(119)
In the photograph of the girl in the studio, similarly (but arguably more hopefully),
Hartman imagines other, anticipated “but not yet located” images of the girl through
which we may “glimpse the terrible beauty of wayward lives” and through which
“it is easy to imagine the potential history of a black girl that might proceed along
other tracks” (Hartman 2019)(30, emphasis mine).
In this scene Hartman refers to Tina Campt’s book Listening to Images (2017) in
which Campt deploys methods of “listening” to identity photographs from state
archives. Her close readings of these “quiet” photographs re-energize them as “af-
fective remainders” (Georgis 2013)(15). Campt distinguishes “quiet” from “silence,”
because “quiet registers sonically” and so requires careful and focused listening
(Campt 2017)(6). She invites readers to attend to photographs “by way of the
unspoken relations that structure them” – both in the event of the photograph be-
ing taken and subsequent archival encounter(s) (7). Hartman’s description of an
identity photograph of Alice Kennedy, or “inmate 4501” at Bedford Hills Reforma-
tory (from a later chapter “Riot and Refrain”), makes evident her aim to reattune
her senses to enable more affective readings of quiet photographs, a readjustment
that resists the reiteration of the violence that arrested Alice Kennedy’s body and
aimed to reduce her agency through (de)identification:
"She stares blankly ahead, steely-eyed, withholding everything, owning
nothing. . . . Even a century later, reading through the materials assem-
bled in the case file and poring over her letters, I am prohibited from
calling her name, less to protect her than to guarantee her disappear-
ance. The state never releases her but claims forever this part of her
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past as its property. The photograph, which was intended to classify,
measure, identify, and differentiate, offers no clue about the riot or her
role in it, but I am unable to look at her face without anticipating it,
without straining to hear its music." (Hartman 2019)(264-65, emphasis
mine)
Hartman perhaps illustrates the prohibition “from calling her name” by choosing
not to include it into the main text. (Alice’s name is only retrievable from the List of
Illustrations closing the book.) Nevertheless, “each photograph bears traces of the
catastrophe and is susceptible to becoming a noncatastrophe” (Azoulay 2013)(571).
Ariella Azoulay (2008) similarly argues for photography’s ability to be read otherwise
by a reoriented, reattuned spectator, who she proposes may “watch” a photograph
rather than “look at” it (16, cited in (Campt 2017)6). This action dismantles the
logic that seeing means knowing if a spectator must become active through “watch-
ing” (or “listening”) and suggests that “the event of photograph is never over”
(Azoulay 2011, 77, cited in (Campt 2017)120).
The “quiet” image itself may thereby be reread as “active” when we consider Ran-
cière’s (2009) description of the “pensive image,” or the image that contains an
“untold thought that cannot be attributed to the intention of the person who pro-
duces it and which has an effect on the person who view it without her linking it
to a determinate object” (107). The “pensive image” “signals a zone of indeter-
minacy” (Rancière 2009)(107) in which a “counterintuitive” spectator can read an
image against or outside of the photographer’s intention for “an affect of indetermi-
nate effect” (104). Along with Hartman and Campt, Azoulay suggests that what is
necessary is not only a careful, critical reading, but also that photographs be repo-
sitioned in new contexts whereby they may be charged with a different power. This
action works toward undermining the “scopic regime” that attempted to capture the
photographed with the intention to regulate, confine, limit, and classify (Azoulay
2013)(571).
Hartman acknowledges that the girl’s lack of a name threatens the possibility of her
recovery, but then repositions the “name” by calling it a “fiction” that would only
“postpone the question: Who is she?” (14).
"Without a name, there is a risk that she might never escape the oblivion
that is the fate of minor lives and be condemned to the past for the rest
of her existence, remaining a meager figure appended to the story of a
great man and relegated to item number 308, African American girl, in
the survey of his life or work. . . . In a compelled photograph, a girl’s
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name is of no greater consequence than her desire for a different kind
of likeness. (The only thing I knew for sure was that she did have a
name and a life that exceeded the frame in which she was captured.)"
(Hartman 2019)(15)
She attempts to reposition the photograph in a new context, protected from the
external gaze, in the service of imagining another kind of story that “discern[s] the
glimmer of possibility, feel[s] the ache of what might be” (30). Continuing to ac-
knowledge that without a name she may never find the particular girl photographed,
the girl comes to stand for others. Ambivalently, this reading in the “shadow” of
a new method opens rather than closes off possibility through the repetition of an
ethical witnessing that privileges the question.
2.2.3 Speculating a Complex Hunger
Book One moves deeper into the archive and its limits with the section, “An Inti-
mate History of Slavery and Freedom,” which tells Mattie Nelson’s story based on
but exceeding her extensive case file at Bedford Hills. The section starts, as Hart-
man explains in the endnotes, prior to Mattie’s arrest following an accusation of
prostitution made by her neighbor. Hartman begins by imagining Mattie’s reasons
for leaving her home state of Virginia for New York City and the hopes she held dur-
ing the journey on the Old Dominion steamer (Hartman 2019)(45). The narrative
speculates that Mattie, like many other black girls, was attempting to escape the
“house of bondage” with its “taint of slavery” by migrating north: “Neither Mattie
nor her mother or her grandmother had chosen the kitchen or the washtub; they
had been conscripted there” (47). Mattie knew she “wanted something else. It was
simple and elusive, as vague and insistent as that” (46). In New York, however,
Mattie becomes a maid at a boarding house and then a “laundress,” since the shops
and factories do not hire “colored girls, especially girls as dark as Mattie” (55).
The most powerful and speculative part of Mattie’s narrative centers on her sexual
relationship at “not yet sixteen” with twenty-five-year-old Herman Hawkins (56).
The narration refuses one version of the story of their encounter, acknowledging the
impossibility of assuming there was love, pleasure, consent, or nonconsent in their
meetings. “Whether her lover valued her as a prize or took advantage of a gullible
young woman matters less than what Mattie discovered in that room – what she
wanted might actually matter” (59). Embracing ambiguity, Hartman makes the
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choice here to read Mattie’s love life against the grain. Instead of assuming she was
a victim, helpless to the advances of Hawkins, or that she felt little feeling when they
were together or numbed herself out, Hartman imagines otherwise: “It is possible
that Mattie experienced this opening of her desire as a refusal to all that kept her
fixed in place, stuck at the laundry, chained to an ironing board, suffocating and
without possibility of change” (59).
In constructing the inner, complex life of Mattie prior to her arrest and imprison-
ment at Bedford (where the archive begins), the reader has met Mattie through an
intimate narrator – a loyal confidante and co-conspirator, a sister or a friend who
can be trusted to keep Mattie’s secrets safe. In this way, Hartman sets the reader
up with a new critical lens through which to read Mattie’s case file, which would
work to dehumanize and attempt to deprive her of the possibility of desire and a
beautiful, freer life. “Mattie was a hunger artist wasting away before the eyes of
the world for lack of opportunity while everyone gawked and watched. And like
any artist with no art form, she became dangerous” (Hartman 2019)(59-60). Quot-
ing here Toni Morrison’s novel Sula (1973) in which a passionate girl named Sula
Peace disrupts life-as-usual with her open defiance of social conventions (Morrison
1973), Hartman speculates on Mattie’s desire for an outlet for her expression and
performance of her sexuality.
In Mattie’s narrative Hartman transforms “a deed of no import” into something
larger: “just an everyday act of fucking [which] would not have been noticed had
it not been part of greater social upheaval” (59). Minor acts in Wayward Lives are
consistently present amidst a wave of repression and confinement and the nosiness
of neighbors, landlords, and cops who wouldn’t just let black girls be; minor acts
become integral to a “terrible” movement and revolution of black girls “swarming”
together, desiring better lives and wanting “something else.”
"Mattie’s restiveness and longing and the free love practiced in a pri-
vate bedroom rented by the week were part of a larger ensemble of
intimate acts that were transforming social life and inaugurating the
modern, which was characterized by the entrenchment and transforma-
tion of racism, emergent forms of dispossession, and the design of new
enclosures, and by a fierce and expanded sense of what might be possi-
ble. Girls on the cusp of womanhood, young colored women like Mattie,
were at the center of this revolution in a minor key." (Hartman 2019)(59)
The bedroom is redefined as a grander space: a “laboratory for trying to live free”
(59). This bedroom echoes Helga Crane’s, where alone she would imagine living
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a different life. Mattie, like Helga, also loved beautiful things. She “loved cash-
mere sweaters . . . and the cool slip of silk undergarments against her flesh” (60).
Hartman’s use of sensory detail redirect and reorient our attention. The narrative
emphasizes touch and feeling, dissolving the boundaries between physical sensation,
thought, and emotion: “if she could feel deeply, she could be free” (60).
In the context of the book overall, Mattie’s story serves to illustrate how ordinary
black girls participated in community reorganization and revolution by living outside
of heteronormative arrangements and by refusing to subject themselves to uncreative
work. Hartman casts them as creators of space and of an “outside” within the
enclosure, not only of the ghetto and their economic precarity, but of the boredom
and monotony of lives as domestic workers and servants.
"Few guessed that Mattie was trying to make something of herself, how-
ever uncertain she was about what might be and however desperate to
shake loose the expectations and demands of others, which always boiled
down to drudge and whore. Better an errant path than the known world.
Better loose than stuck. If it is possible to imagine Mattie and other
young black women as innovators and radical thinkers, then the trans-
formations of sexuality, intimacy, affiliation, and kinship taking place in
the black quarter of northern cities might be labeled the revolution before
Gatsby." (Hartman 2019)(60-1)
According to Hartman, before the black communists stepped up the pulpit and prior
to the Harlem Renaissance, the “reconstruction of intimate life commenced” (61).
She writes, “After the slave ship and the plantation, the third revolution of black
intimate life unfolded in the city” via experiments made on and through mind, body,
and soul in such ordinary settings as “the hallway, bedroom, stoop, rooftop, airshaft,
and kitchenette” (61). Social projects abounded at this time, so breaking laws and
social norms was not unusual except, “hardly anyone imagined that young black
women might be involved in this project too” (60). Thus, Hartman makes clear one
aim of the book: to destabilize and amend the history that has left black women
and girls out or regulated them to the margins.
Hartman explains that in contrast to narratives like Du Bois’s Black Reconstruction
that focused on “deviance and pathology,” in her project she set out to annotatively
describe “the way in which the particular formation of black social life yielded rad-
ically different forms of intimacy and kinship and association” (Siemsen 2018). In
Book One Hartman focuses on the stories of new arrivals in the northern city and
their excitement and accompanying disillusionment. These stories narrate economic
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precarity and other difficulties facing families, as well as tales of sex and love matters
breaching moralist and “lawful” codes. They are stories describing instances where
desire meets the necessity to live otherwise, and stories speculating ways of living
“outside” within enclosures, suggesting the building of a possible community inside
the confines of the ghetto in the weather of the criminalization of black life.
2.2.4 Narrating through a “Queer Optic”
Book Two, “The Sexuality of the Black Belt” focuses more explicitly on the poten-
tialities and dreams of living in the gap outside of heteronormativity and describes
queer experiments in refusing and performing gender otherwise. This “Act” tells
stories of creating community outside of straight coupling, particularly through per-
formance and art, alongside the development of the Tenderloin, San Juan Hill, and
Harlem as racially and ethnically mixed communities in New York. Young couples
clash with the law and get swept up in violent riots as more women and girls are
sent to the reformatory. Sexual “variants” are documented and studied, but other
living arrangements and open lesbian relationships persist and defy prying eyes.
Gladys Bentley’s story, imagined as an Oscar Micheaux film never made, is the
most speculative section in Book Two and is a brief but rich scene encapsulating
strategies of evading a monotonous life of servitude. La Bentley or Bobbie Minton,
as he was known, was a performer in the cabaret – “a star in Harlem’s Jungle
Alley, one of its high priests” – whose life offstage garnered as much if not more
attention than his onstage performances (Hartman 2019)(197).5 “Mistah Beauty,
the Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Woman, Select Scenes from a Film Never Cast
by Oscar Micheaux, Harlem, 1920s” describes the queer filmic representation of
Bentley, who “trashed the gendered norms and family ideals central to the project
of racial uplift – self-regulation, monogamy, fidelity, wedlock, and reproduction – and
scoffed at the moralism of the latter-day Victorians, the aristocrats of uplift” (200).
Hartman’s sketch, according to her endnotes, is based on Bentley’s autobiographical
essay “I Am aWoman Again” published in Ebony magazine in 1952, in which Bentley
describes his hormone treatment to become a woman “again,” implying, Hartman
says, Bentley’s abandonment of “the categories of woman and female decades earlier”
(384).
5I choose here to follow Hartman’s use of the pronoun “he” to refer to Bentley, which, Hartman explains, is
a choice made “to respect his masculine identification” (394). Hartman’s sketch and my description of it
cover a period of time preceding Bentley’s transition to “become a woman again,” discussed in Bentley’s
Ebony magazine article (1952).
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“Bentley was abundant flesh, art in motion,” writes Hartman (197). He performed
wearing men’s clothes, always in a tuxedo and top hat, and would march down
“Seventh Avenue attired in the threads of a Harlem sheik and usually with a pretty
chorus girl hanging on his arms” (197).
"He thrived on the fact that his ’odd habits’ were ’the subject of much
tongue wagging’ because he lived and loved as a man. He wasn’t a rad-
ical, but a brilliant performer, one smart enough to make the corporeal
male diction of black and mannish into a kind of costume that delighted,
aroused, and solicited others. . . . The appreciation and the laughter of
onlookers crowded in the cabaret domesticated the danger of La Bentley,
but he conceded no ground. There was nothing feminine about him; it
was more than glamour drag, more than a woman outfitted as a man,
as several of his wives, both white and colored, could attest." (Hartman
2019)(198-99)
Hartman describes Bentley as “a modern surface” and “an exemplary architecture
of black possibility” (199). Bentley’s body becomes the site for his resistance, his
manner of walking subverting expectation, defying and remaking knowledge of what
could be.
Since he lords over the club and cabaret, where “black virtuosity is on display,”
Hartman’s treatment of Bentley’s life as a film centers on this space (96). The
chorus line is of course en scène and comes to stand in as the symbol of movement
and the beauty of excess:
"[T]he dancing bodies are arranged in beautiful lines that shift and
change as the flourish and excess of the dancers unfold into riotous pos-
sibility and translate the tumult and upheaval of the Black Belt into art.
. . . Bentley’s life refracted through Micheaux’s cinema is the wild, dereg-
ulated movement that refuses the color line and flees the enclosure of
the ghetto. The bodies in motion, bodies intimate and proximate, reck-
lessly assert what might be, how black folks might could live." (Hartman
2019)(196-97)
Hartman explains that in a Micheaux film, La Bentley would always be cast as a
villain who would “meet a bad end”; there was never enough room in these kinds of
“race films,” even those directed by a black director, for the survival and exaltation of
the queer black hero or anyone else resisting the normative terms of respectability or
“good morals” (200). In Hartman’s cinematic treatment, La Bentley “dies” but not
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by bullet or car crash but rather “self-immolation” (201). In the film’s “brutal twist,”
Bentley’s “last act of self-renunciation” is an act “motivated by state repression and
declared in a coerced confession”: “The beautiful husband [is forced] to assume the
role of wife, signaling his defeat” (201). Hartman references here the repressive
conditions in and under which the Ebony article was published; the “moral panic”
and anti-homosexual campaign known as the “Lavender Scare” paralleled the era’s
anti-communism (McCarthy was coincidentally re-elected the same year as Bentley’s
renunciation of her “manliness”). Hartman quotes Bentley’s words at the end of the
scene, claiming these are “lines from the deathbed”: “I inhabited that half-shadow
no man’s land which exists between the boundaries of the two sexes” (Hartman
2019)(202).
After reading Bentley’s “death” scene, I was compelled to investigate what Hart-
man calls a “coerced confession.” The article in Ebony was easily found online. Its
subtitle reads, “Fabulous entertainer tells how she found happiness after medical
treatment to correct her strange affliction” (Bentley 1952)(93).6 In the “exposé”
Bentley reveals the “miracle” that made her a woman again – “I found a man I
could love and who could love me” (94). Bentley claims that she discovered that
she had suppressed her “womanliness” ever since childhood because her mother had
always wanted a boy. Deciding she wanted to marry a man, she visited a doctor
who told her that her “sex organs [were] infantile” and recommended injections of
female hormones (98). A few photographs show Bentley engaged in domestic tasks
at home: “Turning back cover of bed, Miss Bentley prepares to make homecoming
husband comfortable . . . Taste-testing dinner she has prepared for husband J. T.
Gipson, Miss Bentley enjoys domestic role which she shunned for years” (94). De-
spite her happy and “normal existence” as a married woman, Bentley reveals that
she is “still haunted by the sex underworld” and decided to tell her story to “help
others who are trapped in its dark recesses” (94): “If I can steer some unknowing
youths – tempted by the lure of something different – from succumbing to the snare
and instead turning to the path of righteousness, I would feel some redemption from
my sins” (98).
The “queer optic” through which Hartman narrates the film of Bentley’s life enables
one to imagine the gap in which Bentley exists however he likes, not as a woman nor
perhaps as a man (Gopinath 2018)(8). It is significant that the “film” though based
on Bentley’s article largely digresses from it and that Hartman chooses instead to
elaborate and reanimate Bentley’s queer life; the scene “endeavors the impossible
– to redress it” (Hartman 2019)(197). In this narration, readers are encouraged
6I adopt now “she” to mirror Bentley’s own use of the pronoun throughout the article.
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to think through the ways in which “womanhood” as a form of “personhood” has
been historically made impossible for those with a variety of bodies in a society that
privileges cis men and bodies read as male. The scene invites us also to consider the
ways in which the lives of people read as female have been made unlivable, and how
sexualities have been delimited contingent on historical, geographical, and cultural
factors to varying degrees. Hartman’s fabulation opens a terrain in which to also
consider the ways in which “womanhood” has been made into an impossibility es-
pecially for African American and other racialized women, especially during slavery
and its afterlives.
2.2.5 The Vagrant’s Noisy Protest
After “wayward lives” have been introduced in Books One and Two, in Book Three,
as the title “Beautiful Experiments” suggests, the narrative shifts to focus on ex-
periments in living otherwise and forms of protest in the street and the reformatory.
This section’s scenes tell of the increasing criminalization of young women amid
their struggles to create community, and the ways in which freedom and refuge were
sought through art and performance. Despite the obstacles and laws forbidding it,
these women assembled, lived communally, and practiced mutual aid. In several
ways Book Three rewrites the history of an American anarchist movement, which
has ignored the masses of colored girls who fought against exploitative conditions
at work and in the home, refused domestic labor, and “troubled the marriage plot”
(Hartman 2019)(91). Within the enclosure of the lock-up, they would also strike,
riot, and find ways to articulate their demands for better and more beautiful lives.
Book Three opens with an image titled “Photograph of Silent Protest Parade: Race
prejudice is the offspring of ignorance and the mother of lynching” (421). The
photograph shows a city street full of rows of black girls wearing white marching
hand-in-hand. The Negro Silent Protest Parade was a silent march along Fifth Av-
enue in New York of roughly 15,000 African American men, women, and children on
July 28, 1917 (in record-breaking heat) (Newman 2017). The march was organized
by the NAACP to protest lynchings, mob violence, and attacks on black laborers,
communities, and neighborhoods, as well as to promote black causes and social
welfare. At the first black-only protest parade in New York, women and children
marched wearing white as men dressed in black followed behind. They marched in
silence, which was common practice for peace parades at the time, but likely also in
solidarity with black communities who had fewer opportunities for public protest.
66
Some of the most recent and violent mob massacres had taken place in Texas, Ten-
nessee, and Illinois, and the East St. Louis Massacre, which occurred roughly fifteen
miles from Ferguson, Missouri where Michael Brown was shot by police in 2014, is
understood to be a catalyst for the parade (Newman 2017). Regardless of the silence
of the protest, the marchers’ placards made their message clear: “Give us a chance
to live” and “Suffer Little Children and Forbid Them Not.” Other signs (not visible
in this photograph) read: “Your hands are full of blood” and “We Are Maligned as
Lazy and Murdered When We Work” (Newman 2017).
Following a sketch illustrating the hysteria around black women’s sexuality as a
“growing menace” and concurrent criminalization of young women judged “way-
ward,” comes the scene “The Anarchy of Colored Girls Assembled in a Riotous
Manner” containing the story of Esther Brown. The title of the scene borrows the
phrase “assembled in a riotous manner” from an incendiary speech made by the
governor of New York in 1787, in which he proclaimed that authorities must “take
all methods for the seizing and apprehending of all such Negroes found to be as-
sembled and if any of them refuse to submit then fire upon them, kill or destroy
them” (Hartman 2019)(398). Hartman makes it clear how this proclamation was
a continuation of the violence and restriction of the southern plantation, on which
“no more than three slaves could meet together on penalty of being whipped not
more than forty lashes” and twenty lashes for “playing or making any hooting or
disorderly noise” (248).
Hartman thus initially frames the story of a young woman’s criminalization and
participation in prison “noise strikes” against the backdrop of a long history of
antiblack violence and struggle. Reminding readers of the history of the labeling
of “black noise” as dangerous and criminal, Hartman makes clear not only how
history is “incomplete” but also the commingled ways in which black being – walking,
assembling, associating, dancing, singing, and making noise – has attempted to be
managed, controlled, and criminalized by racist authorities.
"In the twentieth century, the unregulated movement and assembly of
black folks remained a matter of public safety. Gatherings that were too
loud or too unruly or too queer – or venues like hotels and cabarets that
welcomed black and white patrons; black-and-tan dives frequented by
Chinese men and white girls or black women with Italian paramours or
women who preferred dancing with each other – were deemed disorderly,
promiscuous, and morally depraved. These forms of free association and
open assembly threatened the public good by transgressing the color line
and eschewing the dominant mores." (Hartman 2019)(248)
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In Book Three Hartman reframes instances of criminality, such as “errancy” and
“vagrancy,” as forms of living rebellion: “What the law designated as crime were the
forms of life created by young black women in the city” (236). Alongside the revolts
she brings to life in the reformatory, on the street, and in the cabaret, Hartman once
again highlights “ordinary forms of gathering” and “practices of subsistence and
making do” that followed refusals to accept unjust, degrading work in exchange for
meager pay, labor that promised to suspend life and replace freedom with servitude
(236).
Mirroring her method in Mattie Nelson’s sketch, Hartman speculatively describes
Esther Brown prior to the creation of her Bedford Hills case file, drawing from
Esther’s own statements taken from patient and staff notes and state commission
investigations. Within this narrative, Hartman recontextualizes quotes from Karl
Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, Emma Goldman, and Peter Kropotkin to “misread” an-
archist tracts because “Only a misreading of the key texts of anarchism could ever
imagine a place for wayward colored girls” (Hartman 2019)(231). Hartman attests
that Kropotkin left out black women’s societies and choruses in his famous 1902
anarchist essay Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution. “Untested militants and smug
ideologues . . . failed to recognize that experience was capable of opening up new
ways, yielding a thousand new forms and improvisations” (230). Esther Brown’s
“way of living was nothing short of anarchy,” but though they walked the same
streets of New York, she and Emma Goldman “failed to recognize each other” (230);
Hubert Harrison, the lecturer on “free love,” overlooked Esther’s presence too. Un-
surprisingly, “Esther Brown’s minor history of insurrection went unnoted until she
was apprehended by police” (232).
Before her arrest, however, Esther refused to work as often as she could. She pre-
ferred idleness, her “only luxury,” or liked “strolling along Harlem’s wide avenues
. . . losing herself in cabarets and movie houses”:
"Esther Brown hated to work, the conditions of work as much as the very
idea of work. Her reasons for quitting said as much. Housework: Wages
too small. Laundry work: Too hard, ran away. General housework:
Tired of work. Sewing buttons on shirts: Tired of work. Dishwasher:
Tired of work. Housework: Man too cross. Live-in service: I might as
well be a slave. . . . She ran the streets because nowhere else in the
world was there anything for her. . . . She had several lovers to whom
she was bound by need and want, not by the law. . . . With the support
of her sister and grandmother and help from friends, lovers, dates, and
consorts, she didn’t need to work on a regular basis. She picked up day
work when she was in a pinch and endured a six-week stretch of “Yes,
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Missus, I’ll get to it” when coerced by need. . . .Why should she toil in
the kitchen or laundry in order to survive? Why should she work herself
to the bone?" (Hartman 2019)(232-34)
It is important here to point out again Hartman’s use of the interrogative, utilized
heavily in “A Minor Figure” and throughout Wayward Lives. Instead of focusing on
how Esther’s refusal to work was read by the authorities at Bedford Hills, these ques-
tions illustrate Hartman’s own reading. “Why should she work herself to the bone?”
punctuate Manichean readings that perpetuate antiblack violence post-plantation.
Questions also operate to reread Esther’s and other captives’ dispossession of their
autonomy and futures as a “question mark” (McKittrick 2013)(5). As a counter-
historical poetic gesture, Hartman’s questions work against the logics that read
Esther and her friends as criminals. Like the subjunctive mood, I would add, Hart-
man’s questions point to the author’s work to emplace and involve the reader as a
potential narrator of the historical text.
“Fiercely intelligent,” Esther chose “an errant path [that] cut through the heart of
Harlem in search of the open city, l’ouverture, inside the ghetto . . . Wandering and
drifting was how she engaged the world and how she understood it; this repertoire
of practices composed her knowledge” (Hartman 2019)(234-35). According to the
endnotes, l’ouverture, meaning “the opening,” is both a reference to “the revolu-
tionary practice of the enslaved” (i.e. François Toussaint Louverture was a former
slave and leader of the Haitian Revolution) and “another way to think about tumult,
upheaval, and the radical practice of everyday life” (395). Esther’s drifting mirrors
Mamie Shepherd’s, described in an earlier scene: “Roaming about unloosened a wild
something that made her feel alive, a sharp pang of want that caused her to tremble.
The black city at night was alive with possibility” (137). Hartman moves between
Esther’s unregulated and improvised wandering and the movement of all those in
the “city-within-the-city,” shifting between time periods and registers (235). She
riffs in the following excerpt on Michel de Certeau’s “long poem of walking” and
writings by Du Bois, among others (394):
"An everyday choreography of the possible unfolded in the collective
movement, which was headless and spilling out in all directions, strollers
drifted en masses, like a swarm or the swell of an ocean; it was a long
poem of black hunger and striving. It was the wild rush from house ser-
vice on the part of all who [could] scramble or run. It was a manner of
walking that threatened to undo the city, steal back the body, break all
the windows. . . . What might be was unforeseen, and improvisation was
the art of reckoning with chance and accident." (Hartman 2019)(234)
69
Hartman then returns to Esther, who at seventeen-years-old was, “a threat to public
order and moral decency”; she was “quick to anger because of too much pride” and
had “a bad attitude” (235). “Excessive liberty had ruined her. The social worker
concurred, ‘With no social considerations to constrain her, she was ungovernable’”
(235).
Across the limits of the archival trace, Hartman brings Esther’s longings into relief,
imagining this young woman and her desires among those of many in a still more
expansive and inclusive chorus. Again, parallels are drawn between Esther and
Mamie when Hartman conjures a scene of Mamie watching moving images and
being transported by fantasy: “The world was so vast and she had seen so little
of it . . . With ten cents she could buy an excursion to the beautiful places she
would never visit, experience lives she would never inhabit except in a darkened
auditorium, yet it all seemed more real to her than the three-room flat in which
she lived” (137). In the following, Hartman puts Esther in relation to Gwendolyn
Brooks (1953) (quoting from Maud Martha: A Novel) and Lucille Clifton (1993) in
her poem “won’t you celebrate with me”:
"Esther Brown longed for another world. She was hungry for more,
for otherwise, for better. She was hungry for beauty. In her case, the
aesthetic wasn’t a realm separate and distinct from the daily challenges
of survival; rather, the aim was to make an art of subsistence. She did
not try to create a poem or song or painting. What she created was
Esther Brown. That was the offering, the bit of art, that could not come
from any other. She would polish and hone that. She would celebrate that
every day something had tried to kill her and failed. She would make a
beautiful life." (Hartman 2019)(235)
Hartman’s choice of complementary quotes from Brooks and Clifton are not of course
random. Brooks’s book describes the inner transformation of a woman who is ini-
tially disheartened by the bleakness of her kitchenette apartment and then begins
to see a new potential in her cramped quarters: she imagines “green drapes for the
windows,” and thinks, “it was small, but wonders could be wrought here” (Brooks
1953)(22). Hartman chooses Maud Martha to accompany Esther Brown because
both women (like Helga Crane, Mattie Nelson, and Gladys Bentley) practice the art
of the refusal, determined to live other lives, stylishly and beautifully. Hartman’s
use of Lucille Clifton’s concise poem narrates the process of fashioning a self-aware
life. It continues the story of a person “both nonwhite and woman” who makes a
self in the face of surviving that which “has tried to kill [her] and has failed.” Clifton
writes, “won’t you celebrate with me / what i have shaped into / a kind of life? i
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had no model” (Clifton 1993).
Hartman puts Esther’s arrest for vagrancy also in the context of historical vagrancy
laws, stretching back to the 1390s in England when there was a shortage of workers
following the Black Death: “Its aim was clear: to conscript those who refused to
work” (Hartman 2019)(242). Adopted in North American colonies and eventually
expanded in the aftermath of Emancipation, vagrancy laws functioned to reintroduce
“involuntary servitude in guises amenable to the principles of liberty and equality”
(242). “Vagrants” were without proof of employment and propertyless, typically
“the deracinated – migrants, wanderers, fugitives, displaced persons, and strangers”
(245). These laws affected countless urban women of color like Esther. “Vagrancy
was an expansive and virtually all-encompassing category; like the manner of walking
in Ferguson, it was a ubiquitous charge that made it easy for the police to arrest and
prosecute young women with no evidence of crime or act of lawbreaking” (241-42).
Hartman’s recontextualization goes further, extending from Esther’s present into
ours, by illustrating how the law continues to enforce ways of being today, acting to
control, criminalize, and often extinguish Black Being. The italicized phrase above is
pulled from a municipal code that is routinely used today to harass black residents
in a St. Louis suburb. Eighteen-year-old Michael Brown was shot and killed in
2014 by Ferguson Police Officer Darren Wilson, who stopped Brown supposedly
for violating the ordinance by walking in the road. Importantly, Gail Lewis (2019)
points out how Hartman in Wayward Lives not only calls attention to the recurrence
and repetition of this type of violence historically by interweaving past and present
experiences, but also vitally makes clear the differences too, so that we avoid simply
replaying old strategies of survival, or perhaps, rework and revise those strategies
continually (Hartman, Lewis, and Leslie 2019). I would add, echoing McKittrick,
that making clear the differences serves to avoid reading or writing “black futurities”
as (fore)closed (McKittrick 2013)(5).
The narrative continues with the story of Eva Perkins crossing two scenes – “The
Arrested Life of Eva Perkins” and “Riot and Refrain.” In the latter, Eva participates
in the “noise strikes” at Bedford Hills in December 1919 to protest gratuitous abuse
and appalling conditions. According to Hartman, there was nothing unusual about
riots and protests at prisons or at Bedford; however, it was rare for the press to
report on them. The New York Times called the uproar a “sonic revolt” and the
“din of an infernal chorus” (Hartman 2019)(279). In this scene Hartman casts the
“vocal outbreaks” as forms of organized revolt by the chorus: “Songs and shouts
were the instruments of struggle . . . the soundscape of rebellion and refusal” (279).
Though “the chorus spoke with one voice,” she describes individual participants,
speculating on their motivations and experiences, and reinforces links between these
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women, Esther Brown, and others whose stories she tells: “A month after Miss
Minogue put her in a chokehold, beat her head with a set of keys, and pummeled
her with a rubber hose, Mattie Jackson joined the chorus. Thinking about her son
and how he was growing up without her made her wail and shout louder. . . ” (279-
80). Loretta, or Mickey as her friends called her, who was sentenced at fourteen
years old to “an indeterminate sentence” at the reformatory, “beat the walls” and
“was proud to have been the cause of considerable trouble during her entire time at
Bedford” (281).
In contrast to the silent protest, the noise strike drums up unstoppable force.7 It
deafens the ears of all those who refused to listen. It is a form of refusing all that
which has been refused – peace and quiet, comfort and security, a good night’s sleep.
Release comes through shouting, screaming, howling, crying – a letting out of all
that which has made one feel bad, of all the ways one was made to feel bad. The
noise was accusatory and broke all rules.
"The noise conveyed the defeat and aspiration, the beauty and wretched-
ness, which was otherwise inaudible to the ears of the world; it revealed a
sensibility at odds with the institution’s brutal realism. What accounts
for the utopian impulse that enabled them to believe that anyone cared
about what they had to say? What convinced them that the force of
their collective utterance was capable of turning anything around? What
urged them to create a reservoir of living within the prison’s mandated
death? What made them tireless?" (Hartman 2019)(286)
The reader here is invited to wonder with Hartman at this seemingly interminable
reservoir of energy that allowed these women to carry on. The noise enabled those
inside the enclosure of the ward to “break out” momentarily through the resonance
of their voices. And, as Hartman writes, they “channeled . . . the hopes of the ones
who loved them, . . . the nightmares about children stolen away by white men in
the back of wagons or lost at sea” (286). Hartman suggests here that the collective
utterance connected these women’s experiences in their present to the past, and to
not only the experiences of their ancestors, but also to those of the ones to come.
It was this reservoir which existed before them that gave the girls at Bedford the
7Hartman’s description of this form of revolt recalls a similar scene of collective, discordant assembly
imagined by Ulrike Meinhof in the film Bambule (1970). As a journalist Meinhof investigated Germany’s
borstals, “reformatories” serving as detention centers for young women, and she wrote the film Bambule
to expose the abuse the girls suffered and their strategies of resistance. In the film’s culminating scene,
the girls hold a “noise strike,” tearing up their rooms and banging incessantly on the walls, doors, and
windows. “Bambule” is a term appropriated by German prisoners, referring to the act of banging hard
objects against the bars of a prison cell. The word derives from bamboula, the name of a drum and an
accompanying dance originating in Africa and popularized in Haiti and New Orleans (Meinhof 1970).
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capacity to shout, and the impulse they had to continue promised that future strikes
would be possible. In this way, Hartman’s use of the interrogative again ties the
noise strikes at Bedford Hills to other locations, with other actors at different times
when love, outrage, and longing had already and promised again to incite and sustain
resistance.
2.3 Choreography of a Plural Subject
“So how do you keep on? She can’t help it. . . . The struggle is eternal. Somebody
else carries on” (Hartman 2019)(348). Another structure of assembly, the swarm of
blackbirds, is a configuration of the energy propelling the chorus which now returns
and “opens the way” (345). The noise of the chorus leads us out to a more open space
in Hartman’s narrative, into the “free zone” of carnival and the cabaret. The chorus
line on Coney Island provided Mabel Hampton and her friend Mildred Mitchell
options beside husbands, landlords, and “missuses,” an “exit from servitude”: “the
stage was the free territory. Dancing and singing fueled the radical hope of living
otherwise, and in this way, choreography was just another kind of movement for
freedom, another opportunity to escape service, another elaboration of the general
strike” (299).
Like Mattie Nelson in the bedroom and Esther Brown walking the city, Mabel
Hampton found an escape through choreography, through performing movement.
In this refuge she would find like-minded friends and lovers and form an “outside”
– a circle in which she could be herself, shielded to a certain degree from the weight
of heteronormativity and the color line. La Bentley would become one of her ac-
quaintances. “In the music hall, when the lights illuminated the stage, you became
someone other than yourself, and this person guided how you moved, directed your
gestures. The chorus was transformed from a line of separate dancers into a shared
body . . . And this body moved as one, erasing the borders of the bounded self. . . ”
(303) Yet, Hartman writes, Mabel felt even more comfortable than on the stage at
friends’ private parties in Harlem where there were no white people “observing her
like she was a rare specimen” or men forcing her to dance with them; “Most of her
friends were theater people, and half of them were women lovers and in the life”
(304). Among affective descriptions of the dancer’s varied romances and her love of
music, the scene is dotted with photographs of Mabel with friends and lovers recov-
ered from the Lesbian Herstory Archives. Mabel was a rising star, seeking freedom
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through dance and new interracial, social arrangements. She would appear in the
Blackbirds Revue of 1926 at Harlem’s Alhambra Theater (343).
Wayward Lives closes with a photograph of blackbirds flying in a swarm. Photogra-
pher Lukas Felzmann’s image, as discussed earlier, represents the power of collective
organization and the beauty of its free improvised character. This swarm of black-
birds echoes another photograph which opens this last scene (“The Chorus Opens
the Way”) of young black girls laughing and dancing in a line, mimicking the chorus
line (344). Hartman reminds us that the “chorus” means to “dance within an en-
closure” (347). “What better articulates the long history of struggle, the ceaseless
practice of black radicalism and refusal, the tumult and upheaval of open rebellion
than the acts of collaboration and improvisation that unfold within the space of en-
closure?” (347). The chorus serves as a metaphor for the long history of assembling
unlawfully, of dreaming despite the odds, of living beautifully within the slum, of
making an “outside” within the “city-within-the-city.” “Unable to fashion the world
in their own terms, they could, at the very least, resist the world imposed . . . No
one else imagined anything better. So it is left to them to envision things otherwise;
as exhausted as they are, they don’t relent, they try to make a way out of no way,
to not be defeated by defeat” (108, 347).
The chorus is also, Hartman writes,
"the vehicle for another kind of story, not of the great man or the tragic
hero, but one in which all modalities play a part, where the headless
group incites change, where mutual aid provides the resource for col-
lective action, not leader and mass, where the untranslatable songs and
seeming nonsense make good the promise of revolution. The chorus pro-
pels transformation." (Hartman 2019)(347-48)
By structuring her narrative around the chorus, individual stories resist a single
narrator or temporality. As woven stories, they inflect each other; each individual,
included the anonymous girl in the compelled photograph, retains her realness and
singularity, yet her experience is one of a multitude of different stories which are
simultaneously versions of the same story. Put another way, every story becomes
multiple and shared. Their stories are our stories, now.
"A fugitive text, a wayward method, a Black feminist poetics is not a
plea for recognition, but a plan for abolition. . . . So I have labored
to create the kind of narrative able to excavate the beauty of a wrong
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turn and regard the forms of social life opened by refusal. I have tried
to think as hard as Mattie Nelson or Esther Brown did about the kind
of life that can be lived when unfreedom is the normative condition."
(Hartman 2020)
Hartman’s method of threading the writings of others into her narration obscures
discrete voices as it flattens time. She has attempted to write “inside the circle” or as
one member of the chorus among many. All this, it would seem, continues along the
lines of her concern with resisting and refusing “the imposition of a certain regime of
the subject . . . so fundamentally defined by property” (Hartman and Moten 2016).
Outside of the western liberalist discourse of rights and so-called liberties, she has
been interested in highlighting other articulations and configurations of freedom.
I have aimed to show how through her mode of fabulation, based on reading the
archive through an affective register, Hartman creates an opening for the participa-
tion of a self-aware and re-oriented readership. Nyong’o writes that he “call[s] upon
afro-fabulation to do the work of narrating the angular socialities of the present,
the incompossible histories that we draw into our now, and the cryptic futures in
which our deaths are seeded” (200). Nyong’o borrows here from Torok and Abraham
(1994) who describe the “crypt” as that which “lives inside the body (as a result of
an unnamable loss or wound) and that ‘lives the body as the double of another’”
(cited in (Nyong’o 2018)200). Perhaps the “crypt” inside the body can also read as a
figuration of the chorus – a sense of living in the “singular plural” or the porousness
of ourselves.
The plurality of the chorus calls back to the concept of “adjacency” – a proximity
that makes you vulnerable in the face of something affecting someone else, the
gamble (that is not empathy) of sensate feeling across difference (Campt 2019).
I read the swarm of blackbirds (a symbol of perfect bodily organization without
hierarchy that defies interpretation or explanation), or the performativity of the
chorus embodying this relation, as the “better story” of adjacency. The dance within
enclosure is a “full-body” refusal exceeding words that demonstrates “the capacity of
the body to be a source of continuous pleasure over and against routine alienation”
(Gabriel 2020). What does this better story do? In “Venus in Two Acts” Hartman
cites Veena Das (2007) who tells the story of the father who “wills his daughter to
live” even after she has died by brutal violence: “He creates through his utterance
[‘My daughter is alive – my daughter is alive.’] a home for her mutilated and violated
self” (39, 47, cited in (Hartman 2008)3). A fabulated “fiction” (a fiction we need
until perhaps it is “fiction” no longer) serves to help us carry on and resist however
it is possible to.
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3. PRELUDE: “GOD KEEP ME FROM WHAT THEY CALL
HOUSEHOLDS”
While Emily Dickinson apparently took some pleasure in baking (“Twin loaves of
bread have just been born into the world under my auspices – fine children – the
image of their mother”), she hated to clean (Murray 2010)(L36, 73). In a letter to a
friend, she complains of her sister’s willingness: “I don’t see much of Vinnie – she’s
mostly dusting stairs” (L176). In another letter she laments,
"Mother is still an invalid tho’ a partially restored one – Father and
Austin still clamor for food, and I, like a martyr am feeding them.
Would’nt [sic] you love to see me in these bonds of great despair, looking
around my kitchen, and praying for kind deliverance ... My kitchen I
think I called it, God forbid that it was, or shall be my own – God keep
me from what they call households. . . !" (L36)
Her poem “How many times these low feet staggered” (238) registers more somberly
the heavy-as-steel burden of housework on women’s lives and bodies:
"How many times these low feet staggered -
Only the soldered mouth can tell -
Try - can you stir the awful rivet -
Try - can you lift the hasps of steel!
Stroke the cool forehead - hot so often -
Lift - if you care - the listless hair –
Handle the adamantine fingers-
Never a thimble - more - shall wear -
Buzz the dull flies - on the chamber window
Brave - shines the sun through the freckled pane -
Fearless - the cobweb swings from the ceiling -
Indolent Housewife - in Daisies - lain!" (Dickinson 1998)
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While something can be said to resonate between Emily Dickinson’s and Esther
Brown’s loathing of housework, as Saidiya Hartman’s study makes clear, the social,
personal, and psychic meaning of domestic labor significantly differed and continues
to signify differently for black women in the U.S. In the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries all women sought, fought for, and gained greater freedoms through
resisting housework (the freedom to work outside the home and earn money ac-
companied greater independence from fathers, brothers, and husbands, and release
from motherhood, along with more time and energy for creative, social, and political
pursuits). However, black women’s labor outside their own homes and in those of
white middle and upper-class families revealed how “emancipation” from the captiv-
ity of slavery continued in new but strikingly similar guises. Hartman writes, “The
continuities between slavery and freedom were underwritten by black women’s do-
mestic labor,” and an expanded mode of subjection was called “freedom” (Hartman
2016)(170). Tera Hunter (1997) adds that black women’s “success or frustrations
in influencing the character of domestic labor would define how meaningful freedom
would be” (cited in (Hartman 2016)170). As Hartman’sWayward Lives tell us, black
women’s refusal to work resulted often in destitution, social exile, and imprisonment
rather than liberation and poetry.
Though Mrs. Dickinson and her daughters often worked alongside the hired help in
the family home, Emily Dickinson had the privilege to rely on domestic workers to
do the majority of the housework which allowed her greater time and creative energy
to write. Margaret O’Brien, an Irish immigrant, worked for the Dickinsons for about
a decade until she was married. In the years between O’Brien’s leave and a new
hire, Emily’s writing output seemed to decrease, which Dickinson researcher Aìfe
Murray suggests was a result of the loss of regular household help (Murray 2010).
In 1869 the family hired another Irish immigrant, Margaret Maher, who worked for
the Dickinsons for thirty years.
Murray argues that Maher, whom the family called Maggie, had an immense in-
fluence on Emily Dickinson. Not only did she relieve the poet of the housework,
but it is likely that the two women shared writing and even poems with each other.
Maher’s bilingualism (she likely spoke Hiberno- or Irish English) may have had an
effect on Dickinson’s linguistic and syntactical experiments. Murray also hears in
Dickinson’s playful or macabre attitude toward death traces of “the Irish take on
death – laughing death down” (O’Neill 2017). Lastly, it is known that Emily Dick-
inson stored her poems in her maid’s trunk, and upon her death asked Maher to
destroy them; Maher refused. While sister Lavinia destroyed many of Dickinson’s
correspondence, Maggie Maher saved the poems.
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4. A POTENTIAL HISTORY OF A “WAYWARD PURITAN”
How does Howe’s book function as a potential history similarly or differently to
Hartman’s Wayward Lives? In the previous chapter I discussed Hartman’s book as
a potential history in the ways in which it describes and refigures the past counter-
historically. Hartman asks the reader to occupy a space between belief and skepti-
cism, a suspended position that she also assumes in her research. She is on the one
hand doubtful that if there is “truth” to be found in the archive, the researcher or
writer has the capacity to access, interpret, or listen to it. On the other hand, she
is hesitantly hopeful that we may re-attune ourselves to hear the “silence that is
not silent” (Reed 2014)(47). Howe similarly asks the reader to occupy a suspended
state, but rather than being transported into the narrative, like one might while
reading Wayward Lives, the reader of My Emily Dickinson must pause often. In the
following chapter, I will attempt to show how Howe invites the reader to join her in
re-imagining the archive and re-mapping the possibilities of a historical documen-
tary poetics. Howe engages and reorients the reader as an active participant at the
level of discourse, proposing that words themselves, saturated with wayward spirits
and undervoices, may be the keys through which we access and activate a potential
history.
In the previous chapter I discussed how Hartman writes with and against W.E.B. Du
Bois’s work, conventional histories of American anarchism and black radical thought,
and various aesthetic productions including the race-films of Oscar Micheaux and
Nella Larsen’s novel Quicksand, whose epigraph opens the book. In My Emily Dick-
inson several paratexts serve as important frames. Howe’s ample use of epigraphs,
to open the book and several sections, as well as quotations throughout the text,
generally make these frames highly visible. In her dissertation, “The Feminist Imag-
inary in the Early Writings of Poet/Critic Susan Howe” (2003), Candace Stockton-
Bleakley extensively covers the influence of texts she culls from the poetic epigraphs
and titles opening each of My Emily Dickinson’s three main parts. According to
her, these poetic paratexts are used “as an extended analogy to round up the dias-
pora of [Howe’s] meditations” (Stockton-Bleakley 2003)(31). Part One quotes John
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Keats’s poem, “On sitting down to read King Lear once Again,” to send readers
into “the old oak forest” (or “forest of words”) along with Howe and to remind the
reader of Shakespeare’s and Keats’s influence on Dickinson (31). Part Two (“Childe
Emily to the Dark Tower Came”) and Part Three (“Trumpets Sing to Battle”) open
with the same theme, borrowing their titles from Robert Browning’s poem “Childe
Roland to the Dark Tower Came” (another reference to King Lear). These sections
“function allegorically to illuminate . . . Dickinson’s struggle, her quest as poet,”
paralleling that of Browning’s, “to create out of destruction” (34, 42). According to
Stockton-Bleakley, Howe “reconstructs Dickinson as a proto-postmodernist, not only
in technique, but also in her themes of desolation and refusal to accept complicity
in a comforting vision of the world” (42).
In addition to these paratexts, others underlying each part of the book are made
evident through Howe’s pulled quotes and references. These include historically situ-
ated texts from Dickinson’s geographical home in New England and the larger world
of letters that influenced the poet. “The Puritan consciousness of Jonathan Edwards
(1703-1758) shadows and prefigures that of Emily Dickinson,” writes Howe, though
Edwards’s Western Massachusetts differed significantly from Dickinson’s, “where
polite Victorian respectability and the occasional excitement of another religious
revival capped the slow dissolution of an agrarian community” (Howe 1985a)(47,
54). Texts that paint the literary world in which Dickinson wrote include what
Howe calls those of “American Mythology” (42), mainly including captivity nar-
ratives (a popular, religious genre of the novel narrated by women kidnapped and
“rescued” from native tribes) and frontier and war narratives (like James Fenimore
Cooper’s Leatherstocking Tales). Howe also briefly discusses the possible impact
of abolitionist tracts and articles on Dickinson, especially those by critic Timothy
Higginson, with whom she corresponded intermittently over twenty years. The bulk
of Howe’s study, however, is dedicated to Dickinson’s reading history and direct in-
fluences, which included Shakespeare, Keats, Charles Dickins, George Eliot, Robert
and Elizabeth Barrett Browning, the Brontë sisters, Henry David Thoreau, and
R.W. Emerson, quotes from whom Howe weaves throughout the book.
Stefania Heim in her dissertation “Dark Matter: Susan Howe, Muriel Rukeyser,
and the Scholar’s Art” (2015) writes that structurally Howe’s book is most directly
indebted to poet Charles Olson’s Call Me Ishmael (1947), a work of poetic literary
criticism exploring Melville’s influences when he wrote Moby Dick (Heim 2015).
Olson focuses on Melville’s Shakespearean influences, particularly King Lear and
Macbeth, and closely reads Melville’s copies of the plays and hand-written notes
which Olson then traces into the manuscript of Moby Dick. In Howe’s 1987 essay
“Where Should the Commander Be?” she writes about Melville’s indelible impact
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on Olson’s writing:
"It took thirty-five Augusts for this passionate, ambitious, conflicted man
to draw the hero-poet out of himself. . . . Life opens onto work. Through
long study and great love for another author, Olson reached his own –
’I am.’ There, shed of enticings, he stood free of, and contemporary
with, his Soul’s cold fire-father, a Captain among hunters, an ’original
aboriginal’ mediator-Moses, the author of the book called Moby-Dick.
. . . Delicate perceptual intuition, apparent from the beginning, forced
its own integrity of precision on a naturally omnivorous consciousness.
. . . At the threshold of academicism and poetry – sympathy is passionate
morality. Call Me Ishmael is SPACE in which Charles Olson, an outcast
from the world of art in name only, integrates Melville into himself."
(Howe 2015)(184-86)
Olson’s integration of Melville mirrors Howe’s integration of Dickinson through writ-
ing My Emily Dickinson. Howe continues, “Without Melville’s study of Hawthorne,
Olson’s study of Melville would be inconceivable” (193). Apart from the style of inte-
grative research Howe adopts and locates in Olson’s study of Melville and Melville’s
study of Hawthorne, Howe uses Hawthorne’s story “The Birth-Mark” (1843) as a
parable of the editorial violence on the feminine non-conformist literary voice, figured
as an “almost fearful distinctness” (Hawthorne 1843)(2). Howe spends considerable
time in My Emily Dickinson discussing the damage wrought by the unimaginative
editing and publication of Dickinson’s poems and letters (discussed at length in the
Introduction). I revisit and add to my analysis of this gesture to counter editorial
authority in the next section in the context of Howe’s counter-historical subversion
of My Emily Dickinson’s “wider” paratexts.
4.1 Counter To?: “Historical Imagination Gathers in the Missing”
In my discussion of the differences between Hartman’s and Howe’s archives in the
Introduction, I discussed Howe’s critique of the editorial negligence characterizing
publications of Dickinson’s writing and Howe’s interventions against this literary
authority representing “patriarchal language” (Ma 1994)(725). In addition to Dick-
insonian editors Thomas H. Johnson and Ralph W. Franklin, and the editorial logic
that imposes order on feminine nonconformity more generally, counter to which his-
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tories is My Emily Dickinson a counter-history? To broach this question more fully,
I continue to consider the paratexts hovering around and structuring Howe’s study,
but specifically those Howe counters through a strategic method of incorporation
and subversion. Howe’s critical response to these texts in particular, I argue, reveal
the ways in which her project is shaped similarly to how the accounts of sociolo-
gists and reformers, racial uplift fantasies, and conventional narratives of resistance
shape Wayward Lives. Particularly, both Hartman’s and Howe’s responses to these
narratives articulate a concern to include forgotten or occluded histories of women’s
private and public participation in cultural rebellion.
Adding to my examination of My Emily Dickinson’s paratexts, and departing from
Stockton-Bleakley and Heim, I would first draw attention to two texts (or groups of
texts) Howe explicitly cites and that I argue frame Howe’s intervention and study
as a whole. Howe opens the book with an epigraph from William Carlos Williams’s
classic text of historical essays, In the American Grain (1925), which I quote in full:
"It is the women above all – there never have been women, save pioneer
Katies; not one in flower save some moonflower Poe may have seen, or
an unripe child. Poets? Where? They are the test. But a true woman in
flower, never. Emily Dickinson, starving of passion in her father’s garden,
is the very nearest we have ever been – starving. Never a woman: never
a poet. That’s an axiom. Never a poet saw sun here." (Howe 1985a)(6,
quoting Williams)
In these lines Williams seems to doubt the existence or possibility of a “true” woman
poet, referencing the “anomalous” female poets recognized by Edgar Allen Poe
(Howe 1993)(169). Williams then specifically cites Emily Dickinson as a prime ex-
ample of the impossibility of a real female poet. Williams calls the postulate “Never
a woman: never a poet” an “axiom,” which on the one hand could mean that it is an
established, self-evident rule that requires no proof. More likely, however, Williams
is throwing into doubt the rule’s self-evidence and/or its ability to be proven. In
the “sun” of the here and now, Williams could be remarking on the impossibility of
proving the possibility of a woman poet, which then transforms the epigraph into
a critique of the context that disallows the flowering of a woman poet. In Howe’s
brief Introduction, she states her relation to Williams’s lines: “My book is a con-
tradiction of its epigraph” (Howe 1985a)(7). After calling Williams’s statement a
regrettable “false configuration,” Howe proposes that he perhaps “says one thing
and means another” (7). She claims that in saying “Never a woman: never a poet
. . . Never a poet saw sun here,” Williams’s meaning opens; on the one hand, we may
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understand that never has a woman poet come out of obscurity fully into literary
maturity and/or societal, literary recognition. On the other hand, Howe states that
the poet is “never just a woman or a man”: “Every poet is salted with fire” (7).
Thus, Howe situates My Emily Dickinson as written both against the idea that a
true woman “in flower” is impossible while in support of the idea that the poet defies
gender as normatively imagined and prescribed. By writing then “a contradiction”
to Williams’s ambiguity, Howe situates her own work as rooted in ambivalence and
contradiction.
The second wider paratext(s) I would name would include several works of literary
criticism, including those by feminist critics. In Part One Howe draws parallels
between Dickinson and Gertrude Stein, two poets she names as “the most innovative
precursors of modernist poetry and prose” who have been ignored by canonical
critics such as Harold Bloom (Howe 1985a)(11). My Emily Dickinson would first
most obviously be an exercise in demonstrating Dickinson’s rightful place among
other literary pathfinders (which I discuss more below). But Howe also interestingly
criticizes the rigidity of feminist literary scholars such as Hélène Cixous, who, Howe
says, celebrates the male experimentalist (for example, James Joyce) while ignoring
the female (Stein), and who seems to argue for an essentialist feminine voice (12).
Howe argues that Cixous’s “plan for what women’s writing will do . . . too quickly
becomes a must” (12). Howe also harshly critiques Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan
Gubar’s now canonical work The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and
the Nineteenth Century Literary Imagination (1979), in which, Howe argues, the
authors rely on John Cody’s 1971 “reprehensible biographical psychoanalysis” of
Dickinson: “After Great Pain is the rape of a great poet” (24). Howe argues that
these works spend more time reducing Dickinson to the facts of her life (her sex, class,
and agoraphobia) than exploring her “gestures of intention” and the subtleties of her
poetry (24). In addition, Gilbert and Gubar, according to Howe, claim that “a writer
may conceal or confess all, if she does it in a logical syntax”: she counters, “Emily
Dickinson suggests that the language of the heart has quite another grammar” (13).
In an interview with Lynn Keller (1995), Howe discusses the problematic “ghetto-
izing” of women’s poetry, an anxiety I read in Howe’s counter-historical gesture
toward the above paratexts: “I think that women who take a theoretical position
are allowed to take a theoretical position only as long as it’s a feminist theoretical
position, and to me that’s an isolation. . . ” (Keller 1995)(21). Throughout her career
Howe has crossed disciplinary boundaries; My Emily Dickinson, in which Howe
“trespasses” into Literary Criticism, American History, and American Studies, is one
early example. In an interview with Edward Foster in 1989, she also expresses this
early wariness of the “separation” of academic disciplines such as “Women’s Studies”
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and “African-American Studies”: “It seems to me only a further way to isolate texts
that should be known by everyone. But then it may be a temporary necessity” (Howe
1993)(170). She continues, “I am troubled by some feminist criticism because in its
stridency it is only another bias. And in a strange sense it’s still a male bias. Instead
of questioning the idea of power itself, many women want to assume power” (170).
Howe explains that her hesitation to support a certain kind of feminism in academia
has to do with a deep suspicion of canonization in general and her frustration that
female genius is usually seen as an anomaly: “Yes, Dickinson is in the canon. But
she is treated as an isolated case, not as part of an ongoing influence” (168). This
connects back to Howe’s contention in My Emily Dickinson’s Introduction that “a
poet is never just a woman or a man” (Howe 1985a)(7). In this way, her gesture
reveals itself as a more radical refusal of the terms, especially gendered terms, by
which a writer can be rendered a subject.
Works not explicitly mentioned in My Emily Dickinson but to which Howe responds
in her study include examples of classic literary critique: in F.O. Matthiessen’s
American Renaissance (1941), Dickinson is “allotted a short paragraph” (Wein-
berger 2007)(vii). According to the critic, Dickinson mirrored Emerson in her “tricks
of phrase,” but “does not seem to have any of his range as a social critic” (vii). In
addition, D.H. Lawrence fails to mention Dickinson in his 1923 Studies in Classic
American Literature as does Ezra Pound in his anthology From Confucius to Cum-
mings (1958). The “once-important Georgian poet” Harold Monro stated in 1925
that Dickinson was “intellectually blind, partially dead, and mostly dumb to the art
of poetry”; he goes on, “Her tiny lyrics appear to be no more than the jottings of
a half-idiotic school-girl instead of the grave musings of a full grown, fully educated
woman” (vii). Allan Tate compares her to John Donne in 1932, but claims, “She
cannot reason at all. She can only see” (viii).
I read Howe’s book therefore as written in contradiction to the reductive tendencies
of male-dominated subjects and disciplines (especially history and poetry contempo-
rary to Howe’s early work) as well as “psychological” literary criticism and feminist
revisionist gestures contemporaneous with her study of Dickinson. In Eliot Wein-
berger’s Preface to the 2007 reprint of My Emily Dickinson, he writes,
"Against the cliché of Dickinson as some sort of Rousseauian natural
spirit, producing quirky, unlettered effusions, Howe’s Emily Dickinson is
an erudite, and she tracks the poems through a vast amount of reading:
Shakespeare, the Bröntes, the Brownings, Spenser, Shelley, Keats, Blake,
Ruskin, Thoreau, Emerson, James Fenimore Cooper . . . the company in
which, from the distance she did not perceive as a distance, Dickinson
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thought she was writing. Against the isolated neurotic, Howe’s Dickinson
is fully aware of events, including the Civil War, in the world outside."
(Weinberger 2007)(xi)
Howe attempts to write a text accountable to Dickinson and her experiment, which
Howe situates not as an anomaly per se but within a tradition of feminine innovation,
stretching back to Puritan “proto-feminists.” To do this, Howe rigorously dives into
the history and reading that informed Dickinson’s “poetics and praxis” and takes
the poet “at her word” rather than pursue normative grooves of thought informed
by her biography and popular techniques of women’s life-storying (of the 1980s).
Recognizing that poetry was a “scholar’s art” for Dickinson (borrowing the phrase
from Wallace Stevens), Howe argues that Dickinson’s poetry deserves a scholarly
reading, not only of the historical sources and literature that inspired her, but also
of her writing process (Howe 1985a)(15).
Parallel to Hartman’s choice to cite instances when black radical thought histori-
cally refused the ideological fantasies of racial uplift, Howe looks to an archive read
otherwise as the site to locate historical examples of a radical imagination. Howe’s
scholarly approach necessarily depends on close archival readings. Her relationship
with archives, like Hartman’s, can be characterized as ambivalent; it is deeply critical
while simultaneously very open. Framed in contradiction to the paratexts discussed
and counter to an American literary tradition of silencing nonconformist poetics and
praxis through the (male) editor, My Emily Dickinson is a response to the many
“silly” publications that ignore this poet’s working method, continue unapologeti-
cally to “vulgarize” her life, and underestimate her legacy (24). In doing so, Howe
illuminates the poet’s omnivorous scholarship, her appropriations, intentions, and
ambiguities, her synthetic, polysemous play, and her intellectual eccentricity in resis-
tance to imposed linguistic, generic, and cultural hegemony. She names Dickinson as
one of many experimenters who have been dismissed, ignored, and misunderstood.
Through the work of My Emily Dickinson Howe calls for an immediate overhaul in
Dickinson scholarship based on the original manuscripts and more broadly a serious
re-consideration of women’s literary innovation.
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4.2 Inhabiting a Critical Openness
"Of course, I know that history can be falsified, has been falsified. Still,
there are archives and new ways of interpreting their uncompromising
details. I am naïve enough to hope the truth will [come] out. History may
be a record written by winners, but don’t forget Nixon taped himself for
posterity. If you are a woman, archives hold perpetual ironies. Because
the gaps and silences are where you find yourself." (Howe 2015)(158)
In the above quote Howe recognizes the falsification of history. However, she con-
cedes her “naïve” faith that archives can contain and reveal “the truth.” In this
quote I hear Howe’s hesitant but “hopeful” hope. The statement on the one hand
resonates with the view that archives are sites housing historical information that
can be extracted by adept researchers. At the same time, Howe concedes that the
archive is structured by “winners,” after which she circles back to express a “naïve”
belief in the truth’s inevitable exposure: the truth will come out, in time, in different
and more opportune circumstances – perhaps, fortuitously, by accident.
I am struck by the forgiving quality of the word “ironies.” It conjures for me the
image of a researcher combing paper files in search of her ancestor; she expects to
find some trace of her – maybe she was the daughter of so-and-so who accomplished
this or that. Yet, surprisingly for the researcher, her ancestor fails to appear, or
her presence is marked only by an absence. She was the one to whom letters were
addressed, for example, but whose side of the correspondence has been lost. For
Howe, this type of absence nonetheless tells us something about the missing woman
– Howe finds her in the gap. Hartman, on the other hand, hesitates to embrace
this possibility because to do so might obscure the violence of the erasure. To focus
instead on the impossibility of locating her not only serves the purpose of exposing
the violence wrought by the archive but also possibly presents more openings for
new narratives, identities, and representations.
This section begins with a look at Howe’s “hope” because it is worth reiterating an
ambivalent point at which Howe’s and Hartman’s approaches to the archive seem to
meet and diverge. Clearly, Hartman has less reason to be “hopeful” in her archive
and few opportunities to be “naïve”: as discussed, if her subjects show up at all in the
archive, they are conscribed by captivity and criminality, which speaks directly to
their racialized sub-statuses in the U.S. Thus, Howe and Hartman confront different
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archives within often, ironically, the same archive – Yale University’s Beinecke Rare
Book and Manuscript Library, located a short distance from where Howe calls home
in Guilford, Connecticut. What Howe calls “ironies” Hartman would likely call
“failures,” as there is slim to no chance her subjects will show up in narratives
that are “true” or could in any way be construed as accountable to them. Thus,
Hartman’s attempts at rescue must be made through unconventional means.
Howe, on the other hand, also enacts irregular rescue operations. She reads and
writes most often about other writers, and, aside from My Emily Dickinson, she
often finds her subjects by chance – they are usually anonymous or semi-anonymous
figures that history has tried to banish or completely obscure. In My Emily Dick-
inson, the violence of the archive specifically culminates in the editing and “false”
publication of Dickinson’s work, which has operated to tame or erase the poet’s
innovation. In addition to this, Howe situates Dickinson in a larger community and
tradition of rebels and nonconformists; thus, Dickinson ceases to be an “exception.”
Howe’s rescue is attempted through a reimagining of Dickinson, who Howe argues
purposefully refused to publish to avoid destroying her textual experimentation;
next to this, Howe recognizes in close readings of Dickinson’s work, especially her
handwritten facsimiles, her writing’s resistance to de-complication, interpretation,
or domestication. Rather than accept the description of the poet as a spinster or
madwoman, Howe highlights Dickinson’s “antinomian” gesture, her refusal to partic-
ipate in a debilitating culture set on destroying creativity. Though Howe recognizes
that Dickinson herself was aware of the ways in which she was restricted in her life
and choices, Howe performs a “counter-historical” gesture by refusing to reduce the
poet to her gender or biography, preferring instead to read her through her work.
“I think Emily Dickinson’s inability to get her work published during her lifetime
had almost nothing to do with the fact that she was a woman and everything to do
with her originality” (Howe 1993)(168). Further, Howe contends that Dickinson was
aware of the danger her poetry faced if she chose to publish, and proof for Howe is
in Dickinson’s poetry.
Though Hartman researches in “the weather” of antiblackness that pervades the
historical present while Howe confronts “hurricanes of facts” (Howe 2015)(89, quot-
ing Dziga Vertov 1926) (some of which may be useful and liberating), both see the
archive as a “departure point” rather than a site for answers (Morgan 2016)(186).
Like Hartman, Howe sees that the archive and “History is a record of winners.
Documents were written by the Masters” (Howe 2015)(179). She points to the
problematic collaboration between archives and academic scholarship.
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"I am drawn toward the disciplines of history and literary criticism but
in the dawning distance a dark wall of rule supports the structure of
every letter, record, transcript: every proof of authority and power. I
know records are compiled by winners, and scholarship is in collusion
with Civil Government. I know this and go on searching for some trace
of love’s infolding through all the paper in all the libraries I come to."
(Howe 1993)(4)
She critically reads the archive, while at the same time entering the archive open
– to being haunted and changed, available to what or who seeks her out, willing
to see the possible fruits in failure and embrace the risks of following associative
“breadcrumb trace[s]” and trails (VanderHart 2012)(16).
What is normally emphasized in Howe scholarship is her openness in archives, dis-
cussed by W. Scott Howard (2019) in his analysis of Howe’s Articulation of Sound
Forms in Time (1987), which contains her poetic meditation on the banished minis-
ter Hope Atherton’s incoherent narrative. In 1676 the reverend was separated from
the local militia he accompanied, who were on a mission to massacre the Algonquian
natives gathered at the Peskeompscutt fishing grounds near Hatfield, Massachusetts
(Howard 2019)(100-6). After wandering four days in the woods, Atherton returned
home to tell a story that “Many people were not willing to give credit suggesting
that he was beside himself” (Sheldon 1896 (Howe 1987), cited in (Howard 2019)129).
In Howe’s poem-sequence “Hope Atherton’s Wanderings,” she attempts to “artic-
ulate[. . . ] the sound forms” of his discredited language finding in the gaps of his
narrative a space for the poet’s investigation and experimentation (Howe 1993)(180).
What is useful in Howard’s discussion of the poem is the way he highlights Howe’s
often overlooked critical reading of this archived history: “Howe’s readers instead
have surprisingly taken her dynamic collage of archives and artifacts as a relatively
straightforward summary of events, as if their reconfiguration were not also a mode
of deft disruption. . . ” (Howard 2019)(99-100). As Howe reminds us, “Historical
imagination gathers in the missing” (Howe 2015)(143).
Howard’s analysis is also useful for my discussion because within “Hope Atherton’s
Wanderings” Howe cites many of the textual artifacts woven within My Emily Dick-
inson, including the captivity narratives which serve as framing devices. Howard
writes,
"[N]o one has yet considered Articulation as a critical reading of Ather-
ton’s involvement in the garrison’s attack . . . upon a peaceful gathering
of Native Tribes. . . : Why indeed was the Rev. Atherton there at all?
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How and why has his true relation of events been adapted, edited, and re-
published? And by whom, when and why? Furthermore, why has Howe
given us particular artifacts and documents from those contested, nested
captivity narratives (and their historiographies) as framing devices for
the poem’s disjunctive sequence?" (Howard 2019)(101)
Howard articulates the questions that drive Howe’s investigation. In that Atherton is
“more than just an anomaly or a contradiction” (Howe expresses that the reverend’s
“experience and legacy live ‘In all of us’”), her “poetics and praxis . . . invokes the
ongoing work of restorative justice as a constitutive, co-creative agent in the poem’s
openwork sequence of reading/writing against the grain” (Howard 2019) (101) citing
(Howe 1993)(172).
Can a similar critical approach to historiography be located in the disjunctive nar-
rative of My Emily Dickinson? Can this book be considered a “restorative” or
reparative work? Howe closely, critically reads Dickinson’s manuscripts as a poet
reads another poet to embark on her study to write against reductive mis-readings
and man-handlings of Dickinson’s poems and letters. In this way she contributes
to the reparative work of correcting false perceptions that overlook and intention-
ally obscure Dickinson’s experiment. Howard’s interpretation of Howe’s poem on
Atherton can tell us something about her approach more generally to archives, doc-
uments, and discourses which suggests that My Emily Dickinson is more than just
a “revised history” of Dickinson’s life in letters (Ma 1994): it is a potential history
of antinomian counter-voices, one of which was Dickinson’s.
4.2.1 Trespassing on an “Errand into the Wilderness”
Howe’s interest in bringing to light counter-histories is important to acknowledge,
again, because so many Howe scholars have focused on her “telepathic” open method
within the archive. Focusing on the way in which she lets diverse documents lead her
associatively, they have based their descriptions of this technique on the assumption
that she interprets what she locates in the archive to be uncompromised historical
artifact. Howard quotes critics who have concluded that Howe “appropriates her
source texts ‘as a space for the writing of her own journey’” (Howard 2019)(102,
quoting Reinfeld). These critics also argue that “‘Howe has no desire to send us back
to her sources, or, indeed, to encourage us to read them;’ that Howe . . . ‘must have
[only] stumbled across’ such documents ‘while searching for information’ . . . because
ultimately ‘the work is not about history,’” (103, quoting Nicholls, Back, Gaffield).
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In short, Howard makes a strong case for Howe’s persistent critical approach and
rigor of research. While it is true that she listens for chance encounters in the archive,
this method does not override her attention or commitment to close reading; in fact,
if I understand Howard’s argument correctly, it is through her practice of reading
“against the grain” that she is able to follow counter-paths of silenced or muffled
voices and that she is able to attend more thoroughly not only to the recovery of
counter-histories but also to the workings of conventional historiography. Her open
practice enables her to more critically study the archive.
This, to me, resonates with Hartman’s practice of reading the archive otherwise
(Saunders 2008b)(8). Both researchers attune themselves to looking for and sensing
what has been obscured. In Wayward Lives, for example, I discussed how Hartman
focuses her attention on the eyes and the posture of the girl photographed in the
studio; she studies the women who evaded capture by the sociologist’s gaze by
ignoring him. In this reoriented attention, new possible narratives become available,
some which supplement and many times contradict official historiography. Opening
the Bedford Hills files, Hartman unsurprisingly found dehumanizing accounts and
sorrowful statements by inmates; sometimes, however, she also found accounts of
furious rebellion and unanticipated hope. Like the roaming “cormorant,” Howe
similarly spots what she is and isn’t necessarily looking for, especially in Dickinson’s
careful handwriting. Her close reading betrays a clear critical approach, revealing
that she does not take for granted the normative narratives laid out by and for
the historian within an archive whose systematic order privileges certain texts and
artifacts over others.
In various essays Howe describes her fraught relationship to libraries and archives,
guarded places she has been lured to since her youth. These accounts tell the story
of an early education in disciplinary and scholarly exclusion. Howe, the daughter of
Harvard Law School professor Mark DeWolfe Howe, would accompany her father to
the library: “During the 1950s, . . . I was already a library cormorant. I needed out-
of-the-way volumes from Widener Library. My father said it would be trespassing if
I went into the stacks to find them. I could come with him only as far as the second-
floor entrance. There I waited while he entered the guarded territory to hunt for
books” (Howe 1993)(18). Howe remembers her childhood sheltered and shadowed
by Harvard academic circles that were, of course, “very privileged [and] so male”
(159). Rising stars in History and American Studies F.O. Matthiessen and Perry
Miller were friends of the Howe family:
"The Matthiessen book [. . .American Renaissance: Art and Expression
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in the Age of Emerson and Whitman]: an intellectual and poetic Re-
naissance minus Emily Dickinson. Minus Harriet Beecher Stowe. Minus
Margaret Fuller. Of course, Frederick Douglass as well. Women weren’t
the only ones subtracted. It’s these kinds of contradictions that get me.
. . . I can’t quite so simply say I grew up in a false community – a
community that fancied itself as liberal. . . . But you see, it was false
if you were a girl or a woman who was not content to be considered
second-rate." (Howe 1993)(159)
Howe recalls Perry Miller as “a lecherous character”:
"To us daughters of professors, he was the object of great scorn because
we knew that if he was at one of our houses, he would quickly get red-
faced and then his hands would start wandering . . . While Matthiessen
leaves out women, Miller leaves out Native Americans. How could he
have written so many books and essays, one of them called Errand into
the Wilderness and have left out the inhabitants? . . . It wasn’t a wilder-
ness to Native Americans. . . " (Howe 1993)(161)
DuPlessis (1984) writes that “Howe plays on a basic myth of the hero, or the father
– something from which the searching daughter feels alien, something for which
the searching daughter feels desire” (DuPlessis 1984)(124). As Howe recounts her
memories of those figures of her childhood (Miller, a Puritan scholar like her father,
“always wore white socks and black shoes . . . the skin on his ankles . . . like
polished porcelain”), she affectively links her feelings of vulnerability and gendered
exclusion to the noticeable absences within their publications and silences within
their disciplines more generally: “This place I want to come home to [Cambridge
and academia] was false to women in an intellectual sense” (Howe 1993)(161).
Howe’s description of navigating the maze of Yale’s Sterling Memorial Library in
her poetic essay “Frame Structures” (1995) points to her persistent discomfort with
the archive’s categorical logic and her continuing sense of trespassing. Searching for
a particular periodical, she is directed to the Franklin Collection Room:
"Here Yale University’s custodians of early American culture sequester
whatever back issues of periodicals, local histories, antiquarian studies,
bibliographies, even obliquely concern Benjamin Franklin or Philadelphia
I’m not sure which because . . . The materials are arranged according to
a certain scheme of order I couldn’t make out. A librarian, seated near
the entrance at a desk piled high with papers and catalogues, asked me
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to produce credentials i.e., write my university affiliation on a list along
with my reason for being there. . . . It was a hot midsummer day the
Benjamin Franklin Room doesn’t have air conditioning and the librarian
looked impatient. . . " (Howe 2015)(162-3)
She compares archived documents in the same essay to “bourgeois Victorian
women,” shut in by the walls and the logic of the library:
"Documentary histories, registers, ad catalogues, often lovingly gath-
ered by local amateurs, tend to be filed, boxed, and sheltered: shut up.
What is it about documents that seems to require their relegation to the
bedroom (a private place) as if they were bourgeois Victorian women?
Honored, looked to for advice, shielded from the rabble by guardians
of ’tradition’ / ’aesthetic taste,’ available only to particular researchers
(husbands or bachelor machines) and caretakers (librarians cataloguers
secretaries) so long as they are desirable (readable not too tattered) ca-
pable of bearing children (articles chapters books) rearing them (aiding
research), they remain sheltered at home (museum collections libraries)."
(Howe 2015)(162)
Thus, the documents become, in this sense, victims of the archive, “sheltered from
the public gaze” (163).
Within the archive’s conformist order, Howe paradoxically returns again and again
to the theme of the “wilderness,” which, though she criticizes its one-sided usage, she
sees as a “necessary emblem” (161). The wilderness is one way she often describes
the archive – its open riddle and potentially feminine darkness. “Sterling houses
books that aren’t used often, so it has an aura of death. . . . The lights are off.
In silence and semidarkness, it’s mysterious” (Howe 2015)(167). For Howe, and as
I argue for Hartman, within the constraint there exists the possibility of openness
and potentiality. “I wished to speak a word for libraries as places of freedom and
wildness,” she writes (54). In the repeated failure to directly access, navigate, and
possess information, a potentiality opens through trespass to indirectly “occupy”
history. Next to the concession that Hartman’s “trespass” differs from Howe’s, I
postulate that for both scholars an opening is created through their exclusion which
facilitates reading the archive otherwise.
This early exclusion from the scholar’s territory made the archive mysterious, am-
bivalently loathsome and desirable to Howe. “What is forbidden is wild” (Howe
1993)(18). The library for Howe is “wild” because of her placement consistently,
permanently “outside” of it. “The stacks of Widener Library and of all great li-
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braries in the world are still the wild to me. . . . I go to libraries because they
are the ocean” (18). Inducing awe, they pull her, tide-like, in certain directions.
The archive’s architecture not only complements the exclusionary and intimidating
structuring/structural logic that vows to admit exclusively credentialed scholars,
but also creates a “sheltering” space for memory:
"The Beinecke was constructed from Vermont marble and granite, bronze
and glass, during the early 1960s. The structure displays and contains
acquisitive violence, the rapacious ’fetching’ involved in collecting, and,
on the other hand, it radiates a sense of peace. Downstairs, in the Mod-
ernist reading room I hear the purr of the air filtration system, the rip-
pling sound of pages turning, singular out of tune melodies of computers
re-booting. Scholars are seated at wide worktables bent in devotion over
some particular material object. . . . Here is deep memory’s lure, and
sheltering. In this room I experience enduring relations and connections
between what was and what is." (Howe 2014)(43)
(One of these scholars could be Hartman herself.) As a semi-credentialed scholar,
traces of exclusion mark themselves in and on Howe’s body. When she enters the
scholar’s territory, she recalls wondering whether “her clothing [is] possibly a vi-
olation of Harvard research decorum” (Bruns 2009)(47-8): “[A]nd I have a new
monogrammed black leather Coach briefcase my husband gave me for my birthday
because we knew I was making this trip and it seemed professorial. Neither of us
has a college degree so we have that feeling of failure in common and are always at
war with what we wear” (Howe 2003)(122, cited in (Bruns 2009)47). Gerald Bruns
adds, “And then there is the question of how to sound. Told that the Dickinson
materials are not available, and asked to show proof that she has a right to inquire
after them, Howe thinks:
"I have driven up that day from Connecticut and booked into the Howard
Johnson Motel, my pencils are sharpened, notepaper ready. I have
waited weeks for this moment. I think of the disarming of the Anti-
nomians in 1637, coinciding with the founding of Harvard College in
Cambridge, a provincial village of mainly British immigrants. . . . As
a half-Irish or half-Anglo-Irish woman, I know an audience will always
react to the materiality of the voice as a sign. Deepness of timbre is
preferable to shrill. I am feeling a sense of humiliation and angry de-
spair. I know my reaction is extreme. I can hear my voice running
into its irksome high pitch, jostling genteel decorum. The librarians are
feeling its ugly assault." (Howe 2003)(126) cited in (Bruns 2009)(47)
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The extended point I wish to make here is that Howe writes of her experience in
the archive always ambivalently (cold, frustrating exclusion transforms into peace-
ful shelter and back again); additionally, interactions with librarians as the archives’
keepers simultaneously recalls for Howe an American tradition of silencing non-
conformist voices and sends her back to troubled childhood memories. Thus, her
failures of access are ironic in that they open possibilities for affective affiliation
through memory and imagination.
4.2.2 Listening for “Love’s Infolding”
The method of “listening” that Hartman borrows from Tina Campt (2017) and
utilizes in Wayward Lives resonates with Howe’s approach. Howard writes that
“Howe’s poetics and praxis emphasizes attentive dialogic close listening to archival
materials” (Howard 2019)(115), and Bruns highlights that as Howe experiences her-
self as “an alien presence” in the archive, she sees “ghosts as familiars” (Bruns
2009)(47). Howe’s approach to “listening” in the archive has elsewhere been called
“mediumship” (Heim 2015)(112). Howe describes her experience in libraries as one
in which her spirit is moved and the dead may speak through her:
"Often walking alone in the stacks, surrounded by raw material paper
afterlife, my spirits were shaken by the great ingathering of titles and
languages. This may suggest vampirism because while I like to think I
write for the dead, I also take my life as a poet from their lips, their
vocalisms, their breath. So many fruits, some looked firm in spring
and seemed to be promising, now amassed according to an impervious
classification system." (Howe 2015)(54)
Though Howe is hesitant to speak of “voices,” she ambivalently situates herself as
using and being used by, or calling or being called by, the energies that meet her in
the archive. Similar to Campt and Hartman, Howe foregrounds senses beside sight,
also fusing them in new ways: “No, no. I don’t hear voices (though I’m always
scared I might). You don’t hear voices, but yes, you’re hearing something. You’re
hearing something you see” (Keller 1995)(33, emphasis mine). In this way, her
description of researching might be reminiscent of dreaming, in that when we dream
the background or “margins” of our sight or other senses often become heightened
or foregrounded. Howe also listens, she says, to “another language another way of
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speaking so quietly always there . . . extra-marginal . . . Documents resemble people
talking in sleep” (Howe 2015)(62).
In many ways, Howe seems to view herself as a vessel that can be occupied by spirit,
though she often describes herself as the one haunting libraries. Kathleen Crown
(1998) writes, “For Howe, historical inquiry is always a kind of invocation of and
intimate communion with the dead” (491, cited in (Heim 2015)114). Heim adds,
"The implication is that such intimacy is real communion, therefore dan-
gerous and transformative. Writing of her own work on Emily Dickinson,
Howe describes the process of giving voice to the dead as “a kind of fu-
sion” (BM 158). In The Birth-mark she asks, ’Can any words restore to
me how you felt? / you are straying, seeking, scattering. Was it you or
is it me? . . . Who or what survives the work?’ (4, emphasis original).
. . . Howe becomes intertwined – emotionally and actually – with the
historical subject she pursues. Closely following the suggested confusion
between selves (’Was it you or is it me’), the question ’Who or what
survives the work’ suggests that the poet’s historical inquiry might have
repercussions for her own safety." (Heim 2015)(114-15)
Heim expands off Devin Johnston’s analysis of the poet H.D., who through her
developing occultism, used “writing as a mode of transcending the limits of the
self” (115). Similarly, Howe seems to “leave” herself or embody other selves or
spirits in her writing. In a poetic manifesto delivered at the Vancouver New Poetics
Colloquium, she cites Creon’s statement to Antigone: “Go to the dead and love
them” (Howe 1985b) cited in (Heim 2015)(112). For Howe, “Archives are not threats.
They are invitations” (Pad.ma 2010). When Howe says, “For something to work I
need to be another self,” she speaks of a type of transmutation, or what Heim calls a
“dangerous intersubjectivity” (Howe and Thompson 2005, cited in (Heim 2015)112-
15). Invocation and communion occur through close examination of handwriting
because for Howe “texts are pneumatic – inhabited by the ghosts of their authors”
(Bruns 2009)(28). Intersubjectivity becomes her textual strategy through which she
creates works as “textual site[s] for collectively mourning unrealized possibilities”
(Irzık 2019)(436).
Attending to and transforming through marginalized voices is ever more possible
for Howe by paying close attention to the stray marks, gaps, “physical details of the
page” that unsettle order in the archive and are part of the “fictitious real” (Howe
1993)(142). She focuses on highlighting the marginalia that appear in the documents
she encounters toward rescuing “an echo of an undervoice that was speaking from
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the beginning” or uncover “some truth that had been edited out of our history”
(Howard 2019)(15, citing Howe 1990, 1996). She articulates the transmutation that
happens in her archival research onto the pages of her own books through what she
calls “factual telepathy,” “collagist-typographic polyvocal gestures” in which she
borrows textual artifacts, which are overlaid, rearranged, and combined poetically
toward “recaptur[ing] someone something somewhere looking back” (Howe 2015)(1,
27); (Howard 2019)(15). Factual telepathy, more broadly speaking, also describes
Howe’s general process of being summoned by “font-voices” in the archive, which she
reconfigures to recuperate and rejuvenate marginalized histories. Through invoking
Dickinson, writes Howard,
"We are called upon, as if from a mythic realm . . . to search through the
linguistic and material ruins of history for voices and artifacts, ghosts
and gifts on the brink of oblivion that could repair personal and collective
traumas . . . May these enigmatic lines mean anything we would wish for
them, or do they signify more precisely? How far across centuries and
through cultures of literary and historical discourse might these words
resonate? Whose stories and which sources are most relevant?" (Howard
2019)(75-6).
Thus, Howe’s communion seems to extend the resonance of Dickinson’s words, so
that Howe’s poetics is figured as praxis, or something that does something in the
world.
"If I were to read aloud a passage from a poem of your choice, to an au-
dience of judges in sympathy with surrounding library nature, and they
were to experience its lexical inscape as an offshoot of Anglo-American
modernism in typographical format, it might be possible to release our
great-great-grandparents, beginning at the greatest distance from a com-
mon mouth, eternally belated, some coming home through dark ages,
others nearer to early modern, multitudes of them meeting first to con-
stitute certain main branches of etymologies, so all along there are new
sources, some running directly contrary to others, and yet all meet at
last, clothed in robes of glory, offering maps of languages, some with
shining tones . . . " (Howe 2015)(56, emphasis mine)
The act of resuscitating the trace of the linguistic artifact, rather than a lost or non-
existent narrative, can be compared to Hartman’s personal interest and investment
in the traces that can show up (to be lost again) in the photograph.
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In Lose Your Mother (2006) Hartman tells the story of locating her maternal great-
great-grandmother Polly in a volume of slave testimonies in Yale’s library. Yet years
later, she finds instead in the same volume an interview with her paternal great-
great-grandmother Ella Thomas. “Had I confused one great-great-grandmother with
another?” (Hartman 2006)(16). Scouring once more her notes and multiple volumes,
she is unable to locate Polly again. “It was as if I had conjured her up,” she writes.
“Was my hunger for the past so great that I was now encountering ghosts? Had my
need for an entrance into history played tricks on me, mocked my scholarly diligence,
and exposed me as a girl blinded by mother loss?” (16). Hartman characterizes this
experience as representative of the slavery archive’s “slipperiness and elusiveness.”
On her journey to study Ghana’s slave routes she does not aim to unearth her family
history because to her that was an impossible task. “There were no survivors of my
lineage or far-flung relatives of whom I had come in search, no places and people
before slavery that I could trace. My family trail disappeared in the second decade
of the nineteenth century” (17). The question then that fuels her journey is, “How
does one write a story about an encounter with nothing?” (16-17).
Howe recounts a similar but different story about finding (or failing to find) her
paternal grandmother, Fanny Quincy Howe, in a book published by The Feminist
Press in 1977 which became popular “in sociology and women’s studies depart-
ments” (Howe 2015)(169). The Maimie Papers, a book of correspondence between
Fanny Howe and “reformed prostitute” Maimie Pinzer in the 1910s, “provides a so-
ciocultural record of that historically inarticulate subculture, or so the editors say,”
writes Howe (169). The book interestingly overlaps with Wayward Lives as an urban
women’s history privileging a marginalized voice, but it resembles in other ways the
archive Hartman contests. Howe is first concerned with how The Maimie Papers
contains only letters Maimie wrote to Fanny because those Fanny wrote “must have
been lost or thrown out by Maimie or someone in her family”:
"The introduction swiftly provides a standardized version of a ’proper
Bostonian’ before hastening on to the ’multi-dimensioned’ persona of
Maimie. Ruth Rosen, one of the editors, says ’Mrs. Howe became a di-
ary for her.’ What wounds Fanny had ever received, what the two women
might have had in common; the courage they might have built in each
other isn’t the point the editors of this correspondence hope to make.
’How did working-class women live during a period of history charac-
terized by great industrial exploitation and institutionalized sexism,’ is
what Rosen and her fellow editors are after. ’The Maimie Project,’ as it
was called at first, intended to address this question." (Howe 2015)(169)
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The story of Howe’s relation to this publication is interesting because it tells us about
something personal Howe lost in the archive. Despite her grandmother’s status as
a white, wealthy writer and philanthropist, she, surprisingly, doesn’t show up with
Maimie. Howe conceivably wishes to know what her grandmother Fanny had written
about to Maimie over these years of correspondence, a desire likely intensified by the
fact that the letters are published and shared throughout women’s studies university
departments. Despite the fact that Howe may desire the side of the story from the
subject who would normally be located more easily, Howe’s real interest seems to be
in how the relation between the two women (“what the two women might have had
in common”) is not only obscured by the missing letters, but also by the framing of
what is present. Howe suggests that Fanny loses dimension as she comes to represent
“respectable bourgeois female society” in convenient contrast to Maimie, who is
similarly flattened to a “Jewish one-eyed ex-prostitute” whose supposed destitution
made her “transformation” so inspiring.
In this brief anecdote Howe criticizes the possible frameworks, namely crafted by
editors in this case, that would close off readings and other possibilities, with or
without Fanny’s side of the correspondence. There is resonance between Howe’s
and Hartman’s attention to these dynamics. Howe, like Hartman, longs for stories
about women in relation to each other. When discussing the fact that Mattie Nel-
son’s letters are missing from the Bedford Hills case file, Hartman wonders: “What
stories were shared in all the letters lost and disappeared, the things whispered, and
never disclosed? Is it possible to conjure the sentences and paragraphs and poems
contained in that lost archive? Or find a way to Mattie’s self-expression?” (Howe
2015)(75). Why did Maimie and Fanny write to each other? How did they feel about
each other? Where is “some trace of love’s infolding” (Howe 1993)(4)? What could
we (have) possibly learn(ed) about these women (during this time, in this place)
from a consideration of their relationship in letters? Could wider or deeper gaps
in the archive be remedied? Howe is interested in crafting the conditions in which
these types of questions might be broached which simultaneously serves to critique
editorial acts of “muffling” that attempt to erase the imperfections, contradictions,
and “counter facts” that fall outside the archive’s logical frameworks.
4.2.3 Fabulating to Recover the “Stutter”
As mentioned in the Introduction, Howe finds a powerful metaphor for editorial
violence in Hawthorne’s story “The Birth-mark” (1843) in which the scientist Alymer
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attempts to remove a birthmark from his wife Georgiana’s check because to him it
is an intolerable deformity on a “specimen of ideal loveliness” (2). Alymer tells his
“Dearest”:
“I have spent much thought upon the subject . . . I am convinced of
the perfect practicability of its removal. . . . I feel myself fully compe-
tent to render this dear cheek as faultless as its fellow; and then, most
beloved, what will be my triumph when I shall have corrected what
Nature left imperfect in her fairest work! Even Pygmalion, when his
sculptured woman assumed life, felt not greater ecstasy than mine will
be.” (Hawthorne 1843)(4-5)
Georgiana, having “learned to shudder at his gaze,” agrees to allow her husband
to try to remove the birthmark even though she knows she is unlikely to survive
the process (3). Howe writes, “He has grappled with the mystery of life Georgiana’s
difference represents, and the punishment is her death” (Howe 1993)(178). To Howe,
the birthmark represents the “stray mark” she locates through close and careful
readings in Dickinson’s archive (specifically, her facsimiles).
In her essay “These Flames and Generosities of the Heart” (1993), Howe composes
a mock editor-critic’s manifesto:
The production of meaning will be brought under the control of social
authority . . . [for the editors] the conventions of print require humilities
of caution. Obedience to tradition. Dress up dissonance. Customary
usage. Provoking visual fragmentation will be banished from the body
of the ’poem proper.’ Numbers and word matches will valorize these sen-
suous visual catastrophes. Lines will be brought into line without any
indication of their actual position. An editor edits for mistakes. Subdi-
vided in conformity with propriety. A discreet biographical explanation:
unrequited love for a popular minister will consecrate the gesture of this
unconverted antinomian who refused to pass her work through proof.
Later the minister will turn into a man called ’Master.’ . . . Poems will
be called letters and letters will be called poems. ’The tone, a little dis-
tant but respectful and gracious, claims few prerogatives’ . . . Now she is
her sex for certain for editors picking and choosing for a general reader
reading." (Howe 1993)(140, emphasis mine)1
1In another rhetorical gesture, Howe cites R.W. Emerson, who commented on the homogeneity of the
editor’s voice: “I am very much struck in literature by the appearance that one person wrote all the books;
as if the editor of a journal planted his body of reporters in different parts of the field of action, and
relieved some by others from time to time; but there is such equality and identity both of judgment and
point of view in the narrative that it is plainly the work of one all-seeing, all-hearing gentleman. . . ” (cited
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One of Howe’s concerns is to grant Dickinson the possibility of agency and intention-
ality she has been historically denied by reading her work generously, with attention
to form as and alongside content with the inclusion of all “stray marks.” She re-
produces and counter-edits Dickinson’s poems and letter fragments in deliberate
counterpoint to Johnson and Franklin:
"In translating Dickinson’s handwriting into type I have not followed
standard typesetting conventions. I have paid attention to space between
handwritten words. I have broken the lines exactly as she broke them.
I have tried to match the spacing between words in the lists at the end
of poems. . . . Dickinson’s frequent use of the dash was noted in the
Johnson edition, but he regularized these marks. . . Emily Dickinson
had enough humor to read [the word variants in some books] as found
poems. She was her own publisher and could do as she liked with her
texts. . . " (Howe 1993)(152)
An important site to locate Dickinson’s agency for Howe is in her refusal to publish
(this refusal has been interpreted widely as “failure” or “fear”). Howe quotes a poem
by Dickinson that seems to speak to the poet’s awareness that the integrity of her
writing would be compromised upon publishing:
"Publication- is the Auction
Of the Mind of Man [. . . ]
Thought belong to Him who
gave it–
Then- to Him Who bear
Its Corporeal illustration-
Sell / The Royal Air- [. . . ]"
(Howe 1993)(136-37)
Though Howe doesn’t choose to translate these lines, within them one can read
the poet’s anxiety around selling “the Mind” to the editor and commercializing
poetry’s corruption: “Into [print] will I grind thee, my bride” (Howe 1993)(141).2
Howe contributes in disjunctive aphorisms: “Use value is a blasphemy. Form and
in (Howe 1993)141).
2Howe plays with a line here fromWashington Allston’s “The Paint-King” (1809), quoted in R.W. Emerson’s
essay “Nominalist and Realist” (241). “The evil Paint-King woos the Queen of Fairies by threatening fair
Ellen with a most peculiar death”: “Ah me!” cried the damsel, and fell at his feet, “Must I hang on these
walls to be dried?” “Oh, no!” said the fiend, while he sprung from his seat, “A far nobler fortune thy
person shall meet; Into paint will I grind thee, my bride!” (Monthly Anthology and Boston Review 7,
391-95, emphasis mine).
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content collapse the assumptions of Project and Masterpiece. Free from limitations
of genre Language finds true knowledge estranged in it self” (137). Howe postulates
that Dickinson’s choice not to publish was a radical refusal to stifle her feminine
enthusiasm and put a “use value” on her work: “I think she may have chosen to
enter the space of silence, a space where power is no longer an issue, gender is no
longer an issue, voice is no longer an issue, where the idea of a printed book appears
as a trap” (170).
Howe reads Dickinson’s poems themselves as refusing to be limited or controlled.
They exceed convention and mock conformist desires for order and reduction.
“[P]oems with so many lists of words or variants that even Johnson, who was noth-
ing if not methodical, couldn’t find numbers for such polyphonic visual complexity.
What if the author went to great care to fit these words onto pages she could have
copied over? Left in place, seemingly scattered and random, these words form their
own compositional relation” (Howe 1993)(141). Howe gently mocks “An editor’s
query”: “You need to give the reader some thoughts about making use of the words
at the end of the ‘poem proper’ . . . Are we to attach these words as alternatives
to certain words in the ‘poem’?; i.e., Where does ‘too’ go? What am I to do with
it?” Howe adds that the word “too” denotes “excess” (137-38). She suggests next
to Johnson’s decision to read these word lists as “alternatives” the possibility that
they can be considered poems in themselves (138).
She notes that whereas critics have focused on Dickinson’s style of capitalization
and use of dashes (which Howe plays with herself), her attention is directed more
toward Dickinson’s margins and space left on the page (often between words and
even letters). Howe writes, “Maybe margins shelter the inapprehensible Imaginary of
poetry” (Howe 1993)(29). Even though Johnson placed Dickinson’s “variant” words
at the end of her poems as Dickinson had done, Howe writes, “he couldn’t leave
it at that. This textual scholar-editor, probably with the best intentions, matched
word to counterword, numbered lines as he had reduplicated them, then exchanged
his line numbers for her crosses” (139). She again mocks his “best intentions” to
give room for Dickinson’s own while simultaneously leaving open the possibility
that her intention to defy interpretation was an “antinomian” gesture. “Codes are
confounded and converted. ‘Authoritative readings’ confuse her nonconformity. In
1991 these manuscripts still represent a Reformation” (139).
According to Howe, Dickinson’s work “complicate[s] . . . criteria for a poetic order”:
"This visible handwritten sequence establishes an enunciative clearing
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outside intention while obeying intuition’s agonistic necessity. These
lines move freely through a notion of series we may happen to cross –
ambiguous articulated Place. . . . Deflagration of what was there to
say. No message to decode or finally decide. The fascicles have a ’halo
of wilderness.’ By continually interweaving expectation and categories
they checkmate inscription to become what a reader offers them." (Howe
1993)(136, emphasis mine)
Howe recognizes an opening in Dickinson’s “ambiguous articulated Place,” a gap
for the reader and for possibility, free space allowing room for reorientation for and
towards imagining, what Rancière might call, a different “sensory fabric” (Rancière
2009)(56). Howe’s writing of Dickinson’s “enunciative clearing” replicates the poet’s
self-contradictory mode:
"Emily Dickinson almost never titled a poem.
She titled poems several times.
She drew an ink slash at the end of a poem.
Sometimes she didn’t.
She seldom used numbers to show where a word or a poem should go.
She sometimes used numbers to show where a word or a line should go.
. . . Sometimes letters are poems with a salutation and signature.
Sometimes poems are letters with a salutation and signature.
If limits disappear where will we find bearings?" (Howe 1993)(143)
Poems, words, letters, and line breaks defy definition and interpretation, overflow
with contradictions, and disrupt “common sense.” “Rilke writes, in one of the Duino
Elegies, ‘Strange to see meanings that clung together once, floating away / in every
direction –.’ This is always the way with Dickinson. She is always somewhere else . . .
She abolishes categories” (Howe 1993)(157). If our bearings disappear or become
irrelevant, there may be new wheres, new whens, new bearings, and new ways to
break them down. Always movement in the opening.
Howe, similar to Hartman, is enthused by the possibilities in loss and failure, the fail-
ure to grasp and hold. Both writers share a resistance to meeting the past through
“knowing” it or restoring an impossible original. They share a vision of the possibil-
ity in the impossibility, a belief in possibility only in impossibility. At the same time,
Howe yearns in many ways to recover our losses; she re-publishes Dickinson’s poems
“as they were written . . . with very few and superficial changes” (Howe 1993)(144).
She resists, however, the quest for an “original truth” or version, because there is
no “going back” to an “untainted” original: “the poet’s manuscript books and sets
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had already been torn open. Their contents had been sifted, translated, titled, then
regrouped under categories. . . ” (144). “If we could perfectly restore each packet
to its original order, her original impulse would be impossible to decipher,” Howe
writes. “The manuscript books and sets preserve their insubordination” (143).
In an antinomian gesture, against editors and male academic authorities that Howe
has been battling since childhood, Howe enters “another way” and takes on the
responsibility of being accountable to the poet. Having been refused ease of access
into the panopticon of the scholar’s vestibule, she refuses what she has been refused
and seeks (like Dickinson) a home in poetry, trusting (like Dickinson) in poetry:
"HER INTELLECTUAL CONSCIENCE
Must never be underestimated. A tear is an intellectual thing. Dickinson
ignored the worst advice from friends who misunderstood the intensity
of her drive to simplicity, and heeded the best, culled from her own
reading. Her talent was synthetic; she used other writers, grasped at
straws from the bewildering raveling of Being wherever and whenever
she could use them. Crucial was her ability to spin straw into gold.
Her natural capacity for assimilation was fertilized by solitude. The
omnivorous gatherer was equally able to reject. To find affirmation in
renunciation and to be (herself) without. Outside authority, eccentric
and unique." (Howe 1985a)(28)
Howard writes that in this passage we see “not only Howe’s reflection upon her own
inter-/intra-textual methods, but also her keen affection for intellectual iconoclasts”
and her “devotion to the life and work” of Dickinson in the “vitalist materiality” of
her manuscripts, works that “confront us with artistic and scholarly difficulties that
provoke the most imaginative and rigorous of responses” (Howard 2019)(45). Howe
writes, “One of Dickinson’s abilities is to escape everything. If you think you can
explain a poem, she quickly shows you there is a way out of that interpretation. I
think I have the best intentions when it comes to reading The Manuscript Books,
but I often wake up in the night and think, No, I am wrong. She would not agree.
She would be angry with me” (Howe 1993)(170, emphasis mine). As Howe strives
to stay personally accountable to Dickinson, she continuously doubts and hesitates,
refusing the comfort and knowability of static self-assuredness.
We can see here again how Howe’s and Hartman’s archives differ in one major re-
spect. Whereas Hartman critically approaches the archive in its absence of material,
I have tried to illustrate above the ways in which Howe goes beyond a critique of the
supposed “unintelligibility” of content the archive holds in plenty. In other words,
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“one of the greatest poets who ever wrote in English . . . of the order of Shelley and
Holderlin” is denied a serious editorial project in part because she is a woman poet
(“an axiom”) and in larger part, according to Howe, because she “disturbs the order
of a world” (Howe 1993)(19-20). There are crucial ways in which Dickinson’s voice
and perspective are obscured in the archive and in the publications of her work.
In My Emily Dickinson Howe is interested in culling the “gold” from the “straw,”
performing a careful extraction of the poet’s influences, experiments, and their pos-
sible motivations without compromising the integrity and elusiveness of the work.
Operating as a careful critic, she pulls the poems, fragments, words, syllables, and
meanings apart with the purpose of lovingly reconstructing recombinant versions
and reviving the vital thing about the work. Her regenerative purpose, admittedly
“vampiric,” is driven by the idea that there is something living and un-interpretable
through the codes that we’re comfortable with in the work of a woman writing over
a hundred years ago, something that can help us now.
4.2.4 A Feminine “Antinomianism”
In My Emily Dickinson Howe aims to situate Dickinson in a feminine (or feminist)
tradition of nonconformist “breaks in world-historical reason” (Beckett 1989)(20).
The thread that runs through all of Howe’s work, in its earliest and “clearest” ar-
ticulation in My Emily Dickinson, is her interest in and commitment to articulating
“antinomian” (or “enthusiast”) thought. In another sense, this can be described as
the thought and expression that doesn’t “fit” normative histories and their narra-
tives. Howe’s method in articulating this unorthodoxy produces counter-historical
(anti)narratives, which are “never got engaged with the archive, however fraught
that engagement might be” (Smallwood 2016)(120). Howe describes herself as an
“interloper” since she is a poet entering history’s “enclosure,” crossing between dis-
ciplines and challenging the boundary between “fact” and “fiction”:
"I have trespassed into the disciplines of American Studies and Textual
Criticism through my need to fathom what wildness and absolute free-
dom is the nature of expression. There are other characteristic North
American voices and visions that remain antinomian and separatist. In
order to hear them I have returned by strange paths to a particular place
at a particular time, a threshold at the austere reach of the book." (Howe
1993)(2)
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Before explaining further Howe’s strategies to craft enthusiastic counter-histories, I
will explain how Howe positions Emily Dickinson within an antinomian tradition.
“Antinomian” here refers first to the New England antinomian controversy (1636-
38), which was based on a disagreement between the Puritan majority, who preached
righteous behavior or “good works” toward spiritual salvation, and the Antinomi-
ans, who argued in favor of the “covenant of grace” or that one’s outward behavior
did not affect one’s spiritual condition. Under the influence of Anne Hutchinson,
an “early American female preacher and prophet” (Howe 1993)(1) who held public
meetings at her house, the Antinomians claimed they had personal spiritual revela-
tions that should be read as equal in importance to Scripture, and so argued that the
Bible had no precedence over personal communion with God. According to Enikő
Bollobás, Hutchinson contested the spiritual and political authority of the Puritan
patriarchy, and in rejecting the idea of a “national covenant . . . [she] came to be
seen as opposing the very idea of America” (Bollobás 2009). Bollobás writes, she
“usurped the territory of men” by refusing her designation as a “non-intellect” and
was punished for acting “unwomanly”: “For knowing the law and constantly citing
it; claiming to have a conscience, relying on her conscience when matters of faith
needed to be decided, and daring to find truth in her conscience” (Bollobás 2009).
Governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony John Winthrop convicted Hutchinson for
“being a woman not fit for our society” and compared her opinions to “monstrous
births,” making coarse reference to the supposedly congenitally deformed children
born in the Colonies between 1637-38 who were believed to bear the mark of “Mrs.
Hutchinson’s errours [sic]” (Bollobás 2009).
Anne Hutchinson was charged with heresy and sedition, excommunicated, and ban-
ished from the Colonies. Though she was banned from telling her own story, traces
of her account can be found in her trial records and Winthrop’s journals. Howe
relates Hutchinson’s experience to that of Mary Rowlandson, a Puritan woman who
was compelled to narrate her experience of kidnap and release by the Nipmunks
and Narragansetts (Howe 1993)(95). Rowlandson’s narrative helped usher in an
incredibly popular new genre of “frontier literature”: “captivity narratives,” which
were usually narrated by women but “increasingly structured and written down by
men,” became a vehicle by which to impart Protestant lessons of suffering and deliv-
erance and were a powerful Puritan metaphor for the process of religious Conversion
(89). “Rowlandson’s vivid account of the eleven weeks and five days she spent as
a prisoner of the Narragansetts ushered in what was to become a major stream in
American Mythology”; “Mythology,” writes Howe in My Emily Dickinson, “reflects
a region’s reality” (Howe 1985a)(42-3).
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Though Rowlandson’s narrative follows the typical pattern of a burgeoning
Christian-American, white supremacist, patriarchal order, Howe reads between the
lines of Rowlandson’s account. “[I]n writing,” says Howe, “Language advances into
remembering that there is no answer imagining Desire. Remembering a wild place
where there is no forgetting” (Howe 1993)(124). Howe is particularly interested in
the openings created by Rowlandson’s way of marking time while with the Narra-
gansetts. “Time is no longer marked for her in minutes, hours, and days, but in a
series of formed Removes, away from civilization deeper in the heart of the wilder-
ness that is an emblem for Babylon” (42). “Each Remove,” writes Howe, “is a forced
march away from Western rationalism, deep and deeper into Limitlessness, where all
illusion of volition, all individual identity may be transformed – assimilated” (96). In
“The Captivity and Restoration of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson,” an essay in which Howe
expands her reading of the narrative, she remarks on how while Rowlandson has been
criticized for her “lack of curiosity about the customs of her captors . . . and her
narrative has been blamed for stereotypes of Native Americans as ‘savages,’” Row-
landson has herself been stereotyped as a “passive cipher” (Howe 1993)(96). Howe
writes, “Already in 1681, the first narrative written by a white Anglo-American
woman is alive with rage and contradiction. She is a prophet. She speaks for us
now, and the same way that slave narratives do. She says our sin. I think she has
been an unacknowledged undervoice in Thoreau, Melville, Dickinson, Hawthorne,
though I can’t prove it. . . ” (167). Howe reads Rowlandson’s “Removes” against
the grain for “lapses” of rhetoric: “Each time an errant perception skids loose, she
controls her lapse by vehemently invoking biblical authority” (100). For example,
“she interrupts the homeward direction of her impending restoration with a list of
specific criticisms of colonial policies toward her captors” (who never harmed her
and “shared what little they had with her”): “‘Before I go any further,’ writes Row-
landson, ‘I would take leave to mention. . . ’; then she stops her slide into Reason’s
ruin by pushing her readers back to the imperatives of Wonder-Working Providence.
‘Help Lord, or we perish’” (100-1). Howe attests that Rowlandson’s narrative is in
many ways “a contradiction of orthodox Puritan history” (127). In describing the
experience of researching to write about Rowlandson’s account of her experience,
Howe says, “it is hard to explain the urgency I felt” (Howe 1993)(167).
It is urgent for Howe to rearticulate the “fractured syntax, the gaps, the silences”
in Rowlandson’s account and the way in which it “moves in and through the cut”
to present time “in a layered or folded manner that suspends historicity” (Howe
1993)(180); (Nyong’o 2018)(8). Howe’s work is driven by the urgency to articulate
the “stutter” that for her sounds the “uncertainty” in American literature (Howe
1993)(181). In retelling Hutchinson’s and Rowlandson’s stories among others, Howe
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re-enacts the “stutter” to make the case that these stories are part of Dickinson’s
intellectual and spiritual ancestry. Hutchinson’s staunch belief in the authority of
her personal communion with Spirit and Rowlandson’s narrative gestures away from
Reason are combined for Howe in Dickinson, whose “religion was Poetry” (Howe
1985a)(48). Divine messages travel to Dickinson through words, their sounds, and
their elusive meanings. The poet’s unconventionality in language was a form of
feminine lawlessness.
Howe claims, “The antinomian controversy in New England (1636-38) didn’t leave
Massachusetts with its banished originator,” and she locates in antinomianism
the “primordial struggle of North American literary expression” (Howe 1993)(4).
Hutchinson’s trial “is not unrelated to the editorial apprehension and domestication
of Emily Dickinson”:
"The issue of editorial control is directly connected to the attempted
erasure of antinomianism in our culture. Lawlessness seen as negligence
is at first feminized and then restricted or banished. . . . For me, the
manuscripts of Emily Dickinson represent a contradiction to canonical
social power, whose predominant purpose seems to have been to render
isolate voices devoted to writing as a physical event of immediate revela-
tion. . . . The antinomian controversy continues in the form, often called
formlessness, of Dickinson’s letters and poems . . . It continues with
this nineteenth-century antinomian poet’s gesture of infinite patience in
preferring not to publish. Her demurral was a covenant of grace. The
antinomian controversy continues in the first reordering and revision of
her manuscripts according to a covenant of works. . . . It continues in the
current magisterial control of her copyrights and access to her papers. . . "
(Howe 1993)(1-2)
Issues of control and ownership over Dickinson’s writing, which is “still being tamed
for aesthetic consumption” in the canon, mirror for Howe the ways in which male
authorities attempted to control Rowlandson’s narrative and shape its moralistic,
cultural influence (4). Yet, something always doesn’t “fit”: counter-memories or
counter-facts “escape,” and Howe labors to pick up their signals. “While the [cap-
tivity story] seems to conform to Puritan models of prayer and autobiography . . .
the narrative seems to work against itself” (Nicholls 1996)(590). “The idiosyncratic
syntax of Mary Rowlandson’s closed structure refuses closure” (Howe 1993)(126).
Attempting to locate the thought outside the scripture and narrative formula, Howe
urgently works to mark the resonance of this antinomian spirit “outside law.”
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4.2.5 Writing Personally through “Historical Figuration”
Howe’s study of antinomianism or tradition of nonconformism is driven by the search
for “a continuous peculiar and particular voice in American literature” (Nicholls
1996)(588): “What was this voice? ... Certainly not a simply self-expressive
one” (588-89). She proposes that the “antinomian vision in North America is gen-
dered feminine,” thus linking conventional history and literature’s efforts to control,
rewrite, or erase unorthodox gestures and stubbornly original expression (Howe
1993)(4). Her close readings of texts to locate these “signal escapes” align with her
open approach in archives (Howe 1987). In the text, which can be a “wilderness”
“outside” historical narratives premised on “exclusion and erasure,” Howe seeks
“trace-stories” as opposed to origins, according to Nicholls (Nicholls 1996)(588).
Howe’s research on Dickinson and her precursors, would “draw her deep into Ameri-
can history ... the next decade” (588). Adjacent to a new historicist tradition, Howe
shares “an interest in recovering lost and marginalized voices” but also “a passionate
commitment to forms of unintelligibility and disruption...,” continuing throughout
her publications to study writers’ unsettlement of language and resistance to inter-
pretation (588).
For Howe, history and fiction have “always been united”: “In my writing, I have
often explored ideas of what constitutes an official version of events as opposed to a
former version in imminent danger of being lost” (Howe 2015)(91). She listens, like
Hartman, for a silence that is not silent: “Poetry brings similitude and representation
to configurations waiting from forever to be spoken” (Howe 2015)(181). Ma writes
that Howe’s “fusion of history and poetry, carried with increasing emphasis to the
point of interdependency or mutual identification, functions to reposition the power
relations between the two by providing poetry with an entry point into history, into
what hitherto has always been the sealed authoritarian discourse of history”:
"In this readjusted relationship, history is transformed into a flawed text
yet to be examined by a sensibility that, ’read[ing] a past that is a huge
imagination of one form,’ pulls a different text from it . . . While history
as traditionally understood and defined ceases to be definitive, poetry,
or the writing of poetry as a present, continuous praxis, acquires a new
political and historical status." (Ma 1994)(719, citing (Howe 1985a)106)
Her creative, political ambition is to lift undervoices she locates in the archive
through counter-historical writing crafted through an attention to “counter-facts”
107
and marginalia to which she affectively and emotionally responds: “Voices I am
following lead me to the margins. Anne Hutchinson’s verbal expression is barely
audible . . . They walk in my imagination and I love them” (Howe 1993)(4).
This affective listening is a personal journey for Howe; she narrates these stories,
Dickinson’s in particular, as though she is recording an “inarticulate” history that
is her own. Howe’s goal, as discussed, is not to “explain” the silence or undervoice,
but rather to meet it with writing. Howard calls this Howe’s “historical figuration”
(Howard 2019)(65), or, as Heim puts it, Howe’s “rootedness in lives” (Heim 2015)(3).
As in the archive, Howe opens herself in her writing to be fused with others.
"It seems to me that as writers they were trying to understand the writers
or people . . . not to explain the work, not to translate it, but to meet
the work with writing – you know, to meet in time, not just from place
to place but from writer to writer, mind to mind, friend to friend, from
words to words.3 That’s what I wanted to do in My Emily Dickinson
. . . Not just write a tribute but to meet her in the tribute. And that’s
a kind of fusion . . . a book of love." (Howe 1993)(158)
Howe “immerses herself in long study of a thinker in order to adopt and adapt
his structures and habits of mind in constructing her textual experiment,” or what
Charles Olson calls a “saturation job” (Heim 2015)(29, 55). Heim writes that she
“circles, stalks, and refigures the project of life-writing, creating texts that perform
her effort to comprehend and embody characters of compelling interest to her”
(111). “‘Collecting the lives of the dead’ is no sheer act of objective biography,”
(115, quoting Muriel Rukeyser). Heim writes that “[Howe’s] strict and disciplined
commitment to historical particulars and documents finds its expression in artistic,
dramatic processes” (112). Howe compares her style of “life-writing” to theater:
“I try to understand all aspects of the person . . . the way a playwright or an
actor might . . . the only way for me to reach them, or for them to reach me, is
through the limited perspective of documents (and material objects)” (111, citing
Howe and Thompson 2005). Her combination of the factual with fantastic recalls
Hartman’s “critical fabulation”: Howe similarly produces narratives that expand
from biography and “exceed the archive,” not in attempts to “set right” what history
“got wrong,” but to change the conditions in which these stories can be told, retold,
or untold.
3Howe is referring here to Charles Olson’s Call Me Ishmael, D.H. Lawrence’s Studies in Classic American
Literature, William Carlos Williams’s In the American Grain, Simone Weil’s essay “The Iliad, Poem of
Might,” and Jack Spicer’s After Lorca (Howe 1993)(158).
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More than embodying the characters of history, Howe’s “historical figuration” is,
according to Howard, “a dynamic fusion of historical discourse and poetic figura-
tion that amplifies the constitutive tropological agency of metaphoric transference.
This formulation amplifies the synergy that Hayden White articulates among myth,
fiction, and historiography . . . ‘In other words, just as the contents of myth are
tested by fiction, so, too, the forms of fiction are tested by (narrative) historiogra-
phy’” (Howard 2019)(65 [footnote 109], citing White 1987, 45). In Howe’s historical
figuration, “language is confronted with its origins” so that historical narratives as
Howe reconfigures them not only change writers and readers but “history” itself
through a deconstruction of the false fossilization of words and their meanings. Sto-
ries refuse to be frozen in time. “How do you turn fact into narrative so it can move
somewhere?” (Alcalay 2013, cited in (Heim 2015)84).
The past and the present converge when Howe writes in and of the language that
travels and resists one “true” interpretation. DuPlessis interestingly calls Howe
an “annotator” in that she is a “writer of notes on margins of canonized texts,”
reinterpreting while also reading the canon through new, unexpected combinations
(DuPlessis 1990)(128). For example, Howe weaves excerpts from King Lear into
Mary Rowlandson’s narrative, “evoking the genre of the powerless and the genres
of the educated – folk genres and literate genres”: “Intermingled, tangled, disen-
tangled, claimed as female textual ground. So to reanimate the genres, to claim
major intertextual ties with classic works, and to watch, to follow the wraithe [sic]
on the margins into her centers that are dispersed and profound, taken together as
strategies show the depth and power of Howe’s ambition, her omnivorous, intelligent
allusiveness” (129). Howe’s weaving, like Hartman’s, deauthorizes the text, or at
least makes evident its polyvocal multi-authorship. In many ways My Emily Dick-
inson reads like a book written by a “reader” rather than an “author,” yet it retains
the quality of being Howe’s “personal” history.
In Hartman’s interview with Patricia Saunders, she describes herself as the “bridge”
(Saunders 2008b)(10). I locate a similar positionality in Howe’s book. Howe moves
back and forth between providing details of Dickinson’s life or historical context and
her subjective, emotional responses to the poetry. “If we understand Susan Howe as
a sign, as an interpretant along the continuum of sign-relations she puts in motion
here, we experience her as central, essential to the various relations that together
constitute [the work’s meaning]”; “the self is made through, in, by relation . . .
connections are made through, by, in selves” (Heim 2015)(81). Subjects affectively
enter Howe’s life through research as she works to write new histories accountable to
them. To do this, as a historian and a poet in the face of institutions and histories
that have been “false” to women intellectually, Howe “must negotiate a different
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path to truth” than Johnson or Franklin, Miller or Matthiessen, or Gilbert and
Gubar (Heim 2015)(136). For example, in the following, Howe describes her Emily
Dickinson:
"Perry Miller said that Jonathan Edwards’ understanding of behavioral
psychology, as evidenced by his careful documentation of the process
of Conversion, anticipates American empiricism and William James. I
saw that Emily Dickinson took both his legend and his learning, tore
them free from his own humorlessness and the dead weight of doctri-
naire Calvinism, then applied the freshness of her perception to the dead
weight of American poetry." (Howe 1985a)(50-1)
In another section, Howe claims that Dickinson (with Emily Brontë) anticipated
Nietzschean philosophy, echoing Hartman’s “counter-historical” claims through-
out Wayward Lives that young black women created a cultural “revolution before
Gatsby” (Howe 1985a)(62); (Hartman 2019)(xv).
These claims highlight the “struggle over the terrain of truth and its uses” (Heim
2015)(100). Yet, both Howe and Hartman don’t follow the normal protocol of a
historian out to overturn her predecessor’s hypothesis. Howe firstly distinguishes
her study of Dickinson from others’ in her title: My (that is, her) Emily Dickinson.
Howe nods in her title to a letter Dickinson wrote after learning of George Eliot’s
death: “The look of words as they lay in the print I shall never forget. Not their face
in the casket could have had the eternity to me. Now, my George Eliot” (L710, cited
in (Howe 1985a)19). Howe makes clear that hers is a “subjective” study yet does not
seem to agree that this designates it as less rigorous or “truthful.” Howe’s Dickinson,
she writes, is not a “madwoman” like Gilbert and Gubar’s: “I really was concerned
to show that she didn’t write in a rapturous frenzy, that she read to write...” (Howe
1993)(157). Where does this concern come from? Wolfgang Iser (1997) contends
that “If a literary text does something to its readers, it also simultaneously tells us
something about them.” Literature, like our dreams, is “a divining rod, locating our
dispositions, desires, inclinations, and eventually our overall make up,” which is why
our relationships with writers and their work can feel personal, “an affinity bordering
on ownership” (Iser 1998);(Curtis 2017). “Ownership” in this sense should be linked
to “care,” as in caring for, “mind to mind, friend to friend” (Howe 1993)(158).
Heim contends that Howe’s “search for documentary evidence did not oppose, but
rather corresponded to and tracked her turn toward personal response – these two
impulses in her work are . . . central and braided” (Heim 2015)(104). In My Emily
Dickinson, as in Wayward Lives, “history” is written as a personal history between
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narrator and subject, yet Howe avoids writing biographically about Dickinson. For
Howe, care was taken to avoid overwriting Dickinson’s “intellectual conscience” with
the details of her biography; for example, she notes critics’ obsession with pinpoint-
ing the identity of the recipient of Dickinson’s famous “Master” letters over attention
that should be paid to the letters’ structure and repurposed imagery culled from the
poet’s reading (Howe 1985a)(25). “Emily Dickinson took the scraps from the sep-
arate ‘higher’ female education many bright women of her time were increasingly
resenting, combined them with voracious and ‘unladylike’ outside reading, and used
the combination” (21).
As mentioned, Hartman is, on the other hand, interested in creating the conditions
for her subjects to have historical biographies, yet she also avoids the impulse to
write life-stories of individuals. Hartman’s subjects avoid reduction paradoxically
by their integration into a chorus. Individuals are rescued in this process and also
strategically avoid capture as Hartman works to emplace them in new contexts
that won’t obliterate their agency. Howe avoids essentializing Dickinson through
her biography by considering “what constitutes a speaking subject on the page”
(Keller 1995)(32). She prefers to situate Dickinson in a longer history of antinomian
thought, confusing the boundaries between individualism and community. Keeping
the work personal but non-biographical allows Howe to “return[. . . ] feeling to the
fold without reifying it as the precious cargo of individualism” (Heim 2015)(80).
In addition, Howe strives to keep Dickinson’s writing “infinitely open” so that “her
poems and . . . letters encompass whatever I want to bring to them. Need to bring to
them” (Howe 1993)(155). She writes that “Dickinson’s pen-eye aims at the conquest
of mechanical reproduction. It seems after reaching the age of consent she refused
to be photographed” (Howe 2015)(126).
Through the act of writing histories that are personal and accountable, Howe like
Hartman produces a poetics of mourning that proliferate connections between the
past and present. According to Howard, Howe produces “works of mourning that
resist transcendent forms of consolation and closure in order to shape conditions for
positive social change” (Howard 2019)(71). Howe’s “collision or collusion with his-
tory” through poetic historical figuration engages words as soundscapes that cross
time. “Such a poetics and praxis recovers, remediates, and releases . . . languages
and lives without elevation/transcendence or cancellation/oblivion . . . dispels tele-
ological, universal narratives . . . celebrates the heterogeneousness of ‘what one
might know, which in turn is always less than what language might say’ (Hejinian)”
(Howard 2019)(94). Howe’s method resonates with Hartman’s open work of “choral”
fabulation, which invokes voices communing across texts and cross-contextually.
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I have previously discussed how Hartman must necessarily fabulate and re-imagine
the lives of minor figures due to their absence in the archive or because they only
“show up” as captives and criminals. Hartman repurposes various utterances to
craft these stories; thus, they are not stories of individuals but of the collective (or
chorus). Her aesthetic mode of critical fabulation through this chorus is, first, a
strategy to counter conventional history’s claims to “truth” (through the exposure
of the fiction inherent in personal and historical narratives), and, second, a means
through which she opens space for readers to imagine otherwise and to “intervene” in
history by telling new or “better stories.” Though Howe’s historical figures show up
often more readily in the archive, she explains how they are or have been presented
historically as either “exceptions” (the woman poet) or as on the verge of oblivion
and under threat of erasure (antinomian histories) (Howe 1993)(168). She similarly
recontextualizes textual “utterances” toward strategically “fictionalizing” history.
Against the idea then of history “foreclosed,” I argue that Howe’s book is an adjacent
potential history to Hartman’s. Howe similarly plays with temporality through
grammar. In the previous chapter I discussed Hartman’s use of the subjunctive mood
and interrogatives which operate to reread “black dispossession as a ‘question mark’”
(McKittrick 2013)(5). Howe deftly uses the interrogative while weaving past and
present tenses. “Emily Dickinson . . . conducted a skillful and ironic investigation of
patriarchal authority over literary history. Who policies questions of grammar, parts
of speech, connection, and connotation? Whose order is shut inside the structure
of a sentence?” (Howe 1985a)(11). Howe’s questions can be read like Hartman’s
as “a kind of poetics . . . stand[ing] as counterweight to the structural binds” of,
in this case, that “patriarchal authority over literary history” and history more
generally, whose authorities contend that “the past is past” (Morgan 2016)(202);
(Howe 1985a)(11). I venture that Howe’s heavily aphoristic style has a similar
effect. Aphorisms may be read against the grain as word forms that time travel; as
language fossils (short, easy-to-remember, seemingly ahistorical sayings), they are
repeated texts used and reused in varying contexts. Howe, like Dickinson, may also
write in aphorisms as a form of trespass, as a serious satiric gesture through which
“SHE” assumes the authority of “HE” through “word rules.” She turns “rules” into
poems and throws them forth into the future.
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4.3 An Enthusiastic Practice
Howard writes, “Howe’s poetics – that is, her reading/writing against the grain of
history – ultimately celebrates a long-standing notion of praxis, one that under-
scores the artist’s social responsibility as activist and maker, reformer and visionary
dwelling in the midst of contradicting forces, ‘splitting nature’s window / split-
ting the world’ (Howard 2019)(65-6). In her collage poetics, Howe participates in
the artist’s tradition of crafting histories of the practical past that echo Hartman’s
work. As Gayatri Gopinath (2018) claims, this kind of aesthetic practice enacts “a
practice of reading” that rearranges “hierarchies of value” (Gopinath 2018)(9, 16).
Similarly, Howe’s historical poetic practice “reattunes” and suspends the reader in
the gaps and slippages of the archive.
Hartman’s historical narration of how young black women “dwell[ed] in Possibil-
ity” at the edge of an urban “frontier,” re-inventing concepts of beauty, freedom,
modernity, and subjectivity, resonates with Howe’s retelling of Dickinson’s feminine
literary experiment: “In this unsettling New England lexical landscape nothing is
sure. In a shorter space (woman’s quick voice) Dickinson went further than Brown-
ing, coding and erasing – deciphering the idea of herself . . . Really alone at a real
frontier, dwelling in Possibility was what she had brilliantly learned to do” (Howe
1985a)(76). In discussing Howe’s orientation toward words’ potentiality, Ma pro-
poses that, “Howe’s targeted monotheism . . . seems to be patriarchal language”
(Ma 1994)(725). M. NourbeSe Philip’s and Howe’s methods also resonate: “the
words suggesting how to work with them – I look at them and certain words leap
out at me, asking me to choose them . . . eyes skimming the text for phrases,
words, feelings, as one would cast one’s eyes over the sea looking for bodies” (Philip
2008)(195). If the library and the text is a wilderness for Howe, so is language: “Ex-
iles, they wander a wilderness of language formed from old legends, precursor po-
ems, archaic words, industrial and literary detritus” (Howe 1985a)(70). The strategy
through which she “summons” Dickinson (and all the voices and polyphonic sounds
that make up Dickinson’s writing) is an “elaborate weave of quotation” (Nicholls
1996)(589). On this collaged, intertextual “stage,” Howe shifts between pronouns
and uses wordplay to invoke Dickinson’s experiments. This entering of the writing
lives of her subjects, foregrounding various, variant senses, challenges linear read-
ings. In Howe’s poetry “marks” express feeling “physically” on the page when lines
cross and cut each other. “Vertically jagged” sections may represent violence in/of
history and its reiterations: “I would try to match that chaos and violence visually
with words” (Keller 1995)(8). In My Emily Dickinson “jaggedly” combined words,
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definitions, quotations, and fragments confuse beginnings and endings, chapters or
segments, temporalities and even subjects.
Howe names Dickinson an “enthusiastic” voice with her “force of desire which un-
settles the ‘wilderness’ of language” (Nicholls 1996)(591-92). Eschewing the role
of narrator, Howe directs her attention to marginal notes, both what is physically
found in the manuscripts (dashes, “accidents”, lists of word variants) and the “ex-
cess” of words and their combination. She speaks of the way words sound and echo,
and notes the reverberation even in a word’s “look”: “The look of a word is part of
its meaning – the meaning that escapes the dictionary definition, or rather doesn’t
escape but is bound up with it” (Keller 1995)(6-7). The concept of marginalia can
be tied to “enthusiasm” through the theme of “excess” – that which doesn’t fit (like
the counter-fact) and which urgently crosses boundaries.
Noah Webster, Howe tells us, defines an “enthusiast,” among other things, as “One of
elevated fancy or exalted ideals” (Howe 1993)(11). While Howe searches for ambigu-
ity in this definition, she remarks that “fancy is frequently feminized” and affiliated
with “the lower aggregating and associative power of the mind” (11). “‘Fancy’ is
an irredeemably feminine word for most Americans. In our democratic culture men
are not encouraged to display elevated fancy or exalted ideals. Webster says it
is contracted from fantasy. Fancy: false notion, caprice, whim” (12). For Howe,
“fancy” calls to mind collage, aggregation, association, and favoring “chance” over
logic. The religious antinomian is defined as an “enthusiast” with “flights of fancy,”
and is thus feminized. Howe appropriates “fancy” in similar ways to how Hartman
appropriates the term “wayward.” Like “wayward,” “fancy” denotes that which ex-
ceeds the limits. “The story exceeds the words, the verses” (Hartman 2019)(346).
Johnson wrote that during the 1860s, “[Dickinson’s] creative energies were at flood,
and she was being overwhelmed by forces which she could not control’” (cited in
(Howe 1993)149). Howe contends that what he refers to is “female excess” and a
lack of restraint, control, or conformity. Dickinson’s restraint, resistance, sacrifice,
and conviction are all written off as her fear or lack of composure. If her poems show
a lack of control, she is read as lacking this inner faculty. Higginson, Howe notes,
also described Dickinson as having “an excess of tension, and [leading] an abnormal
life” (145).
Counter to this, Howe recognizes in the failure to limit her “excess” Dickinson’s
enthusiastic practice of refusal of the boundaries that defined her “effusions” as such
(Howe 1993)(149, citing Johnson). According to DuPlessis, Howe replicates this
refusal in My Emily Dickinson by adopting the “excessive genre” of the “ode”:
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". . . which lifts things to limitlessness, whose main debate is between
overwhelming boundlessness . . . and some vulnerable boundary which
may compromise ultimates of song, of bliss, of void. In Howe one feels
the loft, the heft, the debate of the ode, the apostrophes of power, of self-
questioning. The persistent ground of ’alterity, anonymity, darkness.’ All
concepts coded feminine. As the ode, as genre, may be – the ode, as the
genre symbolizes poetry in its ecstasy, its poetic diction, its excessive,
overblown, portentious [sic], mellifluous scale. The ode’s appeal to the
sublime, its sense of boundaryless dissolutions, its febrile outcries are also
coded feminine: hysteria, emotionalism, exaggeration, the sense of an
ecstatic dance on the boundaries of the sensible." (DuPlessis 1990)(126)
This enthusiastic, excessive “boundlessness” may be read next to song, cry, and
“noise” with its constituent movement and desire. Sylvia Wynter in Black Meta-
morphosis writes, “Enthusiasm and exaltation are the uncolonized flow of desire
that expresses liberation from societal codings” (549, cited in (McKittrick 2016)90).
McKittrick (2016) adds, “Enthusiasm . . . radically refuses the dominant order: the
feeling of exaltation, emerging as a form of knowledge that is necessarily collabo-
rative praxes, cites and sites black joy and love” (90). Enthusiasm, then, can be
re-coded as the “black noise” of the swarm, “the mutters and oaths and cries of the
commodity” that hit at “utopian” “aspirations” (Hartman 2008)(12). Recall the
wildness of Wayward Lives’ “riot and refrain” (Hartman 2019)(263).
Hartman also, like Howe, “exceeds” the archive and its framing of “legitimate sub-
ject[s] of history and scholarly writing” (Haley 2020). When she writes, “The only
thing I knew for sure was that she did have a name and a life that exceeded the
frame in which she was captured,” Hartman “at once reveals the magnitude of the
unknown and reflects the consequential character of a certainty that grounds [her]
narration and analysis: the only thing I knew for sure" (Haley 2020) citing (Hartman
2019)(15). Similarly, Howe, writes DuPlessis, “is the female speck in the history of
texts. And she is the scout of its presence. The roaming vagrant one, the errancy . . .
thrown out, but thorough and pertinacious”: “Howe is driven to hear the condensed
and impacted operas of the Others, the ones about whom few orators speak, the ones
few encyclopedists commemorate, the ones massacred, the ones of smoke . . . Operas
of rage could be made. What genre is adequate to this discovery – that there are
holocausts of the destroyed? Should the page be black? How then is one ‘a writer’?”
(DuPlessis 1990)(127). Hartman asks an almost identical question in “Venus in Two
Acts”: “What are the kinds of stories to be told by those and about those who live
in such an intimate relationship with death? Romances? Tragedies? Shrieks that
find their way into speech and song? . . . How does one revisit the scene of subjec-
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tion without replicating the grammar of violence?” (Hartman 2008)(4). And more
recently, “What is required to tell a historical story for those who endure the long
durée of dispossession and the seemingly interminable and unalleviated condition
of fungibility? How does one emplot ongoing and recurring violence?” (Hartman
2020).
When Lynn Keller asks Howe what the canvas of her poetry would look like, Howe
responds, “Blank . . . a white canvas. White” (Keller 1995)(7). Does a desire for
“blank” or “white” reflect Howe’s desire for a space for the feminine? DuPlessis inter-
prets “blank” desire as the resonant, reticent acknowledgement of inevitable failure
or falling short of a “poetics of responsibility” – what constitutes the paradoxical
Possibility in the “blank” gap:
"To write: to be caught in hopeless joy between black and white, said
and unsaid, between the overwritten and underwritten, between desire
and obliteration. Divided in language, but speaking the language . . .
The ground can never be cleared of the prior. It saturates us – political
powers, social places, duties, infusions of norms, irruptions of protest.
Thus the sign is never empty . . . it is full, fused and jostling, an active
’stage for struggle’ (Bakhtin says, somewhere). Howe’s innovations on
the page, her sculptural sketches of signs, make a poetics of responsibility
to and in this multiple struggle." (DuPlessis 1990)(127-28)
Howe’s sense of responsibility is articulated in My Emily Dickinson: “How do I,
choosing messages from the code of others in order to participate in the universal
theme of Language, pull SHE from all the myriad symbols and sightings of HE”
(Howe 1985a)(17-18)? Like Hartman, she looks to others, the forebearers and an-
cestresses, for signs of the scaffolding. Marking her debt to Dickinson, Howe writes:
"She built a new poetic form from her fractured sense of being eternally
on intellectual borders, where confident masculine voices buzzed an allur-
ing and inaccessible discourse, backward through history into aboriginal
anagogy. Pulling pieces of geometry, geology, alchemy, philosophy, pol-
itics, biography, biology, mythology, and philology from alien territory,
a “sheltered” woman audaciously invented a new grammar grounded in
humility and hesitation." (Howe 1985a)(21)
116
5. CONCLUSION
Through their individual and spirited interrogations of history’s grammar and crit-
ical orientations toward the archive, I have proposed that Saidiya Hartman and
Susan Howe are not only interested in attending to what Patricia Williams (1988)
might call the “ignore-ance” of the archive but also in putting forth a method for
how scholars might approach historical research and writing that pays careful, af-
fective attention to a past haunting the present and unsettling the future (Williams
1988).
In Wayward Lives Hartman cites Campt’s (2017) method of “listening” to “quiet”
and “quotidian” identity photographs (produced for various state regulatory pur-
poses) as “practices that give us access to the affective registers through which these
images enunciate alternate accounts of their subjects” (Campt 2017)(5). Her close
readings of these photographs resist reduction to their instrumentality. Campt con-
siders the capacity of the “listener” to “attune [her] senses to other affective [and
lower] frequencies” (9). Hartman and Howe, I have attempted to show, do not nec-
essarily desire “better representations” of contested histories, but rather “hearing
the better story in [those] representations” (Georgis 2013)(18). Specifically, Hart-
man listens for the better story in archives of criminalization and captivity that
attempt to overwrite and obscure the social experimentation and everyday resis-
tance practiced by young black women. Howe listens for the better story in the
archives negligent of Dickinson’s and other feminine antinomians’ nonconformism
and innovation. To what end, though, is “listening” for the better story or desiring
to interpret the affective remainders? “And what do stories afford anyway?,” asks
Hartman (Hartman 2008)(3). “A way of living in the world in the aftermath of
catastrophe and devastation? A home in the world for the mutilated and violated
self? For whom – for us or for them?” (3).
In Christina Sharpe’s (2016) conception of “wake work,” she discusses the affective,
aesthetic labor that attends to living “in the wake” of slavery, violence, and dis-
possession (Sharpe 2016). Reading history otherwise through an affective register
is “wake work” necessary to build the ground from which we construct our better
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stories. Sharpe highlights examples of “wake work” that thwart repetitive and in-
evitable readings of black suffering by “seeing and reading otherwise . . . in excess
of what is caught in the frame” (117). Wake work for her includes aesthetic produc-
tions employing “Black visual/textual annotation and redaction,” which I discussed
in Chapter 2 (117). “Annotation,” Sharpe explains, is a method of carefully, coun-
terintuitively approaching images in order to ask, “What can one see beyond the
word that threatens to block out everything else?” (118). Acts of redaction focus
our attention by blocking out that which threatens to obscure, instrumentalize, and
further subject the individual or collective captured by the image or frame (118).
Marianne Hirsch (2012), who similarly investigates transgenerational trauma passed
down as “postmemory,” examines the possibilities of what Eve K. Sedgwick (2003)
terms “reparative” readings of artifacts that, especially in their imperfections and
incongruities, call forth “alternate discourse” and “opening[s] in the present to some-
thing in the past that goes beyond their indexicality or the information they record”
(Hirsch 2012)(245) citing (Sedgwick 2003). In contrast to what Sedgwick calls “para-
noid readings,” in which the researcher employs her knowledge as a “retrospective
witness” to see violence obscured in the artifact, a “reparative reading” leaves ques-
tions unanswered and “ambiguities unresolved, providing an expanded context for
more affective knowing” (Hirsch 2012)(247).
Dina Georgis wonders, “What if aesthetic experience offers not compensation for
suffering but a return (and reparation) of suffering?” (Georgis 2013)(13). Hartman
in Scenes of Subjection speaks of “the event of captivity and enslavement engen-
dering the necessity of redress, the inevitability of its failure, and the constancy
of repetition yielded by this failure” (Hartman 1997)(77). “Redress” in this sense
seems related to the “compulsive repetition of trauma” through which “futures be-
come implicated in the past” or the “compulsion” wherein the past interferes in the
present (Georgis 2013)(12). Redress, according to Hartman, is not compensation
but instead “itself an articulation of loss and a longing for remedy and reparation”
(77). This persistence and continuity of longing for reparation is also articulated by
Howe: “I write to break out into perfect primeval Consent. I wish I could tenderly
lift from the dark side of history, voices that are anonymous, slighted – inarticu-
late” (Howe 2015)(181). “Understood as the persistent remains of the past,” writes
Georgis, “affect is the past’s legacy on the present” (12).
“The implication of transference on history is paradoxical. It both resists knowledge
and allows us to have an experience with what we do not know. . . . The truth of
the story is not found in the literal content of representation, but between the
lines. In story, we enter the space of the other’s wounds and become ethically
implicated in an encounter with suffering” (Georgis 2013)(12). Affective, enigmatic
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encounters with painful histories can be “emotional occasion[s] for learning” and
ethical interpretations not premised on “knowing” (16). This learning would seem to
rearrange what Jacques Rancière (2009) calls the “sensory fabric” of what we know or
the ways in which we make “sense” of our stories (Rancière 2009). Reading “between
the lines” has the potential to affect the “dispositions of the body and the mind”
of readers or spectators by changing our gaze or the “landscape of the possible”
(Rancière 2009)(105). This learning is also emotional, dynamic, and relational: it “is
not about but from representation,” writes Georgis (Georgis 2013)(17). “Whereas
learning about an event or experience focuses upon the acquisition of qualities,
attributes, and facts, so that it presupposes a distance (or, one might even say, a
detachment) between the learner and what is to be learned, learning from an event
or experience is of a different order, that of insight” (Britzman 1998, 177, cited in
(Georgis 2013)17). “Learning, in this sense, is the crisis of not being able to hold on
to what you think you know and bearing it enough to make way for insight” (17).
Campt’s (2019) recent theorizing on “adjacency” resonates with this form of ethical
learning across distance or “insight” through affect. She defines “adjacency” as
“the reparative work of transforming proximity into accountability; the labor of
positioning oneself in relation to another in ways that revalue and redress complex
histories of dispossession” (Campt 2019). A “quiet yet arduous labor,” adjacency
is positioning oneself in “proximity and vulnerability” to another and “requires us
to feel beyond the security of our own situation, to cultivate instead an ability to
confront the precarity of less valued or actively devalued individuals, and doing the
ongoing work of sustaining a relationship to those imperiled and precarious bodies”
(Campt 2019). Adjacency is not empathy, Campt explains, because it does not
allow one to “put oneself in the place of another” or “presume you share the pain or
suffering” of another; rather, it is “recognizing the disparity between your respective
situations and working to redress it”: “It is the work of feeling done both in spite
and because of these differences, and choosing to feel across that difference rather
than with or for someone in very different circumstances” (Campt 2019). Jean-
Luc Nancy (2000) describes “compassion” similarly, “not as . . . a pity [but] the
contagion, the contact of being with one another in the turmoil . . . not altruism, nor
is it identification; it is the disturbance of violent relatedness” (Nancy 2000)(xiii).
I read Campt’s adjacency as an expansion on the quiet practice of “listening” to
images or to “a silence that is not silent” (Reed 2014)(47). This listening is also
labor in the sense that we must “quiet” ourselves in order to hear across difference,
and not “talk over” or write our desires onto another’s (Campt 2019). Listening in
this sense assumes the humility of not knowing what one will hear if one is able to
listen and hear the other. Howe writes, “If history is a record of survivors, Poetry
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shelters other voices”; of Dickinson, she says, “I write quietly to her. She is a figure
of other as thin as paper” (Howe 1993)(47).
The “ethical imperative,” writes Georgis is “to see fiction even in facts and perhaps
facts in fiction” (Georgis 2013)(9). It is to see feelings as “relevant” – which the
“facts” devoid of fiction tend to leave out (9). I have attempted to illustrate the
ways in which Hartman and Howe fabulate “potential histories” of an unending
past affectively felt. Their stories embody “multiple stories,” none of which “are
arbitrary nor without meaning and significance” (Georgis 2013)(7). But to what
end are Hartman’s and Howe’s fabulations?
Nyong’o (2018) considers how moments of fabulation, which are ephemeral and
unexpected, “live on through performative and narrative strategies and tactics”;
indeed, the politic behind fabulation and re-enactment is to maintain and renew
the “feminist and queer repository,” or counter-archive, of “stratagems for aesthetic
oppositionality” (Nyong’o 2018)(6). “A corrective response to the limits of history,
poetry becomes the rewriting of ‘its material . . . the raw materials of a society, a col-
lective of practices [and] avowals [and] disavowals, governed by discourse’ (Andrews
29)” (Ma 1994)(719-20).
"A Vengeance must be
a story
Trial and suffering
of Mercy
Any narrative question
away in the annals
the old army
Enlightened rationalism" (Howe 1990)(64)
We may perhaps figure fabulation similarly to how Hartman defines “beauty” in
Wayward Lives, as “not a luxury [but rather] a way of creating possibility in the
space of enclosure, a radical art of subsistence, an embrace of our terribleness, a
transfiguration of the given” (Hartman 2019)(33). Beyond a disruptive or “correc-
tive” operation to the archive, fabulation is utilized in order to revitalize the “wild
ideas” and tactics through which the status quo has and continues to be challenged.
Hartman’s fabulation in Wayward Lives is part of her larger project to narratively
challenge the “progressive teleology of bondage to freedom” and map the afterlives
of slavery post-emancipation. She writes, for example, how the “ghetto” was system-
atically homogenized and that “segregation was not natural selection”; she writes
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of the beauty of the slum. She credits young black women with shaping radical
thought and social revolution through practices of refusal and imagining otherwise
on the stage, in the street, the tenement, kitchenette, and hallway, and maybe above
all in the bedroom. She writes the stories of how young black queer women and men
(and those who refused to be either) defied heteronormative kinship arrangements
and rejected moralistic narratives, refusing “involuntary servitude” in and outside
the home. She writes that the “wild idea” or fabulated, incompossible “fiction” that
animates her book is that young black women were (uncredited) radical thinkers,
and through doing so she radically redefines radical thinking. She reads history-as-
written “against the grain,” “disturbing and breaking open the stories [the docu-
ments] told in order to narrate my own” (Hartman 2019)(34). She tells a “better
story.” Georgis proposes that “choosing between fact and fiction [may] lead . . . us
away from hearing the better story” (Georgis 2013)(7). The “repository” of better
stories and stratagems is for the purpose of learning how to sustain the refusal to
reiterate violent historical silencing, marginalization, and dispossession. Fabulation
is a practice of unlearning and re-learning, and a repetitive refusal of a history that
repeats itself.
The “wild idea” animating My Emily Dickinson is that Dickinson was engaged in
a practice of refusal concomitant with a history of feminine, antinomian noncon-
formism via “the Word.” Howe speculates that Dickinson found an “outside” in her
segregation from society through her private enclosure within which she partici-
pated in a literary community through reading and correspondence. Howe refuses
the terms of the popular question: Was Dickinson a “spider artist” or a “madwoman
in the attic” writing “poetry as embroidery?” (Howe 1985a)(14-17, citing Gilbert and
Gubar 1979). Howe refuses normative readings of madness like she refuses to gender
the poet. She proposes the intelligence of a “woman-poet” and claims the authority
of a poet to interpret poetry, and yet next to this she refuses to participate in the
activity of reading “coherency” into Dickinson’s experiment. She suggests that just
as history cannot be reduced to a coherent string of logical events and unambiguous
individuals, literature cannot be translated without harming it. She situates herself
in the “line break,” leaving room in her writing for the reader to imagine with her
some radical incoherencies.
If both works can be considered fabulated “potential histories,” then how are their
“better stories” told? Despite fundamental differences between their archives, the
conditions for their subjects’ “subjecthoods,” and the stakes of their poetic refusals,
I have argued for a resonance not only in the contours of Hartman’s and Howe’s
methods, but also between how they position their subjects. Through an ethics
of adjacency and politics of recontextualization, both writers envision a poly or
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multi-subject, unconfined by normative bounds of the subject or linear temporality.
As discussed, Hartman’s narrative method in Wayward Lives of weaving in others’
utterances and writing in relation to the paratexts framing the work, conjures a
communal, phenomenal space unbound to a past, present, or future. Sarah Haley
calls the “chorus” a “theory of time” (Haley 2020). Within this space, Hartman puts
the narrator, her “characters,” and others (e.g. Du Bois, Spillers, Morrison, Lorde,
and Campt) into affective relation – into an intertextual “chorus” arranged by the
text. As stories echo across texts, boundaries between fact and fiction blur. The
“chorus” invites the reader in too, to enter and exceed the archive with Hartman.
Howe, on the other hand, recontextualizes “utterances” from Emily Dickinson and
all those around not only Dickinson’s work but Howe’s as well. For example, she
weaves in the voices and stories of feminine antinomian Anne Hutchinson and captive
narrator Mary Rowlandson, women she figures as related to Dickinson’s spiritual
nonconformist lineage. In addition, the words of literary innovators Emily Brontë
and Gertrude Stein contribute to the textual chorus.
In structuring the narration of their texts in this way, both writers enact a “per-
formed fabulation” through a textual rendition of artist Wu Tsang’s practice of
“full body quotation,” a technique in which performers “re-speak” voices from dia-
logue fed to them through in-ear audio. Though in the context of live performance,
this method of troubling or de-essentializing “the relationship between voice and
speaker” resonates with Hartman’s “close narration” and Howe’s “historical figu-
ration” wherein the utterances of a multitude are recontextualized and re-appear
through a “performative ethic of citation” (Nyong’o 2018)(8-10). As Nyong’o ex-
plains, this practice is a way of “locating new aims for past goals” (8). Not only are
fabulated (and fabulous) resources and stratagems located in the historical record
that threatens to obliterate them, but they are recontextualized relationally in the
service of rendering a “tenseless time” (10), or what Hartman calls the “present-past”
(Hartman 2019)(6). This is done toward recovering experiments and revitalizing a
“radical imagination” (xiii).
The fabulist, according to Deleuze, wishes to call out to “the people who are miss-
ing,” and has “a profound desire, a tendency to project – into things, into reality,
into the future, even into the sky – an image of himself and others so intense it has a
life of its own” (cited in (Nyong’o 2018)17). Fabulation stems from an aspiration of
sociality and a collectivist imaginative vision of adjacency that can map “a road out
of here” (Nyong’o 2018)(18 [footnote 47]). Nyong’o writes, “The desire of the fabu-
list, Deleuze insists, is directed toward a life that is not singular or individual, but
a life lived in the singular plural” (18), citing (Nancy 2000). Considering only the
books’ titles, Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments: Intimate Histories of Social
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Upheaval would seem to narrate social histories for and about the collective while
My Emily Dickinson promises to be one writer’s personal relation to a poet actually
famous for her remove from society. I have shown that what both books narrate
turns out to be vastly more complicated: we see how Hartman focuses her attention
on narrating the intimate experiences of individuals despite the fact they must of-
ten stand in for the multitude due to archival absences. Howe places Dickinson not
only in a cross-temporal literary community via her reading and correspondence but
also in “ghostly” or affective communion with poets (i.e. innovators, antinomians,
enthusiasts) of the past and future. Howe adds that it is through Dickinson’s (albeit
privileged) social “remove” that she is able to fabulate a connection to this chorus.
“The better story as the principle of creation and surviving difficult experience
is also the principle of how people collectively share a story to survive better,”
writes Georgis (Georgis 2013)(13). Subjects in both texts are situated in long his-
tory of nonconformism, within a tradition of resistance and refusal of the terms by
which subjecthood, representation, and intelligibility have been written and nar-
rated. Hartman writes a “serial biography” of the wayward toward articulating
forms of fashioning an “outside” within constraint (Hartman 2019)(31), as Howe
conducts “a skillful and ironic investigation of patriarchal authority over literary
history,” for her a necessary intervention in a slew of biographies that continue to
discount not only Dickinson’s experiment, but historical, feminine experimentation
in general (Ma 1994)(735). Howe contends, “Words are slippery”:
"Questions of audience, signature, self and other will be answered later
by historians, genealogists, graphologists, handwriting experts, who need
to produce a certain rationalism for this unstable I-witnessing, uncover-
ing relation. Can all the professional intermediaries ever since reimagine
this finite-infinite commingling communion? Trammels of identity. Rev-
elation approaches as a mystery." (Howe 1993)(66)
Howe’s and Hartman’s resonant projects have reimagined new narratives of resis-
tance and ethical testimony that loosen our definitions, transform the terms of sur-
vival, expose the limits of our dispositions, and add to the enigmatic an-archive of
“a femininity messily imagined” (Georgis 2013)(23).
This thesis is predicated on the risk of comparing these two works, that could even
perhaps be called “incompossible” histories. I have read these texts for the ways
in which their incompatibilities open onto their resonant affects and their authors’
adjacent desires to hear better stories. Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments and
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My Emily Dickinson as aesthetic practices express a commitment to refuse the terms
through which subjecthood has previously been inscribed as an (im)possibility. At
the same time, both writers experiment with what literature does and can do toward
describing other (incom)possibilities. “I hope my sense of limit is never fixed,” writes
Howe. “A poet is a foreigner in her own language. I don’t want to stay inside”
(Beckett 1989)(27). “Literature,” writes Hartman, “was better able to grapple with
the role of chance in human action and to illuminate the possibility and promise of
the errant path” (Hartman 2019)(93). Central to hope is preservation of the enigma,
the ambiguity Georgis proposes may be the “ethical imperative” (Georgis 2013)(9).
Hartman attests, “I can’t think hope without hesitancy” (Hartman, Campt, and
Weheliye 2018). I propose that Saidiya Hartman and Susan Howe, by refusing
teleological readings and writing hesitantly and uncertainly against affect-less logics,
make a space in which we may expand our “sensible dispositions,” our capacity to
learn and listen, and our ability to be ethical witnesses to the way “stable” stories
and, more importantly, our desire for them give way.
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6. AFTERWORD: AN “INCOMPOSSIBLE” COMPARISON
When I encountered Saidiya Hartman’s writing (first through Lose Your Mother,
followed by Wayward Lives), it triggered a revisit to Susan Howe’s My Emily Dick-
inson. Mainly, at first, Hartman’s narrative reflexivity felt to me akin to Howe’s.
Though to another it might have made more sense to compare Wayward Lives to one
of Howe’s texts more overtly focused on an anonymous figure, through the course
of my research I have found that the many of the underlying themes in Howe’s later
work are first developed in My Emily Dickinson; namely, I find that her concern for
the voice of uncertainty and the spirit of a “feminine” nonconformism started with
her personal study of Dickinson. My hope is that this thesis preserves the integrity
of my initial encounter with these authors in relation to each other because my
study has been driven by the “serendipitous” feeling of resonance I sense between
them and the ways in which I feel each haunts the other’s work. Avery Gordon
suggests that “we will need to invent other forms of curiosity to engage those haunt-
ing moments” (Gordon 1997)(41). I have attempted to follow the threads of my
curiosity between Hartman’s and Howe’s “chance” encounters and how their “texts
allow travel through time” (Creasy 2015).
In this thesis I have tried to focus on a study of both writers’ research and com-
positional methods. I have traced how both writers entered the wilderness of their
archives to write potential histories through an affective register. In many ways, I
have set out to prioritize connections over disjunctions, aiming to build bridges be-
tween their methods, but a longer study might also have considered the digital turn
in archival research. Admittedly, there is much more to be said about how these writ-
ers confront or engage with the physicality or virtuality of their archives. A wider
discussion of these writers might also have included other voices from the “chorus.”
By limiting my focus to Hartman’s and Howe’s modes of research and writing, I
hope, however, to have presented a more comprehensive analysis of their particu-
lar texts. In putting these writers specifically into conversation with each other, I
have also sought to perform my own literary interdisciplinarity in the spirit of their
affiliative works crossing genres, disciplines, and traditions, as well as decades.
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Why argue though for the resonance between Saidiya Hartman’s and Susan Howe’s
projects specifically? Why propose that these writers could be in adjacent “cho-
ruses”? This project has been inspired in part by Gayatri Gopinath’s (2018) “colli-
sions” between seemingly incommensurate aesthetic texts (Gopinath 2018). Though
Gopinath discusses the political, ethical importance of a theory of potentiality in
similar ways to Ariella Azoulay (2013), Gopinath more closely examines how and
why very different texts resonate. As “curator” she positions divergent aesthetic
“texts” or “practices” across modes and genres in order to analyze the unexpected
ways in which bodies, histories, geographies, temporalities, or styles meet in affective
affiliation. In doing so, she aims to show how divergent aesthetic practices may ex-
cavate submerged histories through a shared or resonant “queer optic, which allows
us to apprehend bodies, desires, and affiliations rendered lost or unthinkable within
normative history” (Gopinath 2018)(8). The “queer optic,” she writes, “brings into
focus and into the realm of the present the energy of those nonnormative desires,
practices, bodies, and affiliations concealed within dominant historical narratives”
(8).
Gopinath pays particular attention to aesthetic practices that aim to transform
archives through nonnormative readings and excavations of “small acts and every-
day gestures” (8). She writes that the value of minor histories “lies in their ability
to demand that we look beyond the main event and instead become attuned to
submerged and forgotten modes of longing, desire, affiliation, and embodiment that
may in fact allow us to envision an alternative present and future” (8). This en-
actment of a “queer mode of critique” demands “a retraining of our vision and a
reattunement of our senses” (8). Similarly, I have argued that Wayward Lives and
My Emily Dickinson have the capacity to rearrange readers’ sensibilities by pressing
us to perceive affectively “the promiscuous intimacies of multiple times and places”
(18). According to Gopinath, this is the path by which the aesthetic may “perform
new histories” (Gopinath 2018)(18). By bringing “glimpses of past desires, longings,
and articulations of alternative social and political worlds” into our present realm,
we may consider how the past resonates today (18). As our reality of our present
shifts, so too the horizon may be perceived differently.
The aesthetic, she writes, may enact “a practice of reading” across disciplinary,
academic boundaries, temporalities, and geographies that produces new readings of
archives “through the minor, and for their gaps, slippages, and erasures” (16). These
readings perform a rearrangement of “hierarchies of value” in their close attention
“to the regional, the everyday, the personal, and the discarded” (9). In this way,
aesthetic practices can be “modes of emplacement” that situate the reader into
past narratives, disoriented and reoriented, “in a state of productive suspension”
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(16). “Being suspended,” she writes, “need not be the same as being trapped or in
perpetual stasis; rather, it may be a temporary temporal and spatial respite. . . .
Suspension as both a spatial and temporal category . . . may allow for a momentary
vantage point from which to envision an alternative to the here and now” (17). Thus,
Gopinath says, aesthetic practices have the potential to “do things in the world”;
“the aesthetic enacts, produces, and performs . . . affinities and affiliations rather
than simply rendering (new forms of relationality) apparent” (Gopinath 2018)(16).
These occasions for rupture are enacted through Gopinath’s “queer curation”; she
considers aesthetic practices “that may seem discontinuous or unrelated” because
her goal is “to reveal not coevalness or sameness but rather the co-implication and
radical relationality” (Gopinath 2018)(4). Though I initially considered Hartman’s
Wayward Lives next to Howe’s My Emily Dickinson due to a vague sense of their
resonance, I chose to stage this in-depth encounter between them because of their
apparent incommensurability. It is in this “gap” that I argue it is perhaps most
valuable to examine their affiliation and relationality despite their differences, tak-
ing seriously “the ways in which the aesthetic is bound up with ethical and political
questions” particularly through questions of “ethical” representation (Matthews and
McWhirter 2003)(xx). The gap I read between Hartman’s and Howe’s texts expose
to me an imposed silence, a silence in large part shaped by genre differentiation and
disciplinary “non-affiliation” which is assumed to reflect their political or ethical in-
compatibility. What can be heard within that silence? Is it, in fact, silence? Despite
my argument for the usefulness of connecting these works, I have tried to illustrate
also how moments of resonance may mark more precisely the nuanced, structural
differences between their practices as well. In these chapters I have attempted to il-
lustrate Hartman’s and Howe’s methods for constructing potential histories through
multi-genre writing that is historical poetics meets biography meets feminist literary
criticism. My aim has been to try to enter an interdisciplinary, relational space in
which to discuss how these works resonate despite their differences.
In doing so, I have tried to bear in mind Gopinath’s warning of the risks. She writes
that to give attention to how “incommensurate texts” resonate across time and space
risks flattening their specificities (Gopinath 2018)(30). I have previously pointed to
the fact that Hartman and Howe often share a common archive (Yale’s Beinecke
Rare Book and Manuscript Library). I make this observation not in order to deem-
phasize the differences between their subjects of research. Rather, I have asked,
What does the simple fact of a common archive imply for comparing their incom-
mensurate projects? Next to the comparative wealth of the archive of Dickinson’s
own writing, I have discussed how the lives Hartman seeks to find are more often
than not “undiscoverable.” Hartman’s subjects “enter history” through an archive
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that conscribes their lives through anonymity, criminality, captivity, fungibility, and
death; they live in the wake of slavery and the plantation and in the “weather”
of antiblackness which relentlessly attempts to foreclose Black life, histories, and
futurities (Sharpe 2016).
Adjacent to these differences, I have tried to compare the ways in which Howe
and Hartman both try to “unsettle what’s settled” and to examine the questions
that drive their creative scholarship. I mark a resonance between the ways they
attempt to articulate an “incomplete” past counter to “settler narratives” (Hartman
and Wilderson 2003), and the ways in which they write toward redressing a North
American psychic inheritance of injury.
"There is real suffering on this little planet. I mean we can dis-
cuss whether the Hittites believed in chronology and history before
Herodotus, and in Bensonhurst, Brooklyn, this month, a young African-
American man was murdered by a gang of Italian-American teengers.
Where did the poison of racial hatred in America begin? Will it ever
end? Why are we such a violent nation? Why do we have such contempt
for powerlessness? I feel compelled in my work to go back, not to the
Hittites but to the invasion or settling, or whatever current practice calls
it, of this place. I am trying to understand what went wrong when the
first Europeans stepped on shore here." (Howe 1993)(164)
Both Hartman and Howe, I have tried to show, seem “aware of the difficulties and
traps of identification” and insist on “the impossibility of . . . accessing the past
through . . . conventional historiography” (Gopinath 2018)(128). Hartman’s and
Howe’s books also share an “attention to the limits and possibilities of the visual”
(12), and, I would add, the “intelligible.” While they both stage critical confronta-
tions with the archive, they also write of being haunted within them, communicating
an interest in foregrounding other sensory possibilities for reading memory and his-
tory’s narratives. “They gesture to realms outside and beyond [the visual field],
suggesting instead the sensorial and the affective as alternative modes and conduits
for apprehending the intertwined nature of seemingly discrete historical formations.
They allow us not only to see, but also to sense, the proximity of these histories and
their contemporary instantiations” (12). I have attempted to address and examine
the resonant proximity of the “new histories” performed by these projects, and the
stakes of these archival re-readings toward the work of sketching “new histories” but
also real horizons.
I wish to propose that for these two writers the “real” is not divorced from dreams,
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“fiction,” or the “untrue.” Howe says,
"I think there is a truth, even if it’s not fashionable to say so anymore
... I believe there are stories that need to be told again differently. I
believe with Walter Benjamin that the story is in danger of being lost
the minute someone opens one’s mouth to speak; but you’ve got to open
your mouth to speak, and there is a story, and it’s probably going to
be lost anyway, but whatever that story is, whether you call it fact or
fiction, or an original version, it’s something real." (Keller 1995)(30-31,
emphasis mine)
Hartman similarly writes of the “realness” of a wayward girl’s dream, of the “beauti-
ful places she would never visit [...] lives she would never inhabit [which] all seemed
more real to her than the three-room flat” (Hartman 2019)(137):
"Most days, the assault of the city eclipses its promise: When the water
in the building has stopped running, when even in her best dress she
cannot help but wonder if she smells like the outhouse or if it is obvious
that her bloomers are tattered, when she is so hungry that the aroma of
bean soup wafting from the settlement kitchen makes her mouth water,
she takes to the streets, as if in search of the real city and not this poor
imitation." (Hartman 2019)(10, emphasis mine)
As Hartman tells Patricia Saunders, her projects are about discussing “home” as
“making” rather than inheritance (Saunders 2008b)(13). The errant girls leave the
south due to the lack of livable options only to meet another space of enclosure in
the north and fewer options. Yet they persistently imagine the promise of thriving.
"[A]ll spaces of ’home’ and dwelling are shot through with contradictions
and fissures . . . there is no going back, no return to an unsullied past,
no secure space of safety. In light of this knowledge, these aesthetic
practices reveal how those who were subjected to the violent legacies
of colonial modernity contest this violence by finding imaginative and
pleasurable ways to dwell in the wake of forced containment and forced
mobility. They thus act as a resonant, alternative archive that records
everyday forms of dwelling in the context of containment, displacement,
and dispossession. . . " (Gopinath 2018)(15-16)
I propose that Howe similarly emphasizes Dickinson’s attempts to create an “out-
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side” through a “wild interiority” and make a space of belonging within her religion
of poetry (Beckett 1989)(6). Counterintuitively, she reads the poet’s “self-imposed
exile, indoors” as a means of self-ownership and freedom from representation, an
attempt to escape the confines of her culture, family, class, and gender (Howe
1985a)(13). Dickinson the poet as imagined by Howe, adjacent to the wayward
in Hartman’s stories, resists the “imposition of a certain regime of the subject” and
dwells in a home of her making (Hartman and Moten 2016).
With this discussion of their relationality, I again do not lose sight of the differences.
Howe’s writing mirrors Dickinson’s in going to the limits of intelligibility that is in
many ways counter to how Hartman aims to make intelligible the “impossible” or
“unthought” and add nuance to the archive’s “shorthand.” Toward rearranging the
disposition of the reader, I wonder, can we glean something from Howe’s deconstruc-
tion of language and experiments merging prose and poetry that may be utilized to
“better” read or be better readers of Wayward Lives? How might My Emily Dick-
inson be read through an optic oriented to the “sensory experience,” imagine more
descriptively, for example, the poet’s “outlaw passions,” or place her lawlessness
within a re-edited chronicle of poetic anarchy (Hartman 2019)(xiii-xiv)?
Hartman’s and Howe’s narratives, I argue, “bear witness to the end of a traditional
way of life,” embracing a “radical hope” which is “basically the hope for revival:
for coming back to life in a form that is not yet intelligible” (Lear 2006)(95). The
dream is the “incessant turning over of the ground beneath our feet that is the
indispensable preparation for the radical overturning of the ground that we are un-
der” (Moten 2013)(779); it is to “meet settlement with unsettlement” (Hartman and
Moten 2016). Hartman writes that her “fugitive text ... is not a plea for recognition,
but a plan for abolition” (Hartman 2020); Howe considers Dickinson’s manuscripts
to be “Drawings in motion. Blueprints in motion. Plans for the future” (Howe
2015)(126). Both writers share a commitment to the realness of the “dream,” to the
articulation of “true things in fictions, and of fictions in true things,” and to creating
“a thought of the outside while in the inside” (Duncan 1968, 54, cited in (Heim 2015)
94); (Hartman and Moten 2016). Robert Duncan writes, “the poetic imagination
faces the challenge of finding a structure that will be the complex story of all the
stories felt to be true, a myth in which something like the variety of man’s experi-
ence of what is real may be contained” (6, cited in (Heim 2015) 28). Hartman’s and
Howe’s refusal of violent epistemes articulates the hope of “radical unsettlement”:
“the content that is approached is approach, itself” (Moten 2013)(750). Through
methods of ambivalence, they privilege the question that “cannot be answered but
can only be unasked” (756).
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